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In 1943 Jean Améry was arrested in Belgium for his participa-
tion in the Resistance Movement during the German occupation 
of the country. In an effort to extract information from Améry 
(he had none), the Gestapo tortured for him several days then 
deported him to the Auschwitz death camp.1 Twenty-four years 
later, spurred by the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt, Améry began to 
write about his torture in the Nazi prison camp established at the 
Belgian Fort Breendonk and in Auschwitz. Apropos of the first 
essay he composed, on the topic of the intellectual in the con-
centration camps, Améry stated, “[O]nce a gloomy spell appeared 
to be broken by the writing of the essay on Auschwitz, suddenly 
everything demanded telling,” and “everything” demanded to be 
told in the first person: “Soon the method also asserted itself. If 
in the first lines . . . I had still believed that I could remain cir-
cumspect and distant . . . I now saw that this was simply impos-
sible. Where the word ‘I’ was to have been avoided completely, it 
 1. In Auschwitz, Améry worked as a clerk in the I.G. Farben factory. As the So-
viets approached, he was evacuated, first to Buchenwald and then to Bergen-Belsen. 
After liberation, he worked as a journalist and eventually began writing works of phi-
losophy and literature. In 1976 he published an exploration of suicide, and two years 
later, he took his own life by overdosing on sleeping pills. “Jean Améry (Hans Maier) 
(1912–1978),” Wollheim Memorial, http://www.wollheim-memorial.de/en/jean_amry_
hans_maier_19121978. 
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proved to be the single useful starting point.”2 Améry’s reflections express 
the sense of catalyzing release that writing instigated. Now in command 
of a language in which to tell “everything” in the first person, Améry 
newly experienced himself as the subject of his own history.
 A parallel sense of empowerment, figured as the provisional disso-
lution of a blockage, emerges in French Resistance member Robert 
Antelme’s account of his early efforts to bear witness to his concen-
tration camp imprisonment. After his arrest in Paris on July 1, 1944, 
Antelme was deported, first to Buchenwald then to Gandersheim. After 
the end of the war, François Mitterand discovered him, barely alive, in 
the Dachau concentration camp. Reflecting on the condition of survi-
vors during their first days of freedom, Antelme recalls the internal obsta-
cles they faced. Seized by a “frantic desire to describe” their experience, 
Antelme writes that “No sooner would we begin to tell our story than 
we would be choking over it.”3 Words literally became stuck in Antelme’s 
throat because, according to Antelme’s wife, Marguerite Duras, though 
the war had ended, Antelme effectively remained a prisoner to his body’s 
demands. In her journal Duras expressed her sense that those demands 
were monopolizing Antelme’s identity:
He has gone and hunger has taken his place. Emptiness has taken his 
place. He is giving to the void, filling what was emptied: those wasted 
bowels.
 . . . For two weeks, three, I watched him eat with unremitting plea-
sure . . . Sometimes his pleasure made me weep too. He didn’t see me. 
He’d forgotten me.4
As Antelme’s recovery proceeded through different stages, his recog-
nizable self returned. The process of healing included bouts of isolating 
aggression. Duras writes,
I can see it now, a thick stick, made of some dark wood. Sometimes it’s as 
if he’d like to lash out with it, hit walls, furniture, doors—not people, no, 
but all the things he meets. . . . 
 2. Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Re-
alities, trans. Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1980), xiii.
 3. Robert Antelme, The Human Race, trans. Jeffrey Haight and Annie Mahler (Evanston: 
Marlboro Press, 1992), 3.
 4. Marguerite Duras, The War: A Memoir, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1986), 61–62.
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 It’s as if he’d like to lash out, as if he’s blinded by a rage through 
which he has to pass before he can live again.5
Duras’s formulation of Antelme’s rage as something he had to pass through 
during this period “before” living suggests that rage subsumed his being 
(as his body initially had). She describes how, in this state, Antelme once 
exploded in a café: “I see him now, shouting, banging on the ground 
with his stick. I’m afraid he’s going to smash the windows. The waiters 
look at him in consternation, almost in tears, speechless. And then I see 
him sit down, and sit there for a long while in silence.”6
 Two years after his rescue from Buchenwald, Antelme wrote The 
Human Race, an account of his concentration camp imprisonment. He 
dedicated the book to his twenty-four-year-old sister, Marie-Louise, who 
had died of consumption on the very day of the armistice, while she 
was being flown from Ravensbrück to Copenhagen. Duras relates, “Once 
the book was written, finished, published, he never spoke of the Ger-
man concentration camps again. Never uttered the words again. Never 
again. Nor the title of the book,” and about Marie-Louise, Duras notes, 
Antelme “never mentions her, never utters her name.”7 Reminiscent of 
the silent coda of rage that filled the café, Antelme’s posttestimony silence 
can similarly be understood as freighted with rage, thereby attesting to 
Duras’s perception “It’s in that silence that the war’s still there.”8
 As a child, psychiatrist Robert Krell evaded capture by the Nazis in 
The Hague by going into hiding. At one point during an interview for a 
documentation project, Krell’s interviewer asked him to describe what he 
was feeling; Krell could not respond. He recalls, “I tried to tell her of my 
rage, then became mute. I was unable to speak. My silence seemed end-
less. Words would not form. My mind felt trapped. It was a brush with 
the darkness within me, a hint of what lies there.”9 The futility of Krell’s 
attempt to communicate his rage points to the strong inhibition dog-
ging even survivors disposed toward self-disclosure. While Améry did not 
 5. Ibid., 64.
 6. Ibid., 64–65.
 7. Ibid., 65.
 8. Ibid., 67. For an original study of testimonial literature as the site of “historical energies 
that have yet to be metabolized,” see Michael G. Levine, The Belated Witness: Literature, Testimony, 
and the Question of Holocaust Survival (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 2. See also 
my review of Levine’s book in Modern Language Notes 123, no. 5 (2008): 1191–94.
 9. Robert Krell, “Psychological Reverberations of the Holocaust in the Lives of Child 
Survivors,” Monna and Otto Weinmann Lecture Series (Washington, DC: United States Holo-
caust Memorial Council, Third Printing, 2002), 10, http://www.ushmm.org/research/center/
publications/occasional/1997-01/paper.pdf.
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name a specific emotion as responsible for his twenty-four-year gloom, 
his description of torture’s legacy as “resentments [that . . . ] have scarcely 
a chance to concentrate into a seething, purifying thirst for revenge” 
suggests the presence of a similar inhibition which, in Améry’s case, fore-
closed action and instead produced “resentments.”10
 In a paper he delivered on the difficulties besetting concentration 
camp survivors forty-five years after liberation, psychoanalyst Henry 
Krystal notes, “[A]mong the aftereffects of the Holocaust that made 
psychotherapy very difficult for the survivors was . . . the problems 
of continuing aggression of an intensity that could not be handled in 
psychotherapy.”11 This very intensity may account for why, according to 
Krell, “[R]age seldom is expressed for it is seldom asked about. Who can 
deal with it?” Antelme’s experience indicates yet another reason the sur-
vivor’s rage is avoided: a response whose possible outlet and object is the 
immediate environment, rage has the potential to implicate the pres-
ent community in the survivor’s suffering, thereby posing a challenge 
to the community’s supportive capacities and intentions. In this context 
one might also consider how theoretical discussions of trauma that focus 
strictly on past events and circumstances may serve to forestall consid-
eration of rage, which requires thinking about the survivor’s relation to 
the present world. Here one could cite as representative statements such 
as Cathy Caruth’s, that the “singular possession by the past . . . has become 
a central characteristic of the survivor experience of our time.”12 Dori 
Laub’s discussion of the exigency of testimony similarly foregrounds the 
past, referring to the survivor’s need to bear witness, “unimpeded by 
ghosts from the past against which one has to protect oneself.”13
 Sociologist and psychoanalyst Jeffrey Prager, writing on trauma, opens 
up possibilities for thinking about the survivor’s rage in terms of his or 
her relation to the present social environment. Prager distinguishes his 
work from that of theorists who place exclusive emphasis on the past as 
the locus of the victim’s trauma, noting,
While a prior, overwhelming experience or horrific event—a moment 
described as inflicting upon the sufferer a wound (Van der Kolk, et al.)—is 
a defining condition for trauma, even that depends on its post-hoc remem-
bering. Nonetheless, contemporary trauma research and theory tend not 
 10. Améry, At the Mind’s Limits, 40.
 11. Henry Krystal, “Trauma and Aging: A Thirty-Year Follow-Up,” in Trauma: Explorations 
in Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 77.
 12. Cathy Caruth, in Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 151.
 13. Dori Laub, “Truth and Testimony,” in Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 63. 
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to emphasize trauma’s negotiated relation between subsequent re-visits 
and prior experience, but give primacy to the events or experiences of 
the past, seeing them as driving all subsequent effects.14
Prager calls attention to the ways in which both past experience and the 
present social world are implicated in the survivor’s traumatic suffering:
Psychological trauma is characterized, on the one hand, by the mem-
ory of a person or people who profoundly exploit the victim’s vulner-
ability and, on the other, by the memory of those who disappoint by 
failing to offer necessary protections, who fail to defend against suffer-
ing. . . . trauma indicts in memory the victim’s intimate community—principally 
mother, father or other caregivers—who, at the time of such overwhelm-
ing experience, is felt to have failed to protect the victim (italics added).15
To address the relationship between the present social world and the sur-
vivor’s traumatized state, Prager recurs to D. W. Winnicott’s writings on 
the early life-sustaining fantasies of the self:
Trauma shatters a fantasy of omnipotence: the destruction of the victim’s 
sense that because of the perfection of the world, all is possible and any-
thing can be achieved. Omnipotence depends on the environment that 
encourages the person to believe in his dependence on a benign world-
in-place to provide for his or her needs. It is a seamless world that, as 
Winnicott (1971, 12) puts it, never asks “did you conceive of this or was 
it presented to you from without?” In place of posing the question, the 
environment sustains the illusion that the individual omnipotently creates 
the world that provides for him.
 . . . But traumatic ruptures promote the premature destruction of 
omnipotent dependency. They yield, in memory, an experience of the 
community’s failure to indulge the illusion that the world is there to 
gratify me. The living of life in the shadow of this failure means that 
trauma cannot be placed in the past tense: the fear of its present-day 
return, as Winnicott (1974) describes, shapes the person’s relationship to 
the future.16
 14. Jeffrey Prager, “Jump-Starting Timeliness: Trauma, Temporality and the Redressive 
Community,” in Time and Memory, ed. Jo Alyson Parker, Michael Crawford, and Paul Harris 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), 230 (italics in original).
 15. Ibid., 234.
 16. Ibid., 236–37; Prager cites D. W. Winnicott, “The Fear of Breakdown,” International Re-
view of Psychoanalysis 1 (1974): 103–7, and D. W. Winnicott, “Transitional Objects and Transitional 
Phenomena,” in Playing and Reality (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971), 1–25.
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Departing from D. W. Winnicott’s representation of a pretraumatic 
“seamless world,” Prager links trauma to the destruction of the depen-
dent self ’s enabling fantasy of omnipotence: “Independence is a life-long 
process in which omnipotence is ‘tamed’ though never fully eliminated. 
Through the life-course, the world ever remains an expression of one’s 
own centrality and pre-eminence, though maturation typically mutes the 
fantasy on the pathway toward the world’s disenchantment.”17 In tracing 
the essence of traumatic experience to the premature destruction of the 
fantasy of omnipotence, Prager brings to the fore the crucial communal 
condition of the self ’s existence. It becomes evident that the necessity of 
entertaining a fantasy of omnipotence requires the community’s protec-
tive presence; given that the fantasy remains operative long after the end 
of childhood, so, too, does the community’s responsibility for preserving 
the social conditions under which the fantasy can be sustained.
 In his consideration of the permanent existential devastation that 
torture wreaks, Améry departs from a claim that underscores the cus-
todial nature of the social bonds that give rise to the constitutive fan-
tasy of omnipotence. Améry writes, “The expectation of help is as much 
a constitutional psychic element as is the struggle for existence.”18 This 
expectation is an inborn assumption we hold that the other will aid us. 
According to Améry, it is not only in critical situations that the self comes 
to know the other as a provider of relief: a person establishes his or her 
earliest relationships on the assumption that the world exists to allevi-
ate the self ’s discomfort. By way of example, Améry considers the situ-
ation of a sick child: “Just a moment, the mother says to her child, who 
is moaning from pain, a hot-water bottle, a cup of tea is coming right 
away, we won’t let you suffer so! . . . In almost all situations in life where 
there is bodily injury there is also the expectation of help; the former is 
compensated by the latter.”19 The child moans, and this moan is a com-
munication to the mother. Like every other human cry of pain, it is an 
address. It conveys the child’s expectation of help. It makes no differ-
ence whether the mother can actually provide a material remedy for 
the child’s pain; the child’s very expectation of help compensates for its 
suffering. Whether consciously or not, the child who cries out in pain, 
like the wounded soldier on the battlefield, assumes that someone will 
come to its aid, that it will not be left alone to suffer. The presence of 
the other is crucial in such situations of need, because without it, the self 
 17. Ibid., 236.
 18. Améry, At the Mind’s Limits, 28.
 19. Ibid., 28–29.
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experiences its suffering body as its enemy.20 If pain chains the mind to 
the body, the expectation of help reassures the self of its reality in another’s 
mind. This assumption enables suffering persons to see themselves from 
the position of the other, to access a perspective on themselves outside of 
their suffering bodies and thereby to retain a sense of themselves as more 
than mere bodies.
 The situation of torture deprives the victim of this mediated experi-
ence of self. Améry writes, “Frail in the face of violence, yelling out in 
pain, awaiting no help, capable of no resistance, the tortured person is 
only a body, and nothing else beside that.”21 When the boundaries of the 
body are broken, so too are the sufferer’s ties to society, which asserts its 
presence by overseeing the preservation of those boundaries. Winnicott’s 
discussion of anxiety in the earliest stage of life enables us to formulate 
why the assault upon the victim’s physical borders harks back to this 
early stage and in so doing undermines the assumption of the inviolabil-
ity of those borders. According to Winnicott, anxiety in an infant is not 
“separation anxiety; it relates to quite other things, and is, in fact, anxiety 
about annihilation.”22 This anxiety refers to an experience that predates 
ego-integration and the attendant demarcation of intersubjective bor-
ders. In this earliest stage of life, “[t]he alternative to being is reacting, 
and reacting interrupts being and annihilates. Being and annihilation are 
the two alternatives.”23 Torture returns the self to the earliest alternatives: 
being or annihilation. According to Améry, it “blots out the contradic-
tion of death and allows us to experience it personally.”24
 To have experienced and survived death-in-life through the hand of 
his fellow man turned “antiman” was for Améry tantamount to outliv-
ing his own murder, the implications of which were devastating.25 He 
writes, “The experience of persecution was, at the very bottom, that of 
an extreme loneliness. At stake for me is the release from the abandon-
ment that has persisted from that time until today.”26 Such an experience 
of abandonment was specific to a loss of trust, which Améry described as
 20. Elaine Scarry writes, “The person in great pain experiences his own body as the agent 
of his agony.” The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1985), 47.
 21. Améry, At the Mind’s Limits, 33.
 22. D. W. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the 
Theory of Emotional Development (New York: International Universities Press, 1965), 41.
 23. Ibid., 47.
 24. Améry, At the Mind’s Limits, 34.
 25. Ibid., 40.
 26. Ibid., 70.
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the certainty that by reason of written or unwritten social contracts the 
other person will spare me—more precisely stated, that he will respect 
my physical, and with it also my metaphysical, being. The boundaries of 
my body are also the boundaries of my self. My skin surface shields me 
against the external world. If I am to have trust, I must feel on it only 
what I want to feel.
 At the first blow, however, trust in the world breaks down. The other 
person, opposite whom I exist physically in the world and with whom I 
can exist only as long as he does not touch my skin surface as border, 
forces his own corporeality on me with the first blow. He is on me and 
thereby destroys me. . . . If no help can be expected, this physical over-
whelming by the other then becomes an existential consummation of 
destruction altogether.27
A “defenseless prisoner of fear,”28 Améry was left with an enduring sense 
of “foreignness” that could not be compensated subsequently through 
any kind of human communication.29 Still, Améry’s own experience 
indicates that a certain psychic reorganization, necessary even to acknowl-
edge this permanent state of foreignness, could and did occur in the 
wake of torture. Prager’s discussion of possible “relief ” for the survivor 
points to the necessity of the community’s involvement if this reorgani-
zation is to occur, a necessity he traces to the ongoing dependence of the 
self on the world-supported fantasy of omnipotence:
Unlike those who suggest that traumatic relief depends on a person’s 
return in memory to his or her unassimilated past in the form of repre-
senting and speaking it in an affect-laden language, it is, rather, the resto-
ration of a community that has disappeared and a re-engagement with an 
experience of a providing-world that enables moving-on. Relief derives 
not monologically by reclaiming one’s past through its representation, but 
dialogically by presently describing to a listener or to a community of lis-
teners who are willing and capable of understanding both the breach that 
is now occurring and its likely origin in prior disillusionment.
 . . . In the same way that psychological trauma is a function of a social 
community that failed, trauma’s repair requires the social recuperation of 
omnipotence after its premature destruction, in the face of those who 
 27. Ibid., 28 (italics in original).
 28. Ibid., 40.
 29. Ibid., 39.
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originally contributed to the failure, or of those [to] whom all of mistrust 
and violation has become “entrusted.”30
In this fraught situation, the survivor requires the support and protection 
of the very community, actual or “entrusted,” that may be held respon-
sible for the trauma of abandonment. Given this, we can understand the 
efficacy of the survivor’s wordlessness: it serves “to protect those loved 
ones from the anger felt by having been . . . forsaken,” and it can be 
a means of not losing the community once again.31 Krell’s experience 
attests to the costliness of the survivor’s silence. At the same time, for the 
survivor to articulate feelings of rage over prior abandonment carries its 
own hazards, insofar as expressing those feelings runs the risk of attenuat-
ing healing bonds to the community. How, then, does the survivor nego-
tiate the conflicting needs, on the one hand, not to consign rage to an 
implosive wordlessness and, on the other hand, to avoid the recurrence of 
traumatic abandonment, which the expression of rage might precipitate?
 In an observation about a phenomenon common to his work both 
as a psychoanalyst treating survivors and as an interviewer for the Fortu-
noff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Dori Laub alludes to an 
extraordinary moment of communication, linked to the metaphoric regis-
ter of testimony, that implicitly speaks to this question:
It seems to me that in addition to what is manifestly said . . . there is 
another, a more subtle melody. A cue is dropped, barely heard. . . . The 
patient may dismiss it or pass over it in silence; yet there are times in 
which it is as though a cord [sic] is struck and an internal chorus, a 
thousand voices are set free. The other melody, that subtler music, then 
emerges, suddenly resounding loud and clear. It has always been there, 
center-stage, waiting to be liberated from its captivity of silence. It is 
as though a secret password has been uttered, in the expectation that it 
be passed over once again; a word by which the patient names himself 
and asks against all odds for a reciprocal identification. Only this time I 
responded. And only this time, when I was present enough to recognize 
and hear the password, could the door be opened and the hidden voice 
emerge and be released.32
 30. Prager, “Jumpstarting Timeliness,” 238–39.
 31. Ibid., 237.
 32. Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, M.D., Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psy-
choanalysis, and History (New York: Routledge, 1992), 63–64.
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Laub’s description of what might be characterized as the supplement to 
witnessing via “another, a more subtle melody” enables the formulation 
of a concept of testimony as the occasion of a transmission, separate from, 
yet dependent upon, testimonial diegesis. Laub’s own metaphoric lan-
guage calls attention to the emphatically figural register of this transmis-
sion: the “other melody, that subtler music” that indirectly lends form to 
potentially destabilizing emotions. I understand the liberation that Laub 
refers to as resulting from this oblique form of disclosure, which trans-
mutes these emotions through their transfer to a communicative space 
external to the self.33 Such relaying of emotion through figuration may 
also account for the reparative impact of art, noted in Krystal’s observa-
tion that “survivors were treatable . . . in exceptional cases, if they were 
especially endowed with literary or artistic talents that permitted them to 
develop or reconstruct damaged functions.”34
 A conception of testimony as engaged in such transfer informs Primo 
Levi’s retrospective reflections on the writing of his first work, Survival 
in Auschwitz. Forty years after the testimony’s appearance, Levi notes, “I 
had written those pages without a specific recipient in mind. For me, 
those were things I had inside, that occupied me and that I had to expel: 
tell them, indeed shout them from the roof-tops.”35 That Levi has no one 
in mind when bearing witness, that he shouts to no one in particular 
(just as Antelme wanted to lash out against “all the things,” rather than 
against people), reveals two distinct but related ideas about the trauma of 
social abandonment. First, that it belatedly triggers volatile emotions in 
the survivor that hark back to the earliest stage of development, before 
the differentiation of the subject from the object through the forma-
tion of the unconscious. Of this period Winnicott notes, “The events of 
these earliest stages cannot be thought of as lost through what we know 
as the mechanisms of repression, and therefore analysts cannot expect 
to find them appearing as a result of work which lessens the forces of 
repression.”36 Levi’s retrospective characterization of bearing witness as 
an expulsion and a shouting is thus an apt characterization of testimony, 
insofar as it underscores its distinctness from “work which lessens the 
forces of repressions,” that is, from psychic working-through, whose goal 
 33. Krystal finds the motivation for externalization “to be in the dealing with infantile ag-
gression,” “Trauma and Aging,” 87. Améry’s description of torture as an imposed return to an 
experience of abandonment associated with infantile trauma bears out Krystal’s hypothesis. 
 34. Ibid., 97.
 35. Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Vintage 
International, 1989), 168.
 36. Winnicott, The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, 38.
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is the overcoming of resistances.37 The second idea indicated by Levi’s 
need to unburden himself to no one in particular concerns the require-
ments for recovering from the trauma of social abandonment: so that 
the “shouting” force of buried rage does not trigger defensiveness in its 
receivers, bearing witness involves bringing things into the light of day 
but not necessarily so that they will be recognized by others.
 As Améry’s experience suggests, the transformation of rage through 
narrative-making is a means by which a testimonial “I” can constitute 
itself in the wake of social abandonment and thereby renew its sense of 
agency. Bearing witness is of healing consequence, insofar as it forges 
a shield that protects both the survivor and the community from an 
upsurge of nonprocessable emotion. Améry alludes to this sheltering 
dimension of testimony in the following statement: “It would be totally 
senseless to try and describe here the pain that was inflicted on me. . . . 
If someone wanted to impart his physical pain, he would be forced to 
inflict it and thereby become a torturer himself.”38 If the only recourse 
open to the survivor for conveying prior suffering is inflicting it on oth-
ers, then the primary goal of testimony must not be to communicate to 
others the raw experience of suffering, for this would turn the survivor 
into a torturer and hence estrange him or her from the community.
 The readings that follow explore how the power of testimony resides 
in its capacity to ward off such displaced repetitions through a process 
of externalizing symbolization that aids the survivor and the community 
in their joint endeavor to “live with incurable vulnerabilities.”39 Bearing 
witness can thus be understood as a procedure of holding, in a double 
 37. Sigmund Freud, “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through: Further Recom-
mendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis II,” in vol. 12, The Standard Edition of the Com-
plete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 
1958), 147–56. My analysis differs from Laub’s account of the dynamics of testimony in one 
respect; Laub writes: “The re-externalization of the event can occur and take effect only when 
one can articulate and transmit the story, literally transfer it to another outside oneself and take 
it back again, inside. Telling thus entails a reassertion of the hegemony of reality and a re-exter-
nalization of the evil that effected and contaminated the trauma victim.” Testimony, 69. Whereas 
Laub views testimony as a process of reexternalization that enables an eventual internalization 
of psychically charged experience, my reading suggests that not all responses to trauma can be 
reinternalized; some lend themselves to symbolization but nevertheless remain ego-dystonic; in 
other words, they do not lend themselves to “working-through.” Dominick LaCapra has engaged 
in a sustained discussion of the possibilities and limits of working-through trauma. See especially 
Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 86–113; History 
in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), espe-
cially 117–43; History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
 38. Améry, At the Mind’s Limits, 33. 
 39. Sean Field, “Beyond ‘Healing’: Trauma, Oral History and Regeneration,” Oral History 
34, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 41.
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sense: as a protective holding-back of volatile emotion and as the creation 
of a holding space within which these emotions are submitted to sym-
bolic transfiguration.40
 Four of the chapters that follow consider texts that are either written 
by survivors or written from a survivor’s perspective. In each, holding, in 
the double sense discussed above, leads to the consolidation of a voice 
that enables the narrator/subject to regain agency. The fifth chapter, on 
Liliana Cavani’s film The Night Porter, explores the relation between Nazi 
genocidal rage and failed narrative processes of containment and exter-
nalization. In this regard the film analysis can be considered a counter-
point to the other readings in this study, each of which underscores the 
socializing and restorative effects of narrative practices of containment. 
Even with its different focus and emphasis, Cavani’s film, like the written 
texts considered here, engages the question of how the narrative recon-
struction of past trauma participates in the management of present feel-
ings that stand to interfere with the survivor’s establishment of a sense of 
agency in the present.
 Chapter 1 analyzes the memoir of one of the most prominent his-
torians of Nazi Germany today, Saul Friedländer, who as a child during 
World War II was hidden in France, while his parents were deported and 
murdered in Auschwitz. Friedländer characterizes his childhood as situ-
ated at a remove from the events of the Holocaust and sees himself as 
having lived “on the edges of the catastrophe . . . separated . . . from those 
who had been directly caught up in the tide of events.”41 His first effort 
to come to an understanding of these distant events took the form of a 
literary endeavor: shortly after the end of the war, he tried, unsuccessfully, 
to write a poem based on stories he had heard about the camps. More 
than three decades later, he produced When Memory Comes, a text whose 
intricate rhetorical patterning reveals its childhoods roots in Friedländer’s 
literary imagination. Reading the discontinuities in the narrative struc-
ture in relation to Friedländer’s traumatic separation from his parents, 
the chapter traces an unconscious fantasy of parental rescue that enables 
Friedländer to tolerate avowedly unplumbed responses to his parents’ 
deaths.
 40. For an excellent discussion of textual procedures of distanciation in testimonial narra-
tives that pose obstacles to the recipient’s becoming “a participant and co-owner of the traumatic 
event” (411), see Patricia Yaegar, “Testimony without Intimacy,” Poetics Today 27, no. 2 (Summer 
2006): 399–423.
 41. Saul Friedländer, When Memory Comes, trans. Helen R. Lane (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1979), 155.
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 Chapter 2 focuses on two renowned works by Primo Levi: Survival in 
Auschwitz and The Drowned and the Saved. The combination of anguished 
introspection and critical self-distance characteristic of Levi’s testimonial 
writing has made him a compelling figure for both specialists and non-
specialists interested in the experience of Holocaust victimization. My 
reading of Levi’s work considers the personal stakes of Levi’s philosophi-
cally oriented analysis of victimization gleaned from his firsthand experi-
ence. I focus on Levi’s discussions of the “drowned,” or Muselmänner, the 
name given to the most abject concentration camp prisoners. Whereas 
other readings have followed Levi’s lead and invoked the category of “the 
drowned” as a neutral analytic tool, my reading concentrates on the met-
aphoricity of the category itself, tracing its origin to specific experiences 
Levi had in Auschwitz. When considered within the affective economy 
of Levi’s writing, the images of “drowned” men and women in Levi’s 
texts acquire psychological significance as containers for dissociated feel-
ings of rage. Levi’s death, a possible but unproven suicide, upset his pub-
lic image as a survivor whose limpid eloquence reassuringly attested to 
the endurance of “the human spirit.” The concluding part of the chapter 
considers Levi’s reception of Jean Améry’s writings, specifically, Améry’s 
contemplation on suicide, in relation to the figure of the Muselmann, not 
in order to contribute to further speculation about Levi’s death but to 
trace certain affinities between the two writers, whose intellectual and 
spiritual differences have heretofore been emphasized, including by Levi 
himself.
 In contrast to the other readings in this study, chapter 3, an analysis 
of Liliana Cavani’s film The Night Porter, explores the externalization of 
rage through violent action rather than its tropological transformation. I 
consider the film’s plot, which concerns a sexual relationship between a 
former SS officer and a former female concentration camp prisoner, as 
an objectified fantasy emanating from the psyche of the Nazi protagonist. 
Pursuing the logic of the fantasy, the film reveals how, within the Nazi 
imaginary, victims were positioned as screens upon which the perpe-
trators projected a rage born of a psychic incapacity to tolerate, much 
less protect, their own vulnerability. Unlike studies of the relationship 
between Nazism and symbolic language that focus on the dehumanizing 
and animalizing rhetoric of anti-Semitism, my analysis of the film sug-
gests that the Nazis’ victimization of the Jews and others, though “justi-
fied” through explicitly and intentionally dehumanizing metaphors, was 
underwritten by an intolerance of a fundamentally human condition of 
vulnerability whose only “solution” was the production of victims who 
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were made to embody that condition and whose destruction promised 
release from it.
 Chapter 4 focuses on the controversial Holocaust narrative Frag-
ments, whose author, Binjamin Wilkomirski, fraudulently claimed to be 
a child survivor. Whereas previous analyses of Wilkomirski and his text 
have largely been concerned with the symptomatic cultural significance 
of the debacle, and in particular with the stature accorded to victims in 
contemporary culture, I call attention to ways in which certain of the 
positions adopted by critics bespeak a transferential identification with 
survivors that is problematic, insofar as it has led to the dismissal of the 
significance of survivors’ favorable responses to the text. In view of these 
responses, I advocate for the narrative’s enduring value as a piece of writ-
ing that captures something authentic about the experience of persecu-
tion, and I offer a reading of the narrative on this basis. Following the 
text’s intricate symbolic logic, I trace a movement of displacement and 
reversal harking back to a trauma of abandonment that resolves into a 
masochistic rage against the self.
 If the tropological operations of Levi’s writing transform the Musel-
mann into an image of abject internal otherness, for novelist Imre 
Kertész, the Muselmann serves as a figure through which to explore the 
challenges that confront the survivor after liberation. Gyorgy, the narra-
tor of Fatelessness, undergoes an ordeal that parallels Kertész’s own history 
of persecution. Reading the novel’s conclusion alongside D. W. Winn-
icott’s theory of creative apperception, I discuss how Gyorgy manages an 
aggression that threatens to sabotage his preeminent desire to rejoin the 
community that had stood by while he was deported. The chapter also 
presents Kertész’s reflections on the relationship between the writing of 
testimonial fiction and the survivor’s reawakening to the possibility of 
love.
 The authors whose works I consider were readers of one another. As 
was already mentioned, toward the end of his life, Levi was in conversa-
tion with the writings of Améry; in The Drowned and the Saved, he also 
criticized Cavani’s The Night Porter, as did Friedländer. Kertész wrote his 
first novel prompted by other survivors’ accounts.42 While underscor-
ing their common experiences of improbable survival and incalculable 
loss, my study is meant to suggest that the intellectual currents running 
between these authors also conducted shared experiences of more inti-
mate, if inarticulable, effects of victimization.
 42. See Saul Friedländer, Reflections of Nazism: An Essay on Kitch and Death, trans. Thomas 
Weyr (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 40–41.
Another Melody  15
 In addition to the possible reasons already discussed for the scant 
attention paid to the survivor’s rage, timing may also have played a role. 
Produced in the tailwinds of the catastrophic events, when the recon-
struction of communal ties and the fostering of individual and collective 
continuity were of pressing concern, the vast corpus of critical studies 
on Holocaust representation has understandably been dedicated, for the 
most part, to the poetics and politics of mourning and commemoration, 
and to the intergenerational transmission of trauma. It is therefore not 
surprising that a response to victimization associated with estrangement 
of the self from the other writ large did not figure in these critical works 
emerging from the shadows of persecution and individual and collective 
loss.43 Addressing this lacuna in Holocaust studies, the following chapters 
are intended to bring to the fore a previously unremarked reason for the 
psychologically and existentially reparative impact of bearing witness: its 
ability to diffuse volatile affect. Perhaps as well the following chapters 
will be relevant to the study of other traumatic aftermaths that call for 
the management of potent emotion. The high suicide rate among U.S. 
veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan would seem to confirm the need for 
such further inquiry.
 43. The figure of the shadow is ubiquitous in Holocaust testimonial literature and scholar-
ship. Cf. Krystyna Chiger and Daniel Paisner, The Girl in the Green Sweater: A Life in Holocaust’s 
Shadow (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2009); Annette Insdorf, Indelible Shadows: Film and the 
Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Geoffrey H. Hartman, The Longest 
Shadow: In the Aftermath of the Holocaust (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996); Andrea Liss, 
Trespassing Through the Shadows; Memory, Photography and the Holocaust (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1998).
The impulse behind Saul Friedländer’s When Memory Comes 
firmly places it within the tradition of the memoir. According to 
Vivian Gornick, that impulse “originates in a writer’s desire to set 
a record straight, tell an exemplary tale, bear witness. . . . It shares 
with fiction writing the obligation to lift from the raw mate-
rial of life a story that will shape experience, transform events, 
make large sense of things.”1 The particular urgency of Friedlän-
der’s desire to make “large sense,” characteristic of the enterprise 
of memoir, is attributable to the ongoing pattern of discontinuity 
that marks his life, beginning with his early childhood during the 
rise of Hitler and continuing into his adulthood in Israel. His his-
tory of rupture created in him the “need for synthesis, for a thor-
oughgoing coherence that no longer excludes anything,” words 
that call attention to the dual nature of his narrative: it is both an 
 1. Vivian Gornick, “The Rhetoric of Witness,” review of All Rivers Run to the 
Sea: Memoirs, by Elie Wiesel, The Nation, December 25, 1995, 839. Paul John Eakin 
discusses When Memory Comes as engaged in the pursuit of a wholeness of identity. 
See Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 1985), 235–55. See also Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi’s discussion of the 
relationship between the development of Friedländer’s identity and the “polyphonic 
forms of narration” of his historical scholarship. “See Under: Memory. Reflections on 
When Memory Comes,” review of When Memory Comes, by Saul Friedländer, History & 
Memory 9, no. 1 (1997): 373.
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account of his survival during and in the aftermath of the Holocaust, and 
a meaning-producing endeavor, conceived in the hope that telling his 
story will alter the experiential pattern out of which it originates.2
 In the tradition of the Bildungsroman, Friedländer’s narrative begins at 
his birth and concludes with what could be seen as the end of his youth, 
his arrival in Israel. Woven into this account is an ongoing discussion of 
issues relevant to the place and time of his writing: Israel, 1977. What we 
are given, then, is two stories; one about Friedländer’s childhood under 
Nazism and immediately after, and another about the adult narrator’s 
search to uncover the themes running through his history up to the nar-
rative present. In striking ways the project is reminiscent of The Notebooks 
of Malte Laurids Brigge, by Friedländer’s compatriot Rainer Maria Rilke. 
In that text, which Friedländer describes as “moving” and “mysterious,” 
the protagonist must write his way out of his childhood, in order to 
release himself from its emotional grip (56). Moreover, in their com-
plex chronological structures, both narratives resemble weavings meant 
to integrate disparate experiences into a synthesized pattern.
 Here are the biographical facts of Friedländer’s history relevant to 
the analysis that follows. (For clarity, I present these facts as a chronol-
ogy.) Friedländer was born on October 11, 1932 (a date he does not 
include).3 His father was vice president of a German insurance com-
pany in Czechoslovakia. His mother’s family came from the Sudetenland. 
Typical of many assimilated bourgeois Jews, the family considered itself 
German and never anticipated the developments that led to the rise of 
National Socialism in Germany. For a few months in 1938, Friedländer 
attended a private English school. On March 12, 1939, when it became 
evident that Hitler would occupy the country, the family left for Hungary 
but turned back when they reached the Moravian town of Brno only to 
find that the Germans had already arrived. Because of the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia, the family left once again and went to Paris. Friedländer, 
seven at the time, was placed in a home for Jewish children in Montmo-
rency. After the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the fam-
ily moved to the spa town of Néris in the arrondissement of Montluçon, 
where they remained for two years. In July 1942, when the French began 
to arrest foreign Jews, Friedländer’s parents sent their son into hiding; 
however, in their panic to do so, they chose a Jewish children’s home. 
 2. Friedländer, When Memory Comes, 114. Subsequent references are included in the body 
of this text.
 3. Vineta Colby, ed., World Authors 1980–1985 (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1991), 
316.
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The very night of his arrival, there was a roundup of children older 
than ten. The gendarmes announced that they would return for the rest 
of the children the next day, and Friedländer was immediately brought 
back to his parents in Néris, who then placed him in Saint-Béranger, a 
Catholic boarding school. His parents, unable to find a place of refuge, 
remained briefly at the Montluçon hospital, where Friedländer’s father 
had been admitted for a worsening ulcer. Then, without further options, 
they attempted to cross the border into Switzerland. “[S]ometime” in 
October 1942, Friedländer was transferred to a school in Montneuf (93). 
In September 1943 he went back to Saint-Béranger, where he remained 
until the end of the war. His parents not having returned, he continued 
on at the same school for a few months, until he went to live with an 
appointed guardian and his family. After the war Friedländer learned that 
his parents had been arrested at the Swiss border and deported to Ger-
many, where they died under circumstances Friedländer does not discuss. 
In August 1946 Friedländer was sent to a Zionist summer camp in the 
Jura Mountains, and at sixteen, he left for Israel to fight for the newly 
formed Jewish state.
 Friedländer was forced to assume a series of new names correspond-
ing to the shifts in the places of his asylum. As a young boy before the 
war, he was called Pavel, or at home, the diminutive Pavlicˇek. He became 
Paul, “from Paris to Néris,” and later, upon his conversion to Catholi-
cism, in Saint-Béranger, Paul-Henri Ferland, to which Marie was added 
at his baptism (94). When he went to Israel, he became Shaul, and then 
Saul. Of these name changes he writes, “[I]t is impossible to know which 
name I am, and that in the final analysis seems to me sufficient expres-
sion of a real and profound confusion” (94). As Friedländer indicates, the 
confusion of names reveals a deeper confusion, configured in the fol-
lowing image as an internal splitting: “[P]erhaps I am the one who now 
preserves, in the very depths of myself, certain disparate, incompatible 
fragments of existence, cut off from all reality, with no continuity what-
soever, like those shards of steel that survivors of great battles . . . carry 
about inside their bodies” (110). Whereas the first expression of Friedlän-
der’s “confusion” expresses the discontinuity of self through an image 
of a sequential difference (the changes in name), the second descrip-
tion posits that discontinuity as the result of an intrapsychic conflict 
(incompatible fragments preserved deep within the self). As such, it links 
Friedländer’s identity as a “survivor” not to his having been a hunted and 
hidden Jew—in 1944 the Vichy militia had literally come looking for 
him—but to an ongoing, internal, post-Holocaust battle. The language 
Encrypted Memories  19
of the following passage reinforces the image of Friedländer’s self as a 
site of embattlement: “We Jews erect walls around our most harrowing 
memories, and our most anxious thoughts of the future. Even a story 
complete to the last detail sometimes turns into an exercise in hiding 
things from ourselves. These necessary defenses are one of the chief fea-
tures of our most profound dread” (75). The passage situates the battle 
within Friedländer as occurring on the terrain of memory, understood as 
an impermeable space of enclosure. By the same token, the representa-
tion of storytelling as a process of building enclosures is qualified by the 
associative connotations of the metaphor itself, as the notion of “hiding” 
is evocative of Friedländer’s survival as a hidden child. The metaphor 
thus stages the very movement of symbolic disclosure or revealing that 
Friedländer’s storytelling will perform as it erects walls around memory, 
thereby suggesting that the “harrowing memories” and “most anxious 
thoughts” that his story attempts to wall in will also seep out in the text’s 
building blocks of figural language. These textual images of fortification, 
hiding, burial, and defense indicate that creating a coherent self through 
memoir-writing will take place through a process of figuration that both 
erects intrapsychic fortification and allows hidden “things” related to 
childhood to become visible. The optical metaphor is an apt description 
of the capacity of Friedländer’s story both to hide unbearable memories 
and to make the hidden things visible, under cover of figural discourse. 
The question is: which things?
 Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’s theory of encrypted memory is 
useful in thinking about this question. According to Abraham and Torok, 
memories become encrypted when the subject who has experienced the 
loss of a love object cannot find the language in which to acknowledge 
the loss. Instead of words of mourning, which externalize loss in a form 
that can be shared with others, the subject creates a walled-off psychic 
space where the lost object is installed and, most importantly, where it 
continues to exist, undead, within the subject. This process, known as 
incorporation, engenders in the subject a fantasy world with its own, 
encrypted existence. Abraham and Torok indicate that such fantasies are 
designed to “repair” the traumatic damage inflicted by the loss of the love 
object.4 They develop only in cases in which the subject’s relationship 
 4. Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok write, “We can conclude therefore that the primary 
aim of the fantasy life born of incorporation is to repair—in the realm of the imaginary, of 
course—the injury that really occurred and really affected the ideal object. The fantasy of in-
corporation reveals a utopian wish that the memory of the affliction had never existed or, on a 
deeper level, that the affliction had had nothing to inflict.” The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of 
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with the object was characterized by a “love totally free of ambivalence” 
that ended only because of the occurrence of the traumatic event.5
 Encrypted fantasies also contain an element of secret shame that is 
associated with the lost object, which it is the task of the fantasy to hide, 
precisely in order to preserve the love object. In Abraham and Torok’s 
words, “Crypts are constructed only when the shameful secret is the love 
object’s doing and when that object also functions for the subject as an 
ego ideal. It is therefore the object’s secret that needs to be kept, his shame 
covered up.”6
 Abraham and Torok emphasize that because the subject is also con-
vinced of the object’s innocence—the object did not bring on the 
trauma—whatever aggression is contained in its fantasies of incorporation 
is an extension of the aggression that the object genuinely suffered—
death—which caused the traumatic separation. Of these encrypted fanta-
sies Abraham and Torok write, “Sometimes in the dead of the night . . . the 
ghost of the crypt comes back to haunt the cemetery guard.”7
 Abraham and Torok’s theory of incorporation opens up ways to for-
mulate how Friedländer’s memoir articulates loss even as it erects fanta-
sies that silently reveal responses to loss that cannot be integrated into 
the dominant narrative. In what follows I will address two key memories, 
located in the middle of the text—a position suggestive of their psychic 
centrality—that stage the dynamic of hiding and revealing.
 The first memory concerns what was to be the last time Friedländer 
saw his parents. Friedländer recalls that in Saint-Béranger, he experienced 
everything “through the filter of a single thought, a single desire, a single 
drive of my entire ten-year-old being: I had to rejoin my parents at any 
cost. It was more than distress or nostalgia: it was a physical need, so to 
speak, and nothing could stand in its way” (84). Impelled by this primor-
dial need, Friedländer runs away to the Montluçon hospital in search of 
his parents: 
I climbed up four flights of stairs, opened the door, and threw myself into 
my mother’s arms.
 There are certain memories that cannot be shared, so great is the 
gap between the meaning they have for us and what others might see 
Psychoanalysis, vol. 1, trans. and ed. Nicholas Rand (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 
134. 
 5. Ibid., 136.
 6. Ibid., 131 (italics in original).
 7. Ibid., 130.
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in them. Undoubtedly the words exchanged in this hospital room were, 
objectively, simple, everyday ones: a child’s pleas, and adults’ promises.
 . . . Could I be dragged away from them a second time? I clung to 
the bars of the bed. How did my parents ever find the courage to make 
me loosen my hold, without bursting into sobs in front of me?
 It has all been swept away by catastrophe, and the passage of time. 
What my father and mother felt at that moment disappeared with them. 
(85–88)
The child throws himself into his mother’s arms; the adult narrator 
expresses his inability to impart in words the meaning of this moment. 
On an explicit level, then, the scene commemorates the present and 
future impossibility of communicating the significance of this reunion.
 The scene’s conclusion reads: “of this heartbreak [déchirement]8 there 
remains only a vignette in my memory, the image of a child walking back 
down the rue de la Garde, in the opposite direction from the one taken 
shortly before, in a peaceful autumn light, between two nuns dressed in 
black” (88). This “vignette” cannot possibly be an unaltered recollec-
tion of an event, because the child is visualizing himself in the memory, 
whereas a young child characteristically directs his attention to the out-
side world rather than focusing on himself.9
 The perspective of the vignette is, however, characteristic of screen 
memories, which inflect memory with fantasy and in which the subject 
perceives himself from the outside. Considering Friedländer’s memory 
as having undergone such revision, the scene lends itself to a reading in 
terms of what Abraham and Torok call “antimetaphor” or “cryptophore,” 
characteristic of fantasies of incorporation.10 Such fantasies are staged lit-
eralizations of the meanings of a significant word. In the scene under 
discussion, déchirement functions as such an antimetaphor. It embodies 
the heartbreak, literally Friedländer’s tearing apart, in the two identical 
figures of the nuns wearing black clothing. These figures can be seen as 
 8. Saul Friedländer, Quand vient le souvenir . . . (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978), 85. Subse-
quent page references are included, in square brackets, in the body of this text.
 9. See Sigmund Freud: “[I]t contradicts all that we have learnt to suppose that in his expe-
riences a child’s attention is directed to himself instead of exclusively to impressions from outside. 
One is thus forced by various considerations to suspect that in the so-called earliest childhood 
memories we possess not the genuine memory-trace but a later revision of it, a revision which 
may have been subjected to the influences of a variety of later psychical forces.” Psychopathology 
of Everyday Life, vol. 6, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1960), 47–48.
 10. Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel, 132.
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symbolic pieces of Friedländer’s torn-apart self. That the nuns wear the 
black color of mourning suggests that they stand for the death—the tear-
ing apart—not of Friedländer’s parents, but of the child himself.
 But what secret fantasy does this scene of deadly tearing express? 
On the one hand, the image of the torn child can be read as a barely 
disguised expression of Friedländer’s feeling that leaving his parents—
not only once, but “a second time”—was a trauma that felt like he was 
dying. But in the logic of incorporation, cryptophores pertain not to 
the subject’s feelings but to the shame of the lost objects that the subject 
has incorporated into himself. Encrypted fantasies “are constructed only 
when the shameful secret is the love object’s doing and when that object 
also functions for the subject as an ego ideal.”11 The question pertinent 
to Friedländer’s cryptophoric fantasy is: what parental shame is rectified 
through the fantasy of the dying child?
 It is significant that Friedländer frames the scene of parting in terms 
of his need, which “nothing could stand in [the] way” of, to be with his 
parents. His need is so deep that he cannot remember a time when he 
was not anxious about being separated from his parents. In his words, 
“The fear of being abandoned: I am unable to account for its deep-
est origins” (13). The opening line of the memoir even suggests that 
his anxiety about abandonment precedes him: “I was born in Prague at 
the worst possible moment, four months before Hitler came to power”: 
Hitler, the cause of danger, is a presence in Friedländer’s life even before 
his birth (3). Still, Friedländer’s anxiety proved ineffective in preventing 
the separation from his parents. But what is more significant in terms of 
the meaning of the fantasy is that Friedländer’s parents proved unable to 
protect their son, either from his anxiety or from the very thing his anxi-
ety was designed to defend against, namely, abandonment. Their deaths 
rendered them incapable of making good on their promise that the fam-
ily would, in the future, be intact. This, I would suggest, is the reason for 
their shame.
 Given that fantasies of incorporation are a means of resuscitating the 
ego ideal, Friedländer’s screen memory of tearing apart must in some 
way serve to rehabilitate the image of his parents as having had sufficient 
strength—“courage” is his word—to protect their child from separa-
tion, notwithstanding the fact that in reality the family was destroyed. To 
this end, the fantasy both acknowledges the reality of his parents’ deaths 
and fulfills the impossible, counterfactual, wish that his parents had had 
 11. Ibid., 131.
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enough courage not to force their child to separate from them. It does so 
by creating an image of the child and parents as together in death. That 
is, in fantasy Friedländer is able to die in order to remain united with 
his parents, who were murdered shortly after the reunion scene in the 
hospital.
 In addition to symbolizing the tearing apart of the child, the final 
image of the scene—three figures walking together—can also be under-
stood as expressing the fulfillment of Friedländer’s wish that the family of 
three had remained intact thanks to the courage of his parents. Symboli-
cally splitting himself in fantasy, Friedländer thus succeeds in his effort 
both to shield his parents from a shame born of their having split up the 
family and, in his attempt to negate the outcome of their decision, to 
have done so by bringing them together in death. In this the fantasy rep-
resents Friedländer’s impossible gift of courage to his parents, impossible 
because postmortem.
 The fantasy is also Friedländer’s gift to himself, insofar as it mani-
fests a consoling, if provisional, effect of cryptophores: their capacity to 
“undermine anyone who would shame their object. They neutralize, as 
it were, the material instruments of humiliation, the metaphors of dejec-
tion. . . . [I]t is not simply a matter of reverting to the literal meanings 
of words, but of using them in such a way—whether in speech or deed—
that their very capacity for figurative representation is destroyed.”12 The 
screen memory renders the peace that this annulment of the metaphor 
brings through the image of the child who walks “in a peaceful autumn 
light [sous une paisible lumière d’automne]” (88) [85]. By the same token, 
reinscribed into the image of peace is death, insofar as the peace is evoca-
tive of the phrase “to rest in peace” (reposer en paix), and because the light 
of autumn bears associations with a time of dying. Finally, the image 
serves to suppress the associative link between heartbreak (déchirement) 
and self-reproach dwelling in the phrase déchiré par le remords, “tortured 
by remorse or self-reproach.”13 As such, it indicates the fantasy’s capacity 
to foreclose Friedländer’s feelings of guilt about the death of his parents.
 Finally, after the episode in the hospital, Friedländer develops a symp-
tom that signifies the annulment in “deed” of his parents’ shame. He 
begins to sleepwalk, like a living ghost from the crypt. “To avoid being 
humiliated,” he binds himself to his bed in Montneuf, an act which, he 
writes, “did keep me where I belonged” (95). The means of managing his 
 12. Ibid., 132 (my italics).
 13. My translation.
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symptom belies its apparent success in keeping him in his place, insofar 
as symbolically it reverses the actual outcome of the hospital scene when, 
without success, he “clung to the bars of the bed.” Now, through this 
haunting repetition of the scene, the fantasy’s intention of keeping the 
son tied to his parents can be realized.
 The second central memory of the text is of a “crisis,” which directly 
follows his memory of binding himself to his bed (95). In Montneuf, 
Friedländer is ten years old, though he does not remember whether he 
arrived “just before or just after” his tenth birthday (94). He writes, “I 
became sadder and sadder: in one way or another, I was going to let 
myself die” (99). He waits until he develops a fever and then, while on a 
walk with schoolmates and a teacher, falls behind the group and wades 
into the ice-cold waters of a brook. He is pulled out of the waters. In a 
passage shortly before this scene, Friedländer indicated that his parents 
had sent a telegram from the concentration camp at Rivesaltes shortly 
before their deportation. What he omits to say is that his parents were 
transferred from Rivesaltes to Drancy; they were among the 1,000 Jewish 
children and adults transported, on November 4, 1942, from Drancy to 
Auschwitz, where they were killed.14 Legible in the name “Rivesaltes” is 
rive (riverbank), a word that links Friedländer’s attempted suicide by the 
riverbank to his parents’ deaths.15
 A Freudian reading would understand the attempted suicide as a 
symbolic act of displaced aggression whose intended objects were the 
deceased parents. But the logic of incorporation dictates another objec-
tal configuration: “Melancholics seem to inflict pain on themselves, but 
in fact they lend their own flesh to their phantom object of love.”16 As 
such, the suicide attempt can be understood as a deed that stages the 
fantasy of reunion with his dead parents. The narrative placement of this 
crisis shortly after Friedländer’s discussion of his parents’ arrest suggests 
that the increasing duration of Friedländer’s separation from his parents 
lends greater urgency to his need to conceal the shame of their help-
lessness through drastic acts. His deepening consciousness of his parents’ 
impotence may also explain why he quotes a written eyewitness account 
 14. Serge Klarsfeld writes, “When [Convoy 40] arrived in Auschwitz on November 6, 269 
men were selected for work and received numbers 73219 through 73482. . . . Ninety-two women 
received numbers 23625 through 23716. The remaining 639 people were immediately gassed. 
There were only four survivors, all men, in 1945. . . . None of the 92 selected women survived.” 
Memorial to the Jews Deported from France 1942–1944 (New York: Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 
1983), 328–29. The names “Jan Friedlander [sic]” and “Elle Friedlanderova [sic]” appear on the 
“List of Deportees, Convoy 40,” on page 331.
 15. My translation.
 16. Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel, 136–37.
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of the Jews’ final days in the Swiss town where they were arrested. The 
account states, “‘Switzerland lets in the old, the sick, the families with 
children. The others are sent back across the border and into the hands 
of soldiers!’” (89). By way of commentary Friedländer poses a question 
that casts doubt upon the soundness of his parents’ judgment: “If I had 
accompanied my parents, would we all have gotten across the border?” 
(89).
 Friedländer had expressed these same doubts earlier in the narrative 
in connection with his memories of his father in Néris. He writes,
[O]ften my father foundered in a sort of wordless sadness . . . I occasion-
ally wish that he had been unable to think things through, that he had 
been too sick to do so. Otherwise, he could not have helped but bow 
to the evidence: his faith in complete assimilation had been mistaken; 
his failure to recognize the Nazi danger total; his confidence in France 
ridiculous. We should have been in Palestine or Sweden, like my uncles 
and my grandmother, at least out of Hitler’s reach. Doubtless the worst 
thing of all in those days was to go on waiting, reduced to complete pas-
sivity. (55)
Friedländer’s wish that his father had been sick so that he would not have 
been able to overthink the family’s situation bespeaks the same counter-
intuitive logic as his wish to be dead in order to remain with the parents: 
in each case it is an attempt to reinforce the ego ideal at the expense of 
life itself.
 Regarding the presence of aggression in the fantasy, Abraham and 
Torok note: “If there is any aggression at all, it is shared between the 
love object and the melancholic subject in being directed at the exter-
nal world at large in the form of withdrawal and retreat from libidi-
nal investments.”17 Given the aggressive significance of the withdrawal of 
libidinal investment, it is noteworthy that Friedländer does not register 
the care bestowed on him after his attempted suicide. He writes about 
his memories of recovery, “[T]he reality of the daily care given me . . . or 
Madame Chancel’s attentiveness has almost disappeared, whereas these 
scenes conjured up in my delirium are still as plain as day to me” 
(100). He does, however, recall that in the room in which he recovered, 
“Madame Chancel [the directress] installed herself near me, behind a 
screen, and a long bedside watch began” (100).
 17. Ibid., 137.
26  Chapter One
 One “paradoxical memory” stands out from that time: a fantasy based 
on a memory of an event four years earlier, when, on the train from 
Czechoslovakia to Paris, he had become separated from his mother (100–
101). Of the recurrence in fantasy of the incident, Friedländer writes,
Panic, real panic, overcame me. I began to run from one car to the other, 
doubtless in the wrong direction. . . . My delirium made the corridors 
endless and the faces became threatening: I screamed in terror and, if only 
because of the croup, felt that I was suffocating to death. But suddenly, 
by a miracle, I was saved: my mother, who had set out in search of me, 
appeared. I ran to her, threw myself in her arms sobbing, felt the coolness 
of her fingers on my face . . . I opened my eyes: it was Madame Chancel 
stroking my forehead to calm me. (101–2)
Immediately after recounting this memory, Friedländer says that for 
many years he could not speak or write about his childhood memo-
ries; they “appeared to be buried” (102). Even so, the delirium rehearses 
the transition he will eventually make from silence into language. The 
dream’s contents show that Friedländer has been able to retrieve early 
memories of his mother as a protector, the role she played before the 
traumatic separation. The achievement of connection to these early 
experiences is reflected in the sign it brings, the scream that produces 
Madame Chancel.
 The scream is Friedländer’s first act of communication, an external-
ization of his feelings about his loss. It takes him out of his isolating 
“delirium” and places him on the threshold of  “‘a community of empty 
mouths,’” that is, of individuals who partake in a compensatory shar-
ing of loss through language.18 As the first speech act of his postsuicidal 
“rebirth,” the scream announces the presence of uncontainable emotions 
without specifying what they are. In this it is emblematic of Friedlän-
der’s text as a whole, which also externalizes uncontainable emotions 
through figural speech that conceals as much as reveals those emotions. 
In this context it is significant that the text is not temporally unified: it 
ceaselessly shifts from the narrative present to a variety of pasts. Its time 
frame is also not firmly delimited: though Friedländer indicates through 
dated entries that he composed the text in Jerusalem from June through 
December of 1977, the first entry does not bear a specific date. Simi-
larly, the final entry does not coincide with the narrative present, as it 
 18. Ibid., 128.
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concerns Friedländer’s arrival in Israel on the ship Altalena. I understand 
these temporal ruptures as signifying that the work of synthesis through 
externalization is interminable.
 In the following passage Friedländer reflects upon the relation of his 
writing to memory:
When people leave us, one after the other, their presence quite naturally 
anchors itself and survives in the memories of the ones who remain. . . . 
From time to time, flowers are put on their graves, and their names are 
there, engraved in stone, essential symbols, through which different gen-
erations maintain the ties between each other, follow each other, and 
communicate. But for me the break was an abrupt one and it cannot 
become a part of everyday life. What words could one use to say such 
things amid the happy triviality of ordinary conversations? (134)
Though Friedländer cannot articulate the meanings of his loss, in rec-
ognizing the gap separating language and his feelings he also opens a 
space in which “absent meaning” may nevertheless be phrased.19 The 
incorporation into his text of his parents’ final letters is an example of 
such phrasing: his parents’ thoughts and feelings may have “been swept 
away by catastrophe, and the passage of time,” but their voices still haunt 
Friedländer’s text (88). The dates appearing throughout the text, which 
mark the time of composition of the individual sections, could be con-
strued as headings written upon letters exchanged across generations. 
That Friedländer includes his parents’ names, Elli and Jan Friedländer, 
at the bottom of their last letter—the only place in the narrative where 
his parents’ names appear together—suggests that Friedlander’s text 
offers itself to his parents as a metaphorical grave in which to anchor the 
“headstone” of their letter, in this way serving as a permanent marker of, 
and resting place for, his parents’ vanished presence.
 Toward the end of the narrative, a third haunting figure surfaces 
among Friedländer’s memories.
To tell the truth, I have always been hungry. Not in Prague certainly. 
Those first years left me with memories of abundance. Everyone knows 
 19. Friedländer himself cites Maurice Blanchot’s words in an essay on memory: “Whether 
one considers the Shoah as an exceptional event or as belonging to a wider historical category 
does not affect the possibility of drawing from it a universally valid significance. . . . ‘Working 
through’ may ultimately signify, in Maurice Blanchot’s words, ‘to keep watch over absent mean-
ing.’” Saul Friedländer, “Trauma, Memory, and Transference,” in Holocaust Remembrance: The Shapes 
of Memory, ed. Geoffrey Hartman (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 262–63.
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our national dishes, the knedliki of all sorts that for generations have made 
the reputation of both Czech and Viennese cuisine, but do you have any 
idea what “Indians,” sold in the pastry shops of the Old City, were? Balls 
of chocolate, split in two and filled with whipped cream. . . . (168)
In this moment of “truth” Friedländer admits to a hunger for an object 
whose color and form recall the figure of the torn-apart child. Thus 
inscribed within a memory of “abundance,” the confection also points to 
an earlier memory that discloses the secret source of the pastry’s appeal: 
during those few months in 1938, when Friedländer attended school, his 
mother would sometimes wait at the school to bring him home. When 
she did, Friedländer writes, she would first “take me by the hand and 
whisk me off to the Café Slavia, right next to the school, to have a huge 
cup of hot chocolate. We would sit there chatting about everything and 
nothing. It was then, just a few months before we were to leave Prague, 
that I discovered how much I loved my mother” (27). Sitting in the most 
famous café of the Old City, the child enjoys the nourishment of mater-
nal presence. Friedländer’s father is also inscribed into this memory of 
food as love, specifically in name of the favorite confection the child no 
doubt tasted in the café: “Indian” recalls the books of Karl May, which 
Friedländer “devoured,” because of an “insatiable appetite” dating from 
his eighth birthday, when, he recalls, “my father bought me my first real 
book” (64).
 The torn-apart child thus haunts Friedländer’s memories of home, 
transubstantiated into a literary symbol that neither lays the child per-
manently to rest nor openly reveals its origins in the trauma of abandon-
ment. But insofar as the symbol externalizes that body, it opens a space in 
which Friedländer may move, and fight: on the eve of his departure for 
Israel, he writes a letter to his godfather and godmother stating: “‘recent 
events have awakened a feeling in my soul that had been dormant there 
for a long time, the feeling that I was Jewish. And I want to prove it by 
leaving to fight alongside all the Jews who are dying in Palestine’” (179). 
The dying Jewish child returns in this memory as well, not inside, but 
alongside Friedländer, as he fights for his right to exist as a Jew. This is 
the very fight his father did not put up. As Friedländer notes,
[M]y father was hunted down for what he had refused to remain: a Jew. 
What he wanted to become, a man like others, had been taken away from 
him, leaving him no possible recourse. He was being refused the right 
to live and no longer even knew what to die for. Much more than an 
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impossibility of acting, his desperate straits had become an impossibility 
of being. (56)
Friedländer never “becomes” his father. Instead his text keeps watch on 
his father’s absent presence. In its capacity to do so, When Memory Comes 
may play the role Friedländer imagines books played in his father’s life. 
He writes that for his father, books “perhaps came to form, from time 
to time, a magic screen against an unbearable reality; they opened up an 
inner domain of calm and consolation” (56). Perhaps.
In Survival in Auschwitz Primo Levi speaks of his pressing need 
to find “interior liberation” from an “immediate and violent 
impulse” to tell his story, which had seized him while he was 
still a prisoner.1 Given the urgency with which Levi wrote, the 
measured, reflective tone he achieves in his narrative is astonish-
ing, and that much more so, considering that Levi published his 
testimony only two years after his liberation. Levi became inter-
nationally famous for Survival in Auschwitz, which, after its second 
run in 1957, was translated into many languages and adapted for 
radio and theatre.
 There are two subjects of this testimony, Levi and the Musel-
mann, the latter being the name used in the camps for a prisoner 
who was not equipped to survive. The title of Levi’s testimony—
literally “If This Is a Man”2—is a reference to the Muselmänner, 
who, in the eyes of the other prisoners, appeared to have lost their 
human qualities before their biological deaths.3 The title of the 
 1. Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity, trans. Stuart 
Woolf (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 9. Subsequent page references are in-
cluded in the body of this text.
 2. If This Is a Man is the original title of the first English translation.
 3. Levi writes that he does not know why this term was used by the oldest 
survivors of the camp to describe those prisoners “doomed to selection,” Survival in 
Auschwitz (88). The term Muselmann itself means “Muslim.” For a discussion of the 
significance of the word and its usage, see Gil Anidjar, The Jew, The Arab: A History of 
boDies of testiMony
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text thus directs the reader’s attention to the Muselmänner. They are also 
the focus of the central chapter of Levi’s testimony, called “The Drowned 
and the Saved.” “Drowned” is Levi’s name for Muselmänner, while “saved” 
is his name for the rest of the prisoners. In 1987 Levi brought this divi-
sion among prisoners into even greater prominence by titling his final 
text The Drowned and the Saved.
 In what follows I will explore how the very process of constructing 
the categories of “drowned” and “saved” was instrumental to Levi’s “inte-
rior liberation.” These categories enabled Levi to analyze the lives and 
deaths of the prisoners of the German death camp in a way that simul-
taneously brought his own self into focus in the aftermath of survival. 
I do not mean to suggest that these categories were significant because 
they enabled Levi to see himself as one of the “saved,” though that was 
also the case; rather, I will emphasize the way these categories served as 
an oppositional structure through which Levi expressed, and managed, 
his own psychic disarray. So compelling was Levi’s use of these categories 
as heuristic tools that their status as metaphors that evolved over time 
has been forgotten by readers. It is important to keep in mind, though, 
that Levi first presented the categories in Survival in Auschwitz and then 
returned to them forty years later in The Drowned and the Saved. As such, 
their specific elaboration in each text reflects different phases in the evo-
lution of Levi’s identity as a survivor.
 In Survival in Auschwitz, “drowned” and “saved” are “particularly well 
differentiated categories among men” (87). They reflect an absolute dif-
ference among victims, essential to Levi’s presentation of the range of 
prisoners’ experiences. In his view, “Other pairs of opposites (the good 
and the bad, the wise and the foolish, the cowards and the courageous, 
the unlucky and the fortunate) are considerably less distinct; they seem 
less essential, and above all they allow for more numerous and complex 
intermediary gradations” (87–88).
 Levi’s portrait of the Muselmänner emphasizes their isolation. The 
other prisoners in the camp believed it was not worthwhile to speak 
to these “men in decay,” because they only complained or talked about 
eating (89). They were not enterprising, so they had nothing to offer 
prisoners by way of food or useful items. On the contrary, they were the 
embodiment of what any prisoner could easily become, and as a result, 
they were ostracized. The Muselmänner were considered non-men, exist-
ing alone, without awareness of other people or consciousness of them-
the Enemy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 119. 
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selves. Levi writes, “They suffer and drag themselves along in an opaque 
intimate solitude [una opaca intima solitudine]4 and in solitude they die or 
disappear, without leaving a trace in anyone’s memory” (89). Dying was 
not death; it was “disappearing,” because the Muselmänner did not exist in 
the eyes of others while they were alive. Their deaths were therefore not 
witnessed, much less mourned.
 Levi first introduces the figure of the “drowned” man through an 
extended metaphor:
To sink is the easiest of matters; it is enough to carry out all the orders 
one receives, to eat only the ration, to observe the discipline of the work 
and the camp. Experience showed that only exceptionally could one sur-
vive more than three months in this way. All the musselmans [sic] who 
finished in the gas chambers have the same story, or more exactly, have 
no story; they followed the slope down to the bottom, like streams that 
run down to the sea . . . Their life is short, but their number is endless; 
they, the Muselmänner, the drowned, form the backbone of the camp, an 
anonymous mass, continually renewed and always identical, of non-men 
who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead within them, 
already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one 
hesitates to call their death death, in the face of which they have no fear, 
as they are too tired to understand. (90)
 The Muselmänner impinge upon Levi’s mind. He writes, “They crowd 
my memory with their faceless presences, and if I could enclose all 
the evil of our time in one image, I would choose this image which 
is familiar to me: an emaciated man, with head dropped and shoulders 
curved, on whose face and in whose eyes not a trace of a thought is to 
be seen” (90). Where did Levi’s knowledge of the Muselmann’s experi-
ence come from? How could he fathom the inner life of a figure who 
he claimed had no inner life? The answer is obvious: by looking into 
his own depths. Or rather, by projecting those depths onto an image 
of otherness from which he could then dissociate. In Survival in Ausch-
witz, before Levi introduces the categories of “drowned” and “saved,” he 
narrates three episodes whose descriptive language directly affiliates him 
with the “drowned,” notwithstanding his intention to use this category as 
the marker of absolute difference between them and himself.
 4. All references to the Italian text are from Primo Levi, Se questo è un uomo (Torino: 
Einaudi, 1975), 112. Subsequent page references are included, in square brackets, in the body of 
this text.
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 The first of these episodes occurs in a section titled “On the Bottom” 
[Sul fondo] (22) [23]. The episode concerns Levi’s arrival at Auschwitz. 
Thirsty, tired, confused, the prisoners have been taken off the train and 
are now standing in a cold room where they are forced to strip. They 
are shaved and then moved into another room. Levi writes, “[H]ere we 
are, locked in, naked, sheared and standing, with our feet in water—it is 
a shower-room. We are alone” (23). Standing with his feet in the water, 
Levi is literally and figuratively in the region of the “drowned,” on the 
bottom. After the shower, the prisoners are dressed in rags and destroyed 
boots:
There is nowhere to look in a mirror, but our appearance stands in front 
of us, reflected in a hundred livid faces . . .
 Then for the first time we became aware that our language lacks 
words to express this offence [la nostra lingua manca di parole per esprimere 
questa offense], the demolition of a man. In a moment, with almost pro-
phetic intuition, the reality was revealed to us: we had reached the bot-
tom. (26) [29]
The scene indicates that the speechlessness Levi will associate with the 
Muselmänner originates in this response to the “demolition” he witnesses 
in this region of the “drowned.” The absence of language to express 
offense will be reflected in Levi’s writing as a relentless muteness charac-
teristic of the Muselmann.
 The second episode in which Levi appears among the “drowned” 
concerns a recurring dream he had in Auschwitz. Levi provides an 
account of the actual dream and also a description of its emotional effect 
on him. In the dream itself, Levi has returned from Auschwitz and is tell-
ing a story to his sister and some friends. He is describing what it is like 
trying to sleep in the camps. The focus of his story is the neighbor (“il 
mio vicino”) with whom he is forced to share his hard bed [74]. In the 
dream Levi has the feeling that he would like to move the neighbor, but 
he is afraid to wake him, because he knows that the neighbor is stronger 
than he. Levi also speaks “diffusely” to his audience about other details 
of camp life, but nevertheless he enjoys the pleasures of storytelling, until 
something changes (60). Levi writes, “I cannot help noticing that my 
listeners do not follow me. In fact, they are completely indifferent: they 
speak confusedly of other things among themselves, as if I was not there. 
My sister looks at me, gets up and goes away without a word” (60). Still 
in the dream, Levi writes,
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A desolating grief is now born in me, like certain barely remembered 
pains of one’s early infancy. It is pain in its pure state, not tempered by 
a sense of reality and by the intrusion of extraneous circumstances, a 
pain like that which makes children cry; and it is better for me to swim 
[risalire] once again up to the surface, but this time I deliberately open 
my eyes to have a guarantee in front of me of being effectively awake. 
(60) [74]
To escape from his pain Levi must “swim” (literally “go up again”) to the 
surface, a metaphor that suggests how his dreamscape, like the shower 
room, is the nether region of the “drowned.” In the story Levi tells to 
his sister and friends, Levi, the speaker, is represented as two separate fig-
ures: he is the narrator of the account of his difficult night, and he is the 
neighbor, il mio vicino, literally his “near” (vicino) one. In keeping with this 
doubling, the language in which the dream scene is represented exhib-
its a web of associations between the neighbor and the “drowned.” Like 
the “drowned,” the neighbor is defined as a body. He is asleep, just as the 
“drowned” man is “too tired” to think (90). The neighbor is physically 
immovable—Levi cannot get him out of his bed. His presence in the bed 
forces the two into a physical intimacy, but without communication: the 
neighbor and the “drowned” are both mute and psychically impenetrable. 
Last, they both dwell in the metaphorical waters of the “drowned.”
 As a figure appearing in Levi’s dream, it is clear that this “drowned” 
man reflects aspects of Levi himself. His speechless corporeality suggests 
the existence of foreclosed psychic spaces that comprise the prehistory 
of the figure that will signify absolute otherness. The troubling pres-
ence of the neighbor in Levi’s dream underscores the personal utility of 
the category of “drowned” as an epistemological construction—one that 
enables Levi to externalize this impenetrable internal other and thereby 
dissociate himself partially from it.
 The figure of the neighbor also bears consideration in relation to 
Levi’s wish, represented in the dream, to be recognized as a skillful sto-
ryteller. If Levi is to command the attention of his audience, the dream 
suggests that he will have to tolerate the presence of the slumbering yet 
imposing psychic material crowding his mind. Levi’s wish to move the 
neighbor rather than communicate with him could be read as an expres-
sion of Levi’s fear of being overpowered by this material. At the same 
time, in its capacity as wish fulfillment, the dream also presents a way for 
Levi to tolerate this fear, insofar as its own narrative procedures could 
be seen as tools for the management of the anxiety that the neighbor 
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generates. Specifically, the dream uses projection to distance Levi from 
his fears. For example, although Levi feels devastated when his friends 
and family ignore him while he tells them his story, he does not blame 
them for their inattention. Instead he projects his narrative incompe-
tence onto them: in the dream, they, not he, speak “confusedly,” or what 
is worse, they cannot speak at all. In another instance of projection, Levi 
awakens from his troubling dream, and now the dream stands before him, 
which is to say, he has projected it outside of himself in an effort not to 
be subject to it again. He will keep his eyes open (“I deliberately open 
my eyes”), avoiding his unconscious in order not to encounter his fears. 
The dream also demonstrates how, through projection, Levi’s impalpable 
inner silence is configured as speechless material entities: the neighbor, 
but also Levi’s sister, whose silence makes her a “related” variant of the 
“drowned.”
 In the dream, Levi has been abandoned by his audience just as he has 
been abandoned to his fate in Auschwitz. Possibly to protect himself from 
personalizing his response, he associates his feelings to “barely remem-
bered pains of one’s early infancy,” in other words, to an imagined time 
of prememory. As such, the analogy between Levi’s grief and pains of 
infancy expresses Levi’s emotion in a form that removes it from the cur-
rent situation, which is its point of origin. This has the effect of depriving 
the feeling of its “sense of reality” by shielding it from “the intrusion of 
extraneous circumstances.” One could reverse this last formulation and 
say that this displacement of the origin of his pain into the past through 
the analogy has the effect of preventing Levi’s pain from intruding on 
the “extraneous circumstances” of the present: the painful rejection of 
his audience. By not openly expressing “this offense,” Levi may thus be 
protecting his ties to his listeners and protecting his listeners from a more 
accusatory expression of his grief. It is important to remember that Levi 
repeatedly dreamt this dream in Auschwitz. By creating in fantasy a way 
of repudiating the impulse to accuse, the dream may itself have been a 
means of tolerating the complete powerlessness of his situation, including 
the impossibility of being able to level accusations at the tormentors.
 Levi has a second dream, which he relates before introducing the 
category of the “drowned” into the text. In this dream, which is a day-
dream, Levi is on a train. When the train stops, he steps outside into the 
warm country air and lies down upon the ground. An Italian woman 
passes him and asks who he is. Levi tells her his story in Italian. He 
writes, “[S]he would understand, and she would give me food and shelter. 
And she would not believe the things I tell her, and I would show her 
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the number on my arm, and then she would believe . . .” (43–44). This 
maternal figure feeds and protects Levi, and speaks his mother tongue. 
But even with a common language and willingness to listen, she remains 
a reluctant listener. Levi cannot secure her recognition as a witness to his 
story. Like the audience in the first dream, she does not receive his story 
in the way that he expects. To convince her of the authenticity of his 
testimony, he must show her a physical sign, his tattoo. While the tattoo 
does not “say” anything, its reality guarantees the legitimacy of his narra-
tive. Like the mute, slumbering neighbor, the tattoo is an essential pres-
ence within the story that must remain visible and that, as an element of 
the dream, strengthens the association of the body as a representation of 
internal otherness and the “drowned.”
 The most prominent image of the body in Survival in Auschwitz is 
a poem by Levi that is separate from the main text and included on an 
unnumbered page between the preface and the first page of the narra-
tive. Its placement suggests that it is an alterity existing within the main 
textual body though distinct from it, like the tattoo of the daydream. 
Though separate, the poem is central: Levi takes the title of his book 
from a line in it, which presents images of the “drowned”: 
You who live safe 1
In your warm houses, 2
You who find, returning in the evening, 3
Hot food and friendly faces: 4
 Consider if this is a man 5
 Who works in the mud 6
 Who does not know peace 7
 Who fights for a scrap of bread 8
 Who dies because of a yes or a no. 9
 Consider if this is a woman, 10
 Without hair and without name 11
 With no more strength to remember, 12
 Her eyes empty and her womb cold 13
 Like a frog in winter. 14
Meditate that this came about: 15
I commend these words to you. 16
Carve them in your hearts 17
At home, in the street, 18
Going to bed, rising; 19
Repeat them to your children, 20
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 Or may your house fall apart, 21
 May illness impede you, 22
 May your children turn their faces from you. (11) 23
The first and subsequently repeated word in the verse, “consider,” indi-
cates that this poem is an apostrophe. As such, it is an appeal to those 
who can see, to consider or recognize those who cannot. The addressee 
of the call is named in the opening lines: “You.” This “you” could refer 
to Levi’s readers, but it could also be the poetic voice addressing the nar-
rative voice of the main text. For insofar as it is a call to “consider” and 
“[m]editate that this came about,” it is prescribing what Levi should do 
as a witness. Given this, Levi’s statement in the preface that his immediate 
purpose in writing was to “furnish documentation for a quiet study of 
certain aspects of the human mind” suggests that his text is a response to 
this poetic apostrophe (9). In other words, Levi, the first-person speaker 
of the main text, may be holding a dialogue with the poetic voice. The 
images in lines 5–14, depicting men and women who have become 
Muselmänner, would seem to confirm that Levi has followed the com-
mand of the poetic voice: he has made the “drowned” the subject of his 
testimonial record.
 When the poem was later included in a published collection of Levi’s 
writing, it was accompanied by the title “Shemà.”5 The title indicates that 
the poem is a rewriting of the central prayer of Jewish faith. Levi’s use of 
this Biblical model establishes a parallel between his poem and obedience 
to God’s law, a parallel that continues in the poem’s final lines, which 
echo the second portion of the Shema. The Biblical passage reads, “And 
these words, which I command thee this day, shall be upon thy heart; and 
thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them 
when thou sittest in thy house, and when thou walkest by the way, and 
when thou liest down, and when thou risest up.”6 Lines 15–20 of Levi’s 
poem parallel the Biblical lines, but unlike the Biblical model, Levi con-
cludes his poem with a warning: “Or may your house fall apart, / May 
 5. Ian Thomson notes that the poem was originally entitled “Psalm” and was written as 
the Nuremberg trials were underway; it was intended not for publication but rather as “a private 
ritual cleansing. Before Levi could chronicle the story of his persecution in prose, the rage had 
to be excised first in poetry. Far from being an afterthought to the cool analytic prose to come, 
the verse was a vital part of the book now incubating.” Ian Thomson, “The Genesis of If This 
Is a Man,” in The Legacy of Primo Levi, ed. Stanislao G. Pugliese (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), 45.
 6. Deut. 6:6–7, The Hebrew Bible in English, http://www.mechon-mamre.org/e/et/et0506.
htm.
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illness impede you, / May your children turn their faces from you.” The 
threat here is undisguised. If the poem’s addressee—be it Levi or the 
reader—does not meditate upon the figures depicted in the verse and 
how they came to be, a curse will befall him, the precedent for which 
is God’s anger. While the model for this poetic voice is not human, the 
accumulating weight of its decree is. It is spoken in the voice of one who 
stands outside the “warm houses” looking in, fearing that his message 
will not be received.7
 How do we reconcile this poetic voice with the measured voice that 
narrates the main text? Excluded from both the preface and main narra-
tive, compressed into a verse, this voice is raging. The poem’s relation to 
the main text as a fragment to the whole is mirrored in the imagery of 
the verse itself: hair, eyes, womb, hearts, faces are as elements of a body 
that has been blown apart, as if by the force of the speaker’s emotion. In 
both form and content, this poetic textual fragment represents another 
figural body associated with Levi’s inner “drowned.” But unlike the slum-
bering neighbor or the tattoo, this fragment is animated by a rage that 
has the potential to destroy the coherence of the main text. This, how-
ever, does not occur. Instead, the rage implodes upon itself. The images of 
the shattered body are confined to a circumscribed textual field, pressed 
to the bottom. As delimited expressions of rage, they, along with the 
images of the drowned within the text, may express Levi’s divided wish 
both to express a rage and to silence it. In Levi’s words the relationship of 
textual body to poetic fragment reflects the “love and rage” with which 
he composed his text.8
 Forty years later, in The Drowned and the Saved, Levi returns to the 
“drowned.” In the final chapter of that text, he provides an account of 
the publication history of Survival in Auschwitz:
It was published for the first time in 1947, a run of two thousand five 
hundred copies, and was well received by the critics but sold only in part: 
the six hundred unsold copies stored in Florence in a remainder ware-
house were drowned in the autumn flood [vi annegarono nell’alluvione 
 7. I am extremely grateful to an anonymous reader for pointing out that the placement 
of the poem at the threshold of Levi’s text aligns it with the placement of the mezuzah (which 
contains a piece of parchment inscribed with the Shema) affixed to the doorframe of Jewish 
homes and that the poem thereby not only engages dialogically with Jewish rites and tradition 
but even redefines them. 
 8. This is how Levi described his work on the book to Jean Samuel; quoted in Thomson, 
“The Genesis of If This Is a Man,” 52.
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dell’autunno]9 of 1969. After ten years of “apparent death,” it came back 
to life when the Einaudi publishing company accepted it in 1957.10
 The description reads as an uncanny allegory of the structure of Sur-
vival in Auschwitz. Just as the main textual body of Survival in Auschwitz 
speaks in the “saved” voice of Levi, so too were the majority of copies 
“saved” from the flood. Further, the “drowned” remains of the book cor-
respond to the voice of the poetic fragment in the text, which is also 
a kind of remainder cut off from the main textual body to protect the 
dominant voice from the rage infusing the poetic fragment. It could be 
said, then, that the raging poetic voice is the “remaindered” voice of Levi 
himself, which, like the remaindered part of the book run, is “drowned.” 
Levi’s comment about the book’s reception by the critics brings into 
focus his investment in being received as a good storyteller, which his 
first dream conveyed. As such, it enables us to understand how the neigh-
bor, as a figure of slumbering rage that “awoke” in the poetic fragment, 
had to remain confined in that space so as not to interfere with the 
more hearable dominant narrative voice. On some level Levi may have 
known that this internal voice of the “drowned” would not have been 
well received by the critics.11
 Levi’s description of Survival in Auschwitz as having come back or 
returned to life, “ritornò alla vita,” is an apt description of The Drowned and 
the Saved, which itself can be read as an uncanny return of the foreclosed 
aspects of Survival in Auschwitz.12 On the one hand, in The Drowned and 
the Saved, the category of the “drowned” becomes more sharply divided 
from the rage of the voice in the poetic fragment. At the same time, how-
ever, the voice of the poetic fragment associated with the “drowned” also 
seems poised on the margins of the text in a less contained way than in 
Survival in Auschwitz.
 Levi reintroduces the category of the “drowned” in what could 
be described as a moment of crisis: the voices of the “saved” and the 
“drowned” momentarily seem to merge into one another. This is the 
only time that Levi explicitly identifies anger as an appropriate response 
in the survivor, though neither the voice of the “drowned,” nor of the 
 9. Primo Levi, I sommersi e i salvati (Torino: Einaudi, 1986), 137.
 10. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 167.
 11. For a discussion of the publication history of Elie Wiesel’s Night that traces the history 
of the editions as corresponding to the excision of rage in the narrative, see Naomi Seidman, 
“Eli Wiesel and the Scandal of Jewish Rage,” Jewish Social Studies 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1996): 1–19.
 12. Levi, I sommersi e i salvati, 137.
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“saved,” seems to lay claim to this anger. The naming of anger occurs 
in the context of Levi’s attempt to trace an enduring feeling of “some-
thing like shame [ forse non era propriamente vergogna, ma come tale veniva 
percepito].”13 His discussion leads him to make following statement:
Changing moral codes is always costly: all heretics, apostates, and dissi-
dents know this. We cannot judge our behavior or that of others, driven 
at that time by the code of that time, on the basis of today’s code; but the 
anger that pervades us [la collera che ci invade] when one of the “others” 
feels entitled to consider us “apostates” or, more precisely, reconverted, 
seems right [giusta] to me (80).14
Levi calls attention to a split within the survivor, between the moral 
code of the community to which he has returned and the amoral code 
that he had been forced to adopt to survive, which dictates: “‘I come 
first, second, and third. Then nothing, then again I; and then all the 
others.’”15 Levi’s concern in this passage is with those who assume that 
the survivor can renounce his prior amoral self of incarceration, which 
is what the image of the survivor as “reconverted” implies. This assump-
tion arouses anger, because, as I understand Levi, it presupposes that the 
survivor has now rejected the part of himself that survived in the camps 
precisely by rejecting the moral code of the community to which he 
has returned. Were the survivor to repudiate his experience of hav-
ing lived in the absence of his present community’s code, he would be 
repudiating the basis of his existence as a prisoner and hence, his right 
to have existed. The anger that is right (or “just”) is on behalf of that 
past self that is at odds with the survivor’s present community. By the 
same token, because the survivor is in fact a part of the community, 
his anger, though just, nevertheless feels like an invasion: it is at odds 
with the moral code that he has adopted. Directly after this passage 
Levi leaves a blank in the text, as if to signify a rupture from that self-
dividing anger. The blank can also be read as indicating that for Levi, 
the storyteller, such anger is disruptive and he must therefore dissociate 
himself from it.
 Following this blank, the voice that resumes speaking is the moral 
voice of the community within the survivor. Levi writes,
 13. Ibid., 55 (my translation). This comment is similar to Jean Améry’s reference to “what 
is called ‘resentments’ in relation to revenge that cannot ‘[purify].’” Améry, At the Mind’s Limits, 
40.
 14. Ibid., 62.
 15. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 79.
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Are you ashamed because you are alive in the place of another? And in 
particular, of a man more generous, more sensitive, more useful, wiser, 
worthier of living than you? You cannot block out such feelings: you 
examine yourself, you review your memories, hoping to find them all, 
and that none of them are masked or disguised. No, you find no obvi-
ous transgressions, you did not usurp anyone’s place, you did not beat 
anyone (but would you have had the strength to do so?) . . . you did not 
steal anyone’s bread; nevertheless you cannot exclude it. It is no more 
than a supposition, indeed the shadow of a suspicion: that each man is 
his brother’s Cain, that each one of us (but this time I say “us” in a much 
vaster, indeed, universal sense) has usurped his neighbor’s place [il suo 
prossimo]16 and lived in his stead. It is a supposition, but it gnaws at us; it 
has nestled deeply like a woodworm; although unseen from the outside, 
it gnaws and rasps.17
 This voice, the representative of conscience, seems to have absorbed 
the invasive anger of the victimized self of the passage directly preced-
ing it, and to have metabolized that anger into critical self-interrogation. 
While this voice does not succeed in uncovering a basis for shame in 
past deeds, it does find something more and less shameful than deeds 
themselves: a universal mark of Cain. On the one hand, the curse of frat-
ricide implicates everyone in shame. But on the other hand, as an arche-
typal image of guilt, the curse also renders shame nonspecific, and in so 
doing, displaces blame away from the community that failed to protect 
the victims.
 The reference in the curse to the neighbor, “il suo prossimo” (like “il 
mio vicino,” literally “his near one”), suggests that there has been a shift in 
Levi’s relation to the internal alterity symbolized in the sleeping neigh-
bor of his dream of forty years ago. In Survival in Auschwitz, the neighbor 
was a presence that could not be ignored. He was dead weight, but the 
speaker in the dream continued to share his bed with him, and the voice 
of his rage was ex-communicated to the poetic text, where it could at 
least be recognized. By contrast, in The Drowned and the Saved, the “near 
one” has become an intolerable threat, a suspected murderer. In this sense 
Levi’s suspicion that each of us is our brother’s murderer can be read as 
indicating an active turning against the slumbering neighbor and, as such, 
as a further repudiation of the possibility of even tolerating the presence 
of opaque sites of meaning within himself.18
 16. Levi, I sommersi e i salvati, 63.
 17. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 81–82.
 18. For a discussion of Levi’s shame in terms of survivor guilt, see Ruth Leys, From Guilt to 
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 In this same section of The Drowned and the Saved, Levi introduces 
the image of the Muselmann as one who had seen the Gorgon: 
I must repeat: we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses. This is an 
uncomfortable notion of which I have become conscious little by little, 
reading the memoirs of others and reading mine at a distance of years. 
We survivors are not only an exiguous but also an anomalous minority: 
we are those who by their prevarications or abilities or good luck did not 
touch bottom. Those who did so, those who saw the Gorgon, have not 
returned to tell about it or have returned mute, but they are the “Mus-
lims,” the submerged, the complete witnesses, the ones whose deposition 
would have a general significance. They are the rule, we are the excep-
tion. . . . We speak in their stead, by proxy.19
This mythological figure seems far removed from the physicality of the 
suffering men and women who died in the camps. Their abject real-
ity recedes beneath the complex chain of descriptive phrases Levi uses 
to signify them: they are “the true witnesses . . . who saw the Gor-
gon . . . ‘the Muslims,’ the submerged, the complete witnesses, the 
ones . . . the rule . . . .” Thus, it becomes difficult to recognize the corpo-
reality of the Muselmann, which I have read as the metaphoric materiality 
that absorbed and silenced the rage on display in the poetic fragment. It 
is as if, through the image of the Gorgon and the accompanying descrip-
tion, Levi removes the symbolic bodies visible in Survival in Auschwitz. In 
other words, a nonhuman figure, “the Gorgon,” displaces the images of 
the human body through which Levi’s internal “drowned” man had been 
legible. In this regard, the designation of the figure of the Muselmann as 
“the complete witnesses” can be understood as an act of self-authoriza-
tion: through it Levi constitutes his own testimonial voice, but only by 
transmogrifying the body symbolically containing his foreclosed rage.20
Shame: Auschwitz and After (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). Leys’s discussion of 
Levi is embedded in a fascinating analysis and critique of a paradigm shift from guilt to shame 
that began in the 1970s.
 19. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 83–84. Sara Horowitz calls attention to the fact that, 
notwithstanding Levi’s conceptualization of the dead as the true witnesses, whose stories the 
survivors tell “by proxy,” the large body of ghetto writings—diaries, chronicles, and archives—left 
by murdered victims constitutes a “powerful and direct testimonial form”; Sara R. Horowitz, 
Voicing the Void: Muteness and Memory in Holocaust Fiction (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1997), 48.
 20. Giorgio Agamben traces the contours of “an impossible dialectic” between the Musel-
mann, or “complete witness,” and Levi, the witness “by proxy” (120). He writes, “Testimony 
appears here as a process that involves at least two subjects: the first, the survivor, who can 
speak but who has nothing interesting to say; and the second, who ‘has seen the Gorgon,’ who 
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 Coincident with the disembodiment of the “drowned,” a blank-
ness begins to inhabit Levi’s words, evident in Levi’s discussion of the 
origins of anguish: “Anguish is known to everyone, even children, and 
everyone knows that it is often blank, undifferentiated. Rarely does it 
carry a clearly written label that also contains its motivation; any label it 
does have is often mendacious.”21 Levi’s reference to children’s anguish 
as reflective of his own enduring anguish replicates his discussion in 
Survival in Auschwitz of his “desolating grief ” in terms of “certain 
‘has touched bottom,’ and therefore has much to say but cannot speak. Which of the two bears 
witness? Who is the subject of testimony?” (120, italics in original). Agamben answers his question: 
“Testimony takes place where the speechless one makes the speaking one speak and where the 
one who speaks bears the impossibility of speaking in his own speech, such that the silent and 
the speaking, the inhuman and the human enter into a zone of indistinction in which it is im-
possible to establish the position of the subject, to identify the ‘imagined substance’ of the ‘I’ and, 
along with it, the true witness” (120). According to Agamben, through the movement of testi-
mony the difference between Levi and the Muselmann collapses into a “zone of indistinction.” 
In this way, the testimonial “dialectic” undermines the very position of the subject and thus 
renders unanswerable Agamben’s initial question about the subject of testimony. The suspension 
of the subject position, which for Agamben specifies the “place” where testimony occurs, results 
in a series of uncanny displacements and substitutions in Agamben’s text: at certain points in his 
analysis, the Muselmann displaces Levi, and elsewhere both seem to be displaced by Agamben 
himself, as in the following passage: “To say that Auschwitz is ‘unsayable’ or ‘incomprehensible’ 
is equivalent to euphemein, to adoring in silence, as one does with a god. Regardless of one’s 
intentions, this contributes to its glory. We, however, ‘are not ashamed of staring into the unsay-
able’—even at the risk of discovering that what evil knows of itself, we can also easily find in 
ourselves” (32–33). In this passage, Agamben openly appropriates an odd, synesthetic metaphor 
from a work by the early Church Father John Chrysostom—“‘staring into the unsayable’”—to 
emphasize the ethical importance of his exercising his own un-Muselmann-like ability to speak. 
Even so, the image itself recalls Levi’s description of the Muselmann as having been rendered 
mute by staring at the Gorgon. Thus, through association, the appropriated metaphor locates 
Agamben with the Muselmann, and through the “dialectic,” also with Levi in the “zone of in-
distinction” where testimony takes place. The passage also illustrates who else Agamben has in 
mind when he writes that testimony involves “at least” two subjects in the dialectic: Levi, the 
Muselmann, and also himself. Remnants of Auschwitz ends with a section composed of quotations 
by former Muselmänner, indicating that Agamben can “leave them—Muselmänner—the last word” 
because from within the “zone of indistinction,” they are authorized to speak for him and he 
for them. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New 
York: Zone Books, 1999), 165. 
  Agamben installs himself in the testimonial space with Levi and the Muselmann be-
cause he believes that the testimonial “I” consists of “‘imagined substance.’” This assumption 
authorizes him to invoke Chrysostom’s words to bolster his own viewpoint about testimony, in 
disregard of the fact that Chrysostom delivered eight sermons against Judaizing Christians that 
were attributed with facilitating the rise of Christian anti-Semitism. Discourses against Judaizing 
Christians, trans. Paul W. Harkins, The Fathers of the Church, 68 (Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1979). In contrast to Agamben’s reading of the “zone of indistinc-
tion” inhabited by the subject of testimony, I understand the testimonial “I” as anchored not in 
“imagined substance” but in historical and experiential specificity that lends authority to that 
“I” and which, in retrospect, serves as the material basis for images that configure the survivor’s 
affective responses to persecution.
 21. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 71.
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barely remembered pains of one’s early infancy” (60). It prevents Levi 
from pointing a finger at his community and thereby risking a second 
estrangement. By the same token, the passage is also significant because 
for the first time, Levi indicates that he is aware of a space inside of him-
self that contains feelings that are inaccessible. He continues his discus-
sion of this blank anguish specifically in relation to his experience as a 
prisoner: 
[E]veryone suffered from an unceasing discomfort that polluted sleep and 
was nameless. To define this as a “neurosis” is reductive and ridiculous. 
Perhaps it would be more correct to see in it an atavistic anguish whose 
echo one hears in the second verse of Genesis: the anguish inscribed in 
everyone of the “tohu-bohu” of a deserted and empty universe crushed 
under the spirit of God but from which the spirit of man is absent: not 
yet born or already extinguished.22
The phrase “atavistic anguish” suggests that the anguish Levi felt was 
older than humanity, not created by it. As such, it aligns the passage 
with the others in which Levi also fills in the “blank” of his anger with 
abstract and abstracting analogies that serve to mitigate blame. But what 
is distinct about this passage is that it is stripped of references to human 
beings—Levi cannot even recognize this anguish in children or infants. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of such a recognizably human form he can 
hear “an echo” of his anguish in Genesis. This may be because Levi rec-
ognizes himself in an image, also present in a sentence from that passage, 
which he does not explicitly discuss but which resonates with his own 
rendering of “the drowned.” The sentence reads, “Darkness was upon 
the face of the deep.”23 The description of the earth’s watery surface as a 
darkened face, which is to say, as a face that cannot be seen, recalls Levi’s 
category of the “drowned”: first, because the Muselmann also beheld a 
face—that of the Gorgon—that humans cannot see; and second because 
the passage concerns the deep waters of the earth, the very environment 
of “the drowned.” If Levi reads himself in this passage, it can only be 
because it reflects back to him the very faceless anguish that he associ-
ates with the “drowned” man. The phrase “tohu-bohu” could be read as 
a graphic rendering of the joined state of Levi and the Muselmann; each 
sound is distinguishable only in terms of the other.
 22. Ibid., 85.
 23. Gen. 1:2, The Hebrew Bible in English.
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 Why would Levi have heard the echo of this anguish in a text about 
the faceless “drowned”? Insofar as his anguish marked the persistence of 
a continuing sense of abandonment that was experienced as a depriva-
tion of language, the only images that could possibly commemorate this 
experience may have been those that pointed to an otherness beyond 
language itself, such as the one Levi found in this empty universe of the 
“drowned.”
 The Bible is only one of the texts that Levi discusses in The Drowned 
and the Saved. In fact, Levi presents himself as an engaged reader of 
many forms of writing—philosophy and literature, but also letters; the 
last chapter includes correspondence with German readers of Survival in 
Auschwitz. Levi also includes a discussion of the writing of Jean Améry. 
In reference to Améry Levi writes that he feels compelled “to polemicize 
with a dead man,” whom he also regards as a potential friend.24 Before 
engaging with Améry’s thought, Levi introduces Améry as “the philoso-
pher who committed suicide and [as a] theoretician of suicide.”25 Read-
ing these lines, it is impossible not to think of Levi’s own death in 1987, 
when he went over the rail of the landing outside his front door and 
plunged three stories down the inner stairwell of his apartment building. 
While Levi’s attentiveness to Améry’s interest in suicide does not sub-
stantiate the assumption that Levi took his life, it does provide further 
impetus for considering what it was in Améry’s writings that might have 
led Levi to see Améry as a potential friend or kindred spirit.
 As he did with “the drowned,” Levi takes his distance from Améry, 
describing him as a man who lived “his life without peace and without 
a search for peace.”26 Levi attributes Améry’s misery to his willingness to 
exchange figurative blows with his enemies throughout his life as a sur-
vivor. By contrast, Levi writes of himself:
I must admit . . . my absolute inferiority: I have never known how to 
“return the blow,” not out of evangelic saintliness or intellectual aris-
tocracy, but due to an intrinsic incapacity . . . I admire Améry’s change 
of heart, his courageous decision to leave the ivory tower and go down 
onto the battlefield, but it was and is beyond my reach. I admire it, but 
I must point out that this choice, protracted throughout his post-Aus-
chwitz existence, led him to positions of such severity and intransigence 
as to make him incapable of finding joy in life, indeed of living. Those 
 24. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 127.
 25. Ibid.
 26. Ibid.
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who “trade blows” with the entire world achieve dignity but pay a very 
high price for it because they are sure to be defeated.27
Unlike Améry, who made it his mission to strike out and back at those 
who had persecuted him, Levi professed not to have written “to for-
mulate new accusations” (9). To Levi’s mind, Améry’s capacity to wage 
war enabled dignity but made living impossible. Reading the following 
passage in view of Levi’s comments about Améry, I wonder whether it 
indicates something about the price Levi was paying to live: “[A] mem-
ory evoked too often, and expressed in the form of a story, tends to 
become fixed in a stereotype, in a form tested by experience, crystal-
lized, perfected, adorned, installing itself in the place of the raw memory 
and growing at its expense.”28 In view of Levi’s comments about Améry, 
we might ask whether Levi’s own story had grown to perfection at the 
greatest expense, for by 1986 Levi’s fame was predicated upon an image 
aligned with the voice of the narrator in the main part of Survival in 
Auschwitz, and not with the inner “drowned” man.
 The language in which Levi introduces Améry into his text suggests 
a more complex investment than his polemicizing would indicate. Levi’s 
profile of Améry as a “theorist” of suicide and as a suicide hints at why 
Améry may have been a particularly compelling figure for Levi. In his 
theoretical work, On Suicide, Améry describes the impact of contemplat-
ing suicide: “Those who step to the threshold of voluntary death carry 
on the great dialogue with their body, their head, and their ego as they 
never have before.”29 In this dialogue the self becomes aware of the ego 
as “that part which, ranked highest, is first experienced phenomenally,” 
and it does so by entering into a relationship with the body.30 Améry 
describes how the body fills the mind contemplating voluntary death:
I often stand on the balcony of a particular seventeenth floor, then climb 
over the railing (fortunately I am always free of dizziness) and, keeping 
only my left hand fastened to the iron bars of the railing, hold my body 
far out over the void and stare into the depths. I only need to let go. How 
will my body plummet down? In the elegant turns of a corkscrew, as do 
the springboard divers I so often admire? Or like a stone? Headfirst, I 
 27. Ibid., 136.
 28. Ibid., 24.
 29. Jean Améry, On Suicide: A Discourse on Voluntary Death, trans. John D. Barlow (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 67.
 30. Ibid.
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fancy, and anticipate in my imagination how my skull shatters to pieces 
on the asphalt.31
 For some of those who believed Levi had committed suicide, the 
way he had died was more shocking than the (putative) fact of his hav-
ing made the choice to take his own life. One biographer wrote, “As 
a chemist he could have ended his life discreetly, like Arthur Koestler, 
with a lethal drug. Instead, he chose to die like a character in a tabloid 
crime-sheet, down the stairwell. By this violent and theatrical death, it 
was pointed out, he had exposed his loved ones to a gruesome sight.”32
 Striking as it is, the formal correspondence between the manner in 
which Levi died and Améry’s representation of voluntary death does not 
prove that Levi’s death was intentional. Though this question remains 
open, what can be known with certainty is that Levi saw Améry as a 
“potential friend.” I would suggest that Levi’s felt affinity with Améry 
was based on what Améry’s writings revealed to him: that it was possible 
to renew contact with the imaginary bodies through which his fore-
closed inner “drowned” man had been visible: the sleeping stranger, the 
tattooed arm, the poetic fragment. In this regard Levi’s fall from great 
heights, intentional or not, brought to light the “raw” flesh of his mem-
ory, held captive for many years, in the form of a story “tested by experi-
ence, crystallized, perfected, adorned.”
 31. Ibid., 65–66.
 32. Ian Thomson, Primo Levi: A Life (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 500–501.
Commenting on her 1973 film The Night Porter, Liliana Cavani 
stated, “Fascism is not only an event of yesterday . . . [i]t is with 
us still, here and elsewhere. As dreams do, my film brings back 
to the surface a repressed ‘history.’”1 The repressed “history” that 
emerges in The Night Porter is a history of shared repression in 
Nazi Germany. In this, Cavani’s film has much in common with 
Klaus Theweleit’s study of the dreams of soldiers of the Ger-
man Freikorps, voluntary armies organized in the aftermath of 
World War I.2 In reference to the Nazi propensity for violence, 
Theweleit remarked that fascism is not an ideology but “a way of 
dealing with reality violently.”3 One might situate Cavani’s film 
by saying that it seeks to represent the unconscious level of shared 
experience behind Nazi violence.
 Cavani’s investigation into “the repressed history” of fas-
cism fittingly centers on a man who works at night—the time 
 1. Liliana Cavani, letter to le Monde, April 25, 1974, quoted in Saul Friedländer, 
Reflections of Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch and Death, trans. Thomas Weyr (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1984), 129.
 2. Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies, 1. Women, Floods, Bodies, History, vol. 22 of 
Theory and History of Literature, ed. Wlad Godzich and Jochen Schulte-Sasse, trans. 
Stephan Conway (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
 3. Klaus Theweleit, “Killing for Desire: Interview with Klaus Theweleit,” in-
terview by Mechtild Blum and Wolfgang Storz, in Unwilling Germans: The Goldhagen 
Debate, ed. Robert Shandley, trans. Jeremiah Riemer (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1998), 213.
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of dreaming—when unconscious material comes to the mind’s surface. 
Max, the eponymous night porter, is a former officer in a Hungar-
ian concentration camp. Now, in 1957, he wants to live “like a church 
mouse,” and so he has taken a job in a Viennese hotel that also serves as 
the meeting place for a group of ex-Nazi officers who had worked with 
him in the camp.4 The officers are war criminals who do not want to 
be put in the position of having to defend themselves before a tribunal. 
To evade prosecution, they hunt down and kill any surviving witnesses 
who could testify against them, and they destroy the Nuremburg archival 
records of their crimes. They also stage mock trials where they proclaim 
themselves cured of their “guilt complexes.”5
 It is in the context of Max’s own trial that Lucia, a witness to Max’s 
past crimes, appears. Now the wife of an American conductor, Lucia 
had been imprisoned in the concentration camp where Max was in the 
practice of impersonating a doctor in order to conduct bogus medi-
cal experiments on prisoners. He had forced the teenage Lucia into a 
relationship of sexual bondage. Twelve years after the war’s end, when 
the film begins, Lucia, accompanying her husband on a concert tour, 
checks into the hotel where Max is working. Max and Lucia recognize 
each other, and they are drawn back into a relationship. This time, Lucia 
becomes Max’s lover by choice. She deserts her husband, and she and 
Max barricade themselves inside Max’s apartment. Having abandoned 
his trial, and refusing to turn over his “witness,” Max is now perceived 
as a threat to the other members of the Nazi group, who consequently 
plan to assassinate Lucia and him.6 This is precisely what happens when 
hunger drives the couple out of the apartment and into the range of a 
waiting sniper.
 Feminist critics embraced the film as a critical examination and desta-
bilization of traditional “subject positions,”7 but mostly it was attacked, 
accused, among other things, of blurring the line between victims and 
perpetrators, of pornographically exploiting the victims of Nazism, and of 
justifying Nazism.8 The film was banned by Italian censors, and charges 
 4. “Do You Recognize Anybody?” The Night Porter, DVD, dir. Liliana Cavani (1973, Ir-
vington, NY: Criterion Collection, 1999).
 5. “The Church Mouse,” The Night Porter, dir. Liliana Cavani.
 6. “A Game for Freaks,” The Night Porter, dir. Liliana Cavani. 
 7. Cf. Marguerite Waller, “Signifying the Holocaust: Liliana Cavani’s Portiere di notte,” in 
Feminisms in the Cinema, ed. Laura Pieropaolo and Ada Testaferri (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1995), 206–37; Kriss Ravetto, The Unmaking of Fascist Aesthetics (Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 2001).
 8. To cite just some examples of the strong negative reactions the film provoked: Rebecca 
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were brought against Cavani on the grounds that her film depicted sex-
ual torture.9
 Perhaps one reason the film opened itself to such a polarized response 
is that, in terms of character development, Lucia is not presented with the 
same depth as Max. Throughout the film, she appears almost exclusively 
through the filter of Max’s vision, and as a result, she exists before the 
viewer only in relation to Max. By thus restricting the viewer’s knowl-
edge of Lucia to Max’s perspective, the film calls attention to its interest 
not in Lucia’s experience as such, but in Max’s experience of her. In this 
regard the blockage of the viewer’s direct access to Lucia tells us some-
thing about Max (the viewer’s lens) and about his relationship to her.10 
It indicates his inability to perceive Lucia in her own right. She occupies 
his mind, but only as a screen upon which he imposes the very fanta-
sies through which the “repressed history” of fascism emerges. Through 
Max’s vision of Lucia, the film explores the transformation of the victims 
into phantasms of the fascist imaginary as well as the significance of such 
phantasms in the development of the “authoritarian personality.”11 By 
troping the victims as signifiers of the Nazi unconscious, the film reveals 
the affective investments of the perpetrators as they pursue a kind of psy-
chic relief through the destruction of their signifying object.
Scherr states that Cavani “deliberately” blurs the “clear demarcations between the experience 
of . . . the victimizer in relation to the victimized” and fails to offer insight into the “psyche 
that has experienced the full atrocity of concentration camp life,” “The Uses of Memory and 
the Abuses of Fiction: Sexuality in Holocaust Fiction and Memoir,” Other Voices: The (e)Journal of 
Cultural Criticism 2, no. 1 (2000), http://www.othervoices.org/2.1/scherr/sexuality.php; Henry 
Giroux writes, “Hailed in the American press as ‘a charming piece of romantic pornography,’ The 
Night Porter is a thinly-disguised fascist propaganda film that glorifies sadism, brutality and exag-
gerated machismo . . . Its barbarism rests not only in its audacity to extoll [sic] fascist principles, 
but also in its attempt to legitimize the death of millions of innocent victims at the hands of 
the Nazi machine.” “The Challenge of Neo-Fascist Culture,” Cineaste 6, no. 3 (1975): 31; Vin-
cent Canby entitled his review of the film “‘Porter’ Is Romantic Pornography,” New York Times, 
October 14, 1974.
  In response to Cavani’s comment “‘We are all victims or murderers, and we accept 
these roles voluntarily. Only Sade and Dostoevsky have really understood this,’” Primo Levi 
wrote, “I do not know, nor does it interest me much to know, whether in my depths there lurks 
a murderer, but I do know that I was a guiltless victim, and I was not a murderer. I know that 
the murderers existed, not only in Germany, and still exist, retired or on active duty, and that to 
confuse them with their victims is a moral disease or an aesthetic affectation or a sinister sign 
of complicity; above all, it is precious service rendered (intentionally or not) to the negators of 
truth.” The Drowned and the Saved, 48–49.
 9. Ravetto, The Unmaking of Fascist Aesthetics, 150–51.
 10. In the few scenes of Lucia in which Max is physically absent, his perspective still de-
termines how she is portrayed.
 11. See Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, and Daniel J. Levinson, The Authoritarian 
Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1950).
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 In studies of victimization, the fluidly associated concepts of empa-
thy, identification, and secondary witnessing as responses to narratives 
of trauma have been affirmed in their own right as contributing “to 
the moral life by making it possible for a person to respond appropri-
ately (though counterfactually) to human need.”12 It is not self-evident 
that inquiries into the experience of perpetration expand the moral life. 
Christopher Browning takes up this issue in the preface to his study of 
a German reserve police battalion that participated in the massacres of 
Polish Jews during the Holocaust. Browning writes,
[A] possible objection to this kind of study concerns the degree of empa-
thy for the perpetrators that is inherent in trying to understand them. 
Clearly the writing of such a history requires the rejection of demoni-
zation. The policemen in the battalion who carried out the massacres 
and deportations, like the much smaller number who refused or evaded, 
were human beings. I must recognize that in the same situation, I could 
have been either a killer or an evader—both were human—if I want to 
understand and explain the behavior of both as best I can. This recogni-
tion does indeed mean an attempt to empathize. What I do not accept, 
however, are the old clichés that to explain is to excuse, to understand is 
to forgive.13
According to Browning, empathy is not corrupting if it expands our 
understanding, in human terms, of the murders.14 I would suggest that 
Cavani’s exploration of the psychological underpinnings of Nazism antic-
ipated studies such as Browning’s, both in its willingness to find points 
of entry into a human phenomenon, and in its insistence that attempt-
ing to map the Nazi imaginary does not serve to exonerate the crimes 
of its adherents. In this latter regard the film anticipates possible critiques 
 12. D. G. Myers, “Responsible for Every Single Pain: Holocaust Literature and the Ethics 
of Interpretation,” Comparative Literature 51, no. 4 (1999): 270–71.
 13. Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution 
in Poland (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), xix–xx. Inga Clendinnen’s study of the 
SS explores “the emotional involvement of those engaged in the work of management” from 
an anthropological perspective attuned to the significance of ritual and theatricality. Reading the 
Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 143.
 14. A desire to discourage precisely such empathy guided the organization of the materials 
on the perpetrators exhibited in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, whose plan-
ners had a “gnawing fear that an effective portrayal of the Nazis’ world and their industry of 
murder would be worse than appalling to visitors—it might be perversely fascinating as well.” 
Edward Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America’s Holocaust Museum (New York: 
Viking, 1995), 199.
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on that very basis: during the mock trial at the hotel, a psychoanalytic 
“defense” is mounted according to which the Nazis’ guilt is rationalized 
as the product of a “complex.”15 Through this scene clearly Cavani is dis-
tancing herself from mitigating explanations of genocide.16
 In his discussion of the plastic and spatial expressions of the “Theater 
of Cruelty”17—his name for “all true theatre”—Artaud notes that “true 
freedom is dark and infallibly identified with sexual freedom, which is 
also dark, although we do not know precisely why.”18 The Night Porter 
conforms to Artaud’s understanding of “true theatre” in that it expresses, 
in the form of a sexual relation, a life force that remains repressed under 
Nazism. On the most literal level, Lucia’s return is represented as an 
interruption of post–World War II collective German repression of 
responsibility for Nazi crimes; but as we will see, her return also brings 
into view a foreclosed need of the perpetrators to establish and maintain 
an attachment to their victims, notwithstanding their drive to destroy 
them.
 Recall that for Browning, an empathic approach toward the perpe-
trators requires a willingness to recognize a resemblance between our-
selves and them. It bears keeping in mind, however, that this resemblance 
remains hypothetical, insofar as it is based on the assumption of an 
untested potential to have been like the perpetrators, rather than on an 
identifiable shared characteristic or experience. The Night Porter solicits a 
more disarming recognition: of an actual rather than speculative point of 
overlap between ourselves and the perpetrators.
 Cavani anchors her exploration of this shared human quality, and 
its repression under Nazism, in her own affinity with Max on the basis 
of their common interest in filmmaking. The first time the viewer sees 
Lucia—in a flashback to her arrival at the concentration camp—she is 
being filmed by Max while she stands naked in a line with other pris-
oners. Max’s camera aligns with Cavani’s, thereby indicating their com-
mon libidinal investment in capturing the naked Lucia through the gaze. 
While we do not yet know what Lucia signifies to Max, it is clear from 
 15. “The Church Mouse,” The Night Porter, dir. Liliana Cavani. 
 16. Giorgio Agamben’s thinking about how the concerns of witnesses fall outside the 
framework of the law is relevant to The Night Porter as well. Agamben writes: “The decisive point 
is simply that the two things not be blurred, that law not presume to exhaust the question. A 
non-juridical element of truth exists such that the quaestio facti [factual question] can never be 
reduced to the quaestio iuris [legal question].” Remnants of Auschwitz, 17.
 17. Antonin Artaud, The Theater and Its Double, trans. Mary Richards (New York: Grove 
Press, Inc., 1958), 101.
 18. Ibid., 30–31.
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the outset that Cavani shares Max’s desire to possess whatever she stands 
for. Since the camera within the scene and the camera recording the 
scene film the same view, their common vision also positions Lucia as the 
viewer’s libidinal object. The interpolation of the film’s audience into the 
Nazi position may account for the charges leveled against Cavani that she 
created a piece of pornography, even though the characters in the film 
“never undid a button, untied a bootlace.”19
 The film foregrounds the motif of optics and observation in relation 
to all of the bodies to which Max is attached, and always in a theatrical 
context. In addition to viewing Lucia’s naked body through a camera 
lens, Max watches Bert, a dancer living in the hotel, perform, while shin-
ing a stage light on him. After the dance, Max administers a shot in Bert’s 
exposed buttock. In a flashback to the camps, Bert wears only a loincloth 
as he performs before an audience of SS officers. Max watches Lucia 
while she attends her husband’s opera as the camera, adopting Max’s per-
spective, focuses on Lucia’s bare neck; Max is also audience to Lucia’s 
topless “cabaret” performance in the camp.20 Such scenes of spectatorship 
call attention to the privileged position of the body as the site of Max’s 
quest to uncover something hidden and crucial.
 In an interview Cavani noted,
The Nazis really loved the cinema and adored filming everything; they 
did it very well—they had some very good cameramen. A lot of the SS 
possessed Leicas—like the one Max has in the film: it’s a genuine 1940s 
Leica. They just loved filming. Everything, even the worst scenes of tor-
ture. Not just the reporters—the professionals—but all of them. It was a 
hobby . . . It seems to me an attempt to become more objective, to “dis-
tance” oneself from what is going on.21
The Nazis’ attempt to establish distance through focus can only be in 
response to an unconsciously registered affinity between themselves and 
their objects. Such perception could more precisely be characterized as 
projection, for Max does not recognize Lucia in her otherness; he creates 
her in the image of his own “othered” or foreclosed desire.
 The initial flashback to Lucia’s arrival at the camp, as well as a later 
flashback in which Max “playfully” shoots a gun as Lucia dodges his 
 19. Dirk Bogarde, An Orderly Man (New York: Knopf, 1983), 190.
 20. “It’s a Story from the Bible,” The Night Porter, dir. Liliana Cavani. 
 21. Alexander Stuart, “Consciousness and Conscience,” Films and Filming 21, no. 5 (Febru-
ary 1975), 12.
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bullets in a bare room, suggest what it is that Max is trying to visualize 
through Lucia.22 In both scenes Max coerces Lucia’s vulnerability into 
plain sight. That vulnerability finds its counterpoint in Max, who plays 
the role of her protector. In one scene in the camp that mixes eroticism 
and nurturing, Max ministers to Lucia’s wounded arm, kissing and ban-
daging it (the suggestion is that he is also responsible for the injury). Max 
also infantilizes Lucia. Though she is a teenager, he makes her ride a car-
ousel and has her wear an oversized bow in her hair. When she returns to 
Max as an adult, she buys a dress in an antiques shop that is too small for 
her adult frame. Taken together, these scenes suggest that Max transforms 
her into the image of a child, thereby associating her with a period of 
dependency and need of protection.
 Understood as a representation of external events, the film’s plot is 
implausible. The dress Lucia buys is an almost exact replica of the one 
Max had her wear in the camps. She knows exactly where Max lives and 
is able to enter his apartment at will. She deserts her husband without 
consequence—he never returns to Vienna in search of her. What is not 
credible on the level of plot is, however, consistent with the power of the 
unconscious to summon what it desires through fantasy. In this regard 
the timing of Lucia’s reappearance—she arrives at the very moment 
when Max is “on trial” and attempting to divorce from his past—is 
significant. On the verge of being repressed, Max’s history suddenly 
returns, as Lucia. He hallucinates Lucia into existence: Standing in the 
empty hotel bar, he speaks the words: “It all seems lost. Something unex-
pected happens. Ghosts . . . take shape in the mind. How can one pull 
away from it? This phantom. The voice and the body . . . this part of one’s 
self.”23 The soliloquy indicates that Max’s desire comprises the external 
“setting” of the film’s action. It legislates possibility and impossibility in 
this dream world.
 The scenes in Max’s apartment double or repeat the flashbacks in 
the concentration camp, and in so doing, they reverse the original dis-
tribution of power between Max and Lucia. I read these repetitions and 
reversals as indicating that the scenes in the apartment restage the con-
centration camp scenes in order to bring into view Max’s unconscious 
desire for Lucia, which was hidden beneath his violent treatment of 
her in the camp. In the camp Max was the agent of aggression; in the 
apartment he is the passive object, the target of the sniper whose bul-
 22. “Do You Recognize Anybody?” The Night Porter, dir. Liliana Cavani. 
 23. “Calling Frankfurt,” The Night Porter, dir. Liliana Cavani. 
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let wounds his hand when he steps onto the balcony. In the camp Lucia 
had been lying on a bunk when Max selected her to be his “partner”; in 
Vienna Max is the one in bed in his apartment when Lucia enters, look-
ing for him. In a scene that repeats the incident with Lucia’s wounded 
arm, Lucia deliberately breaks a glass on the bathroom floor, and when 
Max steps on the shards, cleans and bandages his foot. These parallels 
and reversals encourage us to read past and present scenes not as separate 
incidents but as different versions of the same events: the flashbacks dis-
close the events as they happened, the scenes in the present supply sub-
text of unconscious fantasy. Taken together, they suggest that every act of 
violence that Max inflicted upon Lucia in the camps carried a current of 
unconscious desire, now brought to life in the hallucinated present. I read 
these parallels and reversals as indicating Max’s desire to assume as his 
own image the “Lucia” of his creation: a vulnerable, woundable, needful 
being.
 Understanding Max’s relation to Lucia as a relation to himself, more 
specifically, as a relation to a foreclosed aspect of the self that Lucia rep-
resents, accounts for the film’s concern with theatricality and imper-
sonation. Lucia is a player in Max’s unconscious drama, and the film 
makes constant reference to theatrics and role-playing to reinforce the 
association between Max’s need to dramatize and Lucia’s dramatizing 
function. Max understands his job as night porter to be a role that he 
assumes and casts off with the donning of his uniform. This is why the 
janitor in one scene can stand in for Max by wearing his uniform. The 
“trial” of the SS is also a clear instance of role-playing, with different 
people assuming the roles of judge, jury, and defendants. When Max 
first notices Lucia, she is standing naked among a group of prisoners 
waiting to be registered. He is dressed as a doctor. When he examines 
Lucia’s mouth, his assistant shines a stage light on her, as if in a theatrical 
performance. Max later shines a similar light on Bert during his private 
dance performances for Max. In a flashback within the opera scene, a 
group of prisoners watches an officer rape a male prisoner. The prison-
ers are assembled like an audience, the lighting is dim, and music from 
Mozart’s The Marriage of Figaro plays, thereby establishing a link to the 
operatic framing scene. Still within the flashback and hence absorbing 
its radiating theatricality, Max silently takes Lucia into a room fitted out 
for medical examinations and forces her to perform an act of fellatio 
while the music plays in the background. The encoding of these scenes 
as spectacles underscores their representational function as stagings of 
Max’s desire.
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 When Lucia appears in Vienna after the war, her metamorphosis into 
the girl she had been in the camps takes place when she changes her 
clothing: the first thing she does after arriving at Max’s apartment is show 
Max the child’s dress she bought. In the final scene, when the two leave 
the apartment, Lucia is dressed as a young girl, in her child’s dress and 
kneesocks, while Max is wearing his officer’s uniform. The dress Lucia 
wears is far too small but its fit brings into exaggerated clarity what had 
been evident from the beginning: that Max created Lucia in the image of 
his unconscious desire; they are two actors playing parts in a script that 
inexorably controls them.
 Lucia’s identity as Max’s projection is reinforced by the way she is 
first identified in the camps as the daughter of an Austrian socialist. 
She comes to life as Max’s “offspring.” Later Max tells one of the hotel 
residents that “his little girl” has returned.24 His confidante responds by 
saying that she has never seen Max so much in love. He corrects her 
characterization of the relationship: “No, it’s not romantic . . . it’s a bibli-
cal story.”25 The film then flashes back to a scene in the camp in which 
Lucia dances for a group of Nazi officers. In imitation of Herod, who 
gave his stepdaughter, Salomé, the head of John the Baptist, Max presents 
Lucia with the head of a prisoner who had been harassing her. The refer-
ence to this filial story further enforces the sense that Lucia is Max’s filial 
extension.
 Max’s investment in Lucia is not exclusively Oedipal. Like Herod 
and Salomé, Max and Lucia are not blood relations. In addition, Max’s 
relationship with Bert indicates the polymorphous energies of his attach-
ments; he is not bound to only one libidinal economy.26 Cavani’s decision 
not to restrict Max’s choice of object gives us leave to consider how all 
of Max’s erotic bonds work in the service of his drive to possess fore-
closed aspects of his identity.
 24. “It’s a Story from the Bible,” The Night Porter, dir. Liliana Cavani. 
 25. Ibid. 
 26. Kaja Silverman reads Max’s desire as restricted to the Oedipal economy and the film 
as exposing the illusion on which Max’s phallic identity is based. She writes, “Voluntary exhibi-
tionism does not call into question the passivity of the female subject. Rather, it jeopardizes the 
illusion of masculine activity. It poses a much more profound castration threat than Freud was 
willing to acknowledge, for by making over the distance between the gaze and the Gaze, and 
by revealing the fatal attractiveness of the feminine/masochistic position, it quite literally cuts 
off the masculine sadistic position . . . this film seems intent on laying bare the extremity of the 
male subject. Max’s refusal to project that extremity on Lucia, to re-assert her inferior status by 
surrendering her to his associates . . . threatens the existence of the micro-culture of which he 
is a member. This threat is of course intolerable. Max is redefined as a traitor.” “Masochism and 
Subjectivity,” Framework 12 (1980): 6–8.
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 The filial quality of Lucia’s relation to Max signifies his attachment 
to her as life-extending. The film also affiliates the viewer and Lucia, 
through the mediation of Max’s attachment. In addition to perceiving 
Lucia through Max’s eyes, the film represents the tie between Lucia and 
Max as the only authentic relationship in the film. Lucia’s husband has 
little interest in her traumatic past; it does not enter his mind to con-
sider what it means for her to return to Austria as a survivor. The morn-
ing after his concert, he reads aloud laudatory reviews, unaware that 
she is trembling with anxiety. Other characters and relationships are so 
restricted by the specters of the past that they seem barely to exist: Bert 
lives only to perform for Max; the wife of the Italian cook becomes cata-
tonic when her husband, who like Lucia is a surviving witness, is mur-
dered; and Max’s neighbor concerns herself with other people’s business.
 But even as the film compels its viewers into identifying with Max 
through a common attachment to Lucia, it also places a limit on this 
identification, by affording a distancing perspective on Max. In the flash-
back to Lucia’s arrival to the camp, when the audience first sees Lucia 
through the aligned cameras of Max’s camera and Cavani, the viewer also 
watches Max engage in the act of seeing Lucia. This latter line of vision 
opens a space for critical reflection about the significance of Max’s desire 
for Lucia. This space is off-limits to Max—he cannot think about his 
own investment in her. Enabling the viewer to reflect upon Max’s fantasy 
world interrupts the identification with him. On the level of spectator-
ship the film thereby avoids pornographically duplicating Max’s attach-
ment to Lucia.
 In the scenes that take place in the camps, Max unambiguously 
enforces the Nazi genocidal plan. Lucia matters to Max insofar as he can 
exploit her as a means of self-expansion.27 In the camp Max makes con-
tact with Lucia only in the context of domination and submission—he 
shoots at her, shackles her hands, forces her to perform sexual acts. In 
Vienna after the war, Max’s actions demonstrate his enduring commit-
ment to violence: he does not hesitate to murder Mario, the Italian cook, 
and he cuts his ties to Bert, another bearer of tenderness. Bert’s own 
wounded love converts to murderous revenge in a reversal that doubles 
Max’s own violence: when Max and Lucia leave the apartment, Bert is in 
the car with the sniper who kills the couple.
 27. Jean Améry discusses torture as an act of self-expansion: “[I]n the world of torture man 
exists only by ruining the other person who stands before him. . . . When it has happened . . . the 
torturer has expanded into the body of his fellow man.” At the Mind’s Limits, 35.
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 Max’s fantasy of preserving his connection to Lucia may be subver-
sive, but this does not mean that Max understands his passion or that he 
is able to align himself with it. His fantasy is wordless; he barely speaks 
in Lucia’s presence, as if to suggest that he is not able to integrate what 
she signifies into his identity.28 Moreover, that the film presents the Nazi 
imaginary in the form of acting out further indicates the impossibility 
of incorporating Lucia into a psychically and socially sanctioned space. 
Artaud describes how, in the absence of such spaces, the theater of cru-
elty manifests the attitudes of mind that words cannot grasp:
The theater restores us all our dormant conflicts and all their powers, and 
gives these powers names we hail as symbols . . .
 These symbols, the sign of ripe powers previously held in servitude 
and unavailable to reality, burst forth in the guise of incredible images 
which give freedom of the city and of existence to acts that are by nature 
hostile to the life of societies.
 In the true theater a play disturbs the senses’ repose, frees the repressed 
unconscious, incites a kind of virtual revolt (which moreover can have its 
full effect only if it remains virtual).29
Unable to live with Lucia, Max initially responds to her return with 
rage. In their first encounter in her room in the hotel, he throws her to 
the floor and yells, “Why did you come!”30 Yet he cannot renounce her 
either; his suffering from their estrangement becomes evident when the 
mock tribunal orders her to be murdered because she is a potential wit-
ness. Finally, though, lacking the psychical capacity to tolerate vulner-
ability, much less integrate it into his identity, Max finds himself at odds 
with his passion for Lucia. He is driven to a social death—becoming a 
recluse—which might more aptly be described a suicide.
 In his discussion of the death drive, Freud examines what happens to 
a mind like Max’s, riven by mutually exclusive desires. Freud calls atten-
 28. The perpetrators did not speak of inner worlds; their speech was violence, which is 
inimical to the language of interiority. Its physical language takes the place of words. This is 
why Georges Bataille was struck by the absence of silence in the world of the Marquis de 
Sade’s violators. According to Bataille, insofar as de Sade’s torturers speak, they differ from real 
torturers. He writes, “Since language is by definition the expression of civilized man, violence is 
silent . . . violence never declares either its own existence or its right to exist; it simply exists.” 
Eroticism: Death and Sensuality, trans. Mary Dalwood (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1986), 
186–88.
 29. Artaud, The Theater and Its Double, 27–28.
 30. “Calling Frankfurt,” The Night Porter, dir. Liliana Cavani. 
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tion to the energy of certain “innate instinctual impulses” that are not 
able to reach the same phase of development as other, acceptable impuls-
es.31 These forestalled impulses “turn out to be incompatible in their 
aims or demands with the remaining ones, which are able to combine 
into the inclusive unity of the ego.”32 The energy of these incompatible 
impulses does not dissipate, however; instead, it impels those instincts to 
find alternate possibilities of satisfaction. We could say that Max’s search 
for alternate possibilities of satisfaction leads him to hallucination, where 
he fantasizes Lucia, an embodiment of the traits that his reality requires 
him to renounce. The phantasm of Lucia offers precisely the kind of 
neurotic satisfaction that is incompatible with the demands of Max’s ego. 
What Freud calls “satisfaction” is not synonymous with pleasure: “[P]lea-
sure and unpleasure, being conscious feelings, are attached to the ego.”33 
Thus, when instincts that challenge the ego’s formation seek satisfaction, 
the ego experiences unpleasure: “all neurotic unpleasure is of that kind—
pleasure that cannot be felt as such.”34
 The scene of Max’s and Lucia’s death reinforces Max’s incapacity to 
tolerate Lucia.35 Max has put on his officer’s uniform and laboriously 
dresses the catatonic Lucia in her girl’s outfit and then drags her out of 
the apartment. They drive away, knowing that the sniper who has been 
staking out the apartment will now complete his assignment. They park 
at a bridge, emerge from the car, and, with Lucia tottering against Max, 
take a few steps. This is not a Wagnerian reunion in death: shots ring out 
and the two figures collapse away from each other like marionettes.
 If “the theatre is a formidable call to the forces that impel the mind 
by example to the source of its conflicts,”36 Cavani’s film exposes con-
flicts within the Nazi mind whose traces remain legible on the bodies of 
the Nazis’ victims, confirming Theweleit’s observation that “[e]veryone is 
 31. Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” in vol. 18, The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth 
Press, 1955), 10.
 32. Ibid., 11.
 33. Ibid. (footnote, added 1925).
 34. Ibid., 11.
 35. In his analysis of the most abject victims of the concentration camps, Wolfgang Sofsky 
discusses the provocative nature of apathy in the concentration camps. The Muselmänner, the most 
abject victims, incited the rage of the SS and the prisoner-functionaries. By the end of the film, 
Lucia has become the image of a concentration camp victim. In this sense her murder could 
be understood as a staging of the rage against the vulnerable prisoner. See “The Muselmann,” 
in The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp, trans. William Templer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), especially 203–4.
 36. Artaud, The Theater and Its Double, 30.
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susceptible [to violence], in accordance with the violence that has gone 
into him. For some bodies, violence is a necessity. Let me say this about 
that: As a rule, perpetrators ‘heal’ themselves with their acts of violence. 
They begin ‘to live.’”37 The Night Porter explores the relation between 
the violence that has gone into the perpetrator’s body and the resulting 
propensity for violence. Max’s relation to Lucia suggests that the mur-
derous impulses of the perpetrators answered to a need “to heal” their 
own wounded vulnerability through the production, and then destruc-
tion, of that very attribute in their victims. In this the film bears out 
Theweleit’s observation that, to the fascist unconscious, the “argument 
that a social democrat is not a communist, a communist not an anar-
chist, and that none of these categories has anything to do with Jews, 
has never had much effect. The fascist unconscious perceives an essen-
tial sameness in all of the categories (and in the many others that made 
the spectrum of concentration camp prisoners so diverse).”38 The Night 
Porter indicates that this sameness could be perceived in anyone, because 
what was perceived was a projected otherness. Cavani’s decision not to 
identify Lucia as Jewish, but rather as the daughter of a Socialist, sup-
ports Theweleit’s analysis; it suggests that the Jews were the most “avail-
able” victims because of the history of European anti-Semitism, but that 
Nazism could turn anyone, regardless of his or her cultural identity, into 
a vulnerable being and therefore into an unbearable object of rage.
 37. Theweleit, “Killing for Desire,” 213.
 38. Theweleit, Male Fantasies, 1, 383–84.
Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood is the English title of 
a memoir that appeared originally in German in 1995 as Bruch-
stücke: Aus einer Kindheit 1939–1948. Its author, Binjamin Wil-
komirski, a Swiss clarinetist, clarinet builder, and teacher, pieced 
together memories of his childhood as a persecuted Latvian Jew. 
Born “somewhere in the region of Riga,” Wilkomirski describes 
his separation from his family during the massacre of Jews when 
he was three or four and his subsequent capture and deportation 
to Majdanek and then to another unnamed camp that might have 
been Birkenau.1 His account includes his delivery to an orphan-
age in Kraków and eventually to Switzerland, where he was 
adopted and raised by unsympathetic Swiss parents.
 Reviewers instantly recognized the memoir’s power, and they 
repeatedly called attention to the singular perspective Wilkomir-
ski afforded on the experience of persecution—he wrote from 
the viewpoint of a child. Appearing, as the book did, fifty years 
after the end of World War II, its insight into the plight of chil-
dren victims was made even more poignant by the advanced age 
of the generation of Holocaust survivors.
 1. Stefan Maechler, The Wilkomirski Affair: A Study in Biographical Truth, trans. 
John E. Woods (New York: Schocken Books, 2001), 65–66. The appendix contains the 
complete text of Binjamin Wilkomirski’s Fragments, trans. Carol Brown Janeway (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1996). Subsequent page references, to The Wilkomirski Affair 
and to the appended translation of Fragments, are included in the body of this text.
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 Soon after publication, Fragments was translated into nine languages. It 
was awarded many prizes, including the National Jewish Book Award in 
the United States and the Prix Mémoire de la Shoah in France. Wilko-
mirski became a frequent face at survivors’ meetings, gave public speeches, 
and participated in conferences devoted to issues of survivorship.
 But his celebrity turned to ignominy in 1998, after Daniel Ganz-
fried, a Swiss author and the child of a Holocaust survivor, published 
an article about Wilkomirski in the Swiss weekly Weltwoche. Ganzfried’s 
headline presented an entirely different picture of Wilkomirski’s back-
ground from the one of Fragments: “‘Binjamin Wilkomirski, alias Bruno 
Dössekker . . . knows Auschwitz and Majdanek only as a tourist’” (129). 
Ganzfried’s research uncovered adoption records that dated Wilkomirski’s 
illegitimate birth to 1941 and identified his birth mother, Yvonne Gros-
jean, as a Protestant woman from Biel. According to Ganzfried’s findings, 
Wilkomirski was placed in an orphanage and in 1945 became the foster 
child of the Dössekkers, who adopted him in 1957. Local school files in 
Zurich indicate that he attended first grade in April 1947, which discred-
ited his contention that he had entered Switzerland in 1948.
 New facts also emerged about the publication history of Fragments. 
It seemed that Wilkomirski’s German publishers had made their own 
inquiries before the book was released and had uncovered contradictions 
between the story and legal records. They nevertheless decided to stand 
behind their author, choosing to believe his contention that his adop-
tion records had been falsified. Some of Wilkomirski’s critics saw a profit 
motive behind the publisher’s position, basing their views on the assump-
tion that the book would not have sold as widely had it been marketed 
as a novel.
 Once the book’s authenticity was in doubt, prominent historians and 
public figures revealed that they had been skeptical of the book from 
the first. Rabbi Marvin Hier, dean and founder of the Simon Wiesen-
thal Center in Los Angeles, thought it unlikely that “such a young child 
could have survived two concentration camps without an adult protec-
tor among the guards.”2 In an interview on 60 Minutes, Raul Hilberg 
pointed to the larger context in which the controversy had unfolded. He 
cited “the ‘cult of testimony’ that invites ‘every single survivor’ to be cel-
ebrated for telling his or her story.”3 Konnilyn Feig felt that the absence 
 2. Doreen Carvajal, “A Holocaust Memoir in Doubt,” New York Times, November 3, 1998.
 3. Quoted in Harvey Peskin, “Holocaust Denial: A Sequel,” The Nation, April 19, 1999, 
38.
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of detail in Fragments indicated that its author hadn’t really been in the 
camps.4
 In the United States, where most copies of the book were sold, 
Granta and the New Yorker each published long pieces of investigative 
journalism about the controversy. Elena Lappin, who had been the editor 
of the Jewish Quarterly in 1997 when it awarded Wilkomirski a prize for 
nonfiction, wrote the article for Granta.5 Lappin first met Wilkomirski 
when he accepted his prize from her journal. Her first impression of him 
was positive; as Lappin recalls: “When I met Wilkomirski . . . I thought: 
Here, for the first time in my life, I see a writer who actually is his 
book.”6 While she herself had not been a judge for the award competi-
tion, she had been in agreement with the decision to award the prize to 
Fragments.7 It only occurred to her that the book could have been made 
up in 1998 after she read Ganzfried’s article. Lappin interviewed many 
people for her report, including Wilkomirski and his companion Verena 
Piller, Ganzfried, Wilkomirski’s German editor, his American publisher 
and translator, individuals who had helped Wilkomirski to reconstruct his 
past, and leading Holocaust historians. She concluded that Fragments must 
be a fiction, but not without pointing to an unresolved contradiction in 
her assessment of Wilkomirski, a contradiction she also captures in her 
article’s title, “The Man with Two Heads.” Lappin writes,
I cannot believe that Fragments is anything other than fiction. And yet 
when I came back from his farmhouse that evening [of her first inter-
view with Wilkomirski] I was, as I said, convinced he was genuine. 
Anguish like his seemed impossible to fabricate. As Israel Gutman said in 
Jerusalem: “Wilkomirski has written a story which he has experienced 
deeply, that’s for sure.”
 The question now, in Zurich again, is: What story and which 
anguish?8
 Philip Gourevitch spent six months researching and writing his report 
for the New Yorker.9 His investigation led to an issue that he deemed 
 4. Carvajal, “A Holocaust Memoir in Doubt.”
 5. Elena Lappin, “The Man with Two Heads,” Granta 66 (June 1999), 11 (italics in origi-
nal).
 6. Ibid.
 7. Ibid., 12.
 8. Ibid., 61.
 9. See also Blake Eskin, A Life in Pieces: The Making and Unmaking of Binjamin Wilkomirski 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2002). Eskin, the first American journalist to question 
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ultimately much bigger and more troubling than Wilkomirski himself. 
According to him, the favorable response to Fragments signifies a deep 
cultural malaise, a lack of concern about the distinction between fiction 
and reality, which in turn has the effect of trivializing the Holocaust. 
Gourevitch writes, “After more than six months of studying the mischief 
that has followed from Wilkomirski’s fantasies and obfuscation, I am more 
fearful for and depressed by the culture that received him as an apostle of 
memory than I am for the man himself, whoever he thinks he is.”10
 Tom Segev, author of The Seventh Million, worried about the poten-
tial fallout from the book. He demanded that it be withdrawn, citing its 
potential to “fuel the efforts of some right-wingers to deny the fact of 
the Holocaust.”11 Feig compared Fragments to the publication of the false 
Hitler diaries, sharply elevating the stakes of the scandal and suggesting 
that Wilkomirski’s deception had the potential to do “a terrible thing” to 
survivors who had accepted his narrative as autobiography.12
 Throughout the controversy Wilkomirski maintained that he was 
telling the truth. While he acknowledged that his Swiss legal documents 
were authentic, he claimed that they had been falsified. In 1999 Fragments 
was removed from bookstores; “owing to a lack of sales, several other 
publishers had already ceased to offer it even before Ganzfried’s disclo-
sures” (309). A Swiss attorney filed a formal suit against “Dössekker and 
consorts . . . as an aggrieved party . . . deprived of the book’s price” and 
misled “into feeling sympathy for this topic” (299). Wilkomirski with-
drew from public view in a state of apparent psychological instability.
 In 2001 the book was reissued, together with an exhaustive report 
commissioned by the Liepman Literary Agency, which had been respon-
sible for assigning the international publishing rights for Fragments. Stefan 
Maechler, the author of the report, confirmed what Ganzfried, Goure-
vitch, and Lappin had established, and uncovered further evidence that 
Fragments was inauthentic. But Maechler did not agree with Ganzfried’s 
assessment of Wilkomirski as a “‘coldly calculating man systematically 
executing a fraud’” (269). What Maechler calls “[t]he public’s reverent 
pose” was, according to him, “one of the most striking hallmarks of the 
book’s reception” (288). Maechler characterized Wilkomirski as someone 
the veracity of the memoir, became interested in Wilkomirski because he thought he might be 
a family relative. 
 10. Philip Gourevitch, “The Memory Thief,” New Yorker, June 14, 1999, 68.
 11. Malcolm Jones Jr. and Ray Sawhill, “A Classic or a Hoax?” Newsweek, November 16, 
1998, 84.
 12. Carvajal, “A Holocaust Memoir in Doubt.”
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whose “fantasies of victimization were radicalized with the help of those 
around him” (270). Speaking specifically about the American public, 
Maechler wrote: “As the most innocent of all victims and one who knew 
how to tell an emotional and shocking story, Wilkomirski was the figure 
the public had been all but waiting for. In addition, he is not only a vic-
tim; at the same time he is also a hero, and as such he was able to satisfy 
the fundamental American need for success stories” (291–92). Maechler’s 
critique extends beyond Wilkomirski and his perception of the Ameri-
can public’s tendency to idolize people. He also notes how such idolatry 
blunts aesthetic judgment:
The almost religious zeal that set Wilkomirski the victim on a pedes-
tal, above all standards of measurement, may also explain the astounding 
evaluation of the work as great literature. Even if Wilkomirski had been 
in the camps, that would not automatically mean that he had to write a 
good book. . . . [T]he general reaction of wishing to bow in reverence 
before Wilkomirski and to elevate his work to a literary Olympus could 
also be motivated by a resistance to dealing seriously with the Shoah. 
(288–89)13
 Lawrence Langer had immediately discerned that Fragments was a 
work of fiction. In 2006 he speculated that a “desire to learn more [about 
the Holocaust] might . . . account for” the public’s favorable reception 
of the book.14 Nevertheless, he was stymied by the positive reactions of 
“knowledgeable members of both academic and survivor communities.”15 
And while in 1998 he had described Fragments as a “powerful novel,” his 
later essay contained no mention of his earlier recognition of the text’s 
literary achievement (117). The book now claimed his attention because 
it exemplified the “dangers” of fraudulent memoirs. Langer writes, “An 
embarrassed silence continues to inhibit the voices of those initially mis-
led, and one would hope that eventually some among them will break 
through that barrier, not in order to construe a needless apologetics but 
to engage in a frank self-scrutiny that might enlighten future audiences 
about the ongoing dangers of fraudulent Holocaust accounts.”16 Langer 
 13. Gourevitch also attacks the book’s literary merits. In his article he refers to several pas-
sages to prove that the writing is “almost too silly to be called kitsch.” “The Memory Thief,” 68.
 14. Lawrence L. Langer, Using and Abusing the Holocaust (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2006), 50.
 15. Ibid.
 16. Ibid., 63.
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did not consider that survivors might be responding to the very quali-
ties of the text that had earlier impressed him; nor did it seem that their 
favorable reactions carried authority with him.
 The general absence of curiosity about survivors’ positive reactions, 
of which Langer’s response is only one example, may indicate that the 
revelations about Wilkomirski had triggered an uncharacteristic defen-
siveness in critics. That the negative evaluations of the literary merits of 
Fragments appeared only after Wilkomirski was exposed as a fabricator 
further suggests that, at least in part, the critiques of Wilkomirski were 
polemically driven. This seems especially plausible in view of the con-
sideration that Wilkomirski’s transgressions are but an extreme example 
of the transferential identifications that stand to compromise the critical 
detachment of all professional readers. Wilkomirski’s failure to preserve 
such detachment may have been an uncomfortable reminder to his crit-
ics of the hazards of such unchecked investments, including those that 
take the form of a defensive stance on behalf of survivors. Wilkomirski’s 
personal background may have further raised the specter of uncomfort-
able resemblance. For, like many of his critics, Wilkomirski trained as a 
scholar; his knowledge of the events of the Holocaust is secondhand. 
While doing graduate work in history, he amassed over a thousand docu-
ments, which he eventually donated to Yad Vashem. Gourevitch reports 
that two rooms in Wilkomirski’s house are devoted to Holocaust materi-
als: books, files, computers, videotape machines, a microfilm reader, and 
an archive of letters, manuscripts, photographs, and documents collected 
from survivors.
 The continuing silence of survivors and academics that Langer points 
out may indicate that for some individuals, including myself, the under-
mining of Wilkomirski’s credibility did not compromise the authority 
of his text. To understand the source of this authority requires that one 
separate Fragments from the quagmire of its author’s missteps, to entertain 
the possibility that the fraudulent memoir is a rhetorical construct with 
its own merit and whose narrative form and patterns of figuration offer 
their own yield of knowledge. In what follows I will consider these rep-
resentational dimensions of the text, in order to provide an interpretative 
foundation for the view that Fragments captures an important aspect of 
the survivor’s aftermath of victimization.
 I understand Wilkomirski’s public comportment as a staging or enact-
ment of the voice of his written narrative. Both Wilkomirski the person 
and Wilkomirski the narrator project an enthrallment to the past and 
an image of survivorship as a condition in which, notwithstanding the 
Traumatic Aftermaths  67
passage of time, emotional life has not evolved beyond the period of 
active victimization. Wilkomirski’s “performance” of such investment 
in prior victimhood provides a point of entry into his narrative. Jeffrey 
Prager has argued that remaining in the past emotionally is one form that 
coping with the aftermath of survival can take, and that testimonial nar-
ratives can serve to reinforce this arrest of time. According to Prager, the 
investments of survivors in stories of their past may develop in reaction 
to the threat posed by conflicts that arise in response to their previous 
victimization, that is to say, in the aftermath of persecution. Accounts of 
trauma can be a means of avoiding these conflicts, thereby manifesting 
a “form of defensive distancing from the affective experience and inner 
personal conflicts of those who have been traumatized.”17 Prager writes, 
“Narratives of past wrongs tend to externalize conflict to the outside 
world and, paradoxically, both protect defensive denial, preserve others as 
villains and promote a sense of oneself as a victim.”18 Telling and retelling 
the story of that trauma becomes a “protective strategy . . . the construc-
tion of a sequestered self—the building of a fortress against fragility [and] 
the dangerous emotions accompanying trauma—fear of annihilation and 
rage at abandonment, for example.”19
 Considered in terms of Prager’s understanding of traumatic narrative, 
Wilkomirski’s behavior and his text, taken together, could be understood 
as a performative demonstration of an emotional life arrested in an expe-
rience of past victimization. I would emphasize that I am not consider-
ing the significance of this performance in terms of Dössekker’s actual 
biography but rather in relation to its manifest depiction of Holocaust 
survival. I am interested in Dössekker’s imagined story and his living 
portrayal of his story’s protagonist, insofar as they exemplify the psycho-
logical efficacy of testimonial narrative in its specific capacity to displace 
and contain potentially volatile emotions linked to the aftermath of vic-
timization. It is my contention that survivors may well have responded 
to Fragments precisely because it stages the attempt to manage affect by 
remaining focused on the past. To analyze the text as performing the 
displacement of affect has required that I bracket Wilkomirski’s actual 
identity in order to focus on the first-person narrator of the text.20 The 
 17. Jeffrey Prager, “Healing from History: Psychoanalytic Considerations on Traumatic Pasts 
and Social Repair,” European Journal of Social Theory 11, no. 3 (2008): 411.
 18. Ibid.
 19. Ibid.
 20. For a consideration of the text in relation to Swiss memory politics of the 1990s, see 
Anne Whitehead, “Telling Tales: Trauma and Testimony in Binjamin Wilkomirski’s Fragments,” 
in Trauma Fiction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 30–47. See also Carl Tighe’s 
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references to “Wilkomirski” in the following pages thus designate the 
persona Dössekker believes himself to be.
 Wilkomirski describes his memories as “[m]ostly a chaotic jumble, 
with very little chronological fit; shards that keep surfacing against the 
orderly grain of grown-up life and escaping the laws of logic” (377). 
While not chronologically organized, these memories, when read 
sequentially, as they appear in the text, do, however, display an order—not 
one of chronology, but of a psychological evolution of foreclosed affect.21 
This affect manifests in two early episodes that predate the scenes of per-
secutory violence. In the first, Wilkomirski writes,
It must have been Riga, in winter. The city moat was frozen over. I’m 
sitting all bundled up [wohlverpackt]22 with someone on a sled, and we’re 
running smoothly over the ice as if we’re on a street. Other sleds over-
take us, and people on skates. Everyone’s laughing, looking happy. On 
both sides tree branches are bright and heavy with snow. They bend over 
the ice; we travel through and under them like through a silver tunnel. I 
think I’m floating. I’m happy. (378)
The elements of the scene harmonize into an atmosphere of containment 
and connectedness: the environment holds Wilkomirski in a many-lay-
ered embrace. He occupies a position in the center of familiar surround-
ings that literally and figuratively enfold him: he is physically wrapped 
and protected from the cold; his sled moves among the other sleds, so 
it too is encircled; his happiness serves as the focal point for the skaters 
around him, whose happiness reflects his own; the trees that border the 
analysis of Fragments in the context of the Swiss institution of Verdingkinder (earning children), 
“Faking a Life: Binjamin Wilkomirski, Fragments,” in Writing and Responsibility (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 90–102. 
 21. The narrative is written in a voice crafted to capture the consciousness of a child survi-
vor but within the framework of an adult experience of memory. Wilkomirski creates this voice 
through specific narrative procedures. For example, he avoids analyzing his early experiences 
through retrospective reflection, which reinforces the impression of naïveté. This is apparent 
in scenes such as the one in which he describes his arrival at the first camp, when he asked a 
soldier about the “thing . . . hanging down from his belt” (403). The soldier answers by raising 
his arm with “the strange thing in his fist” (404). Wilkomirski continues, “[S]omething whizzed 
across my face with such burning heat that I thought I’d been cut in two. That’s how I learned 
what a whip is” (404). This scene conveys the shock that accompanied Wilkomirski’s every act 
of understanding; he is a child learning that making sense of things—“that’s how I learned”—is 
synonymous with serving as a target of assault. Wilkomirski offers no commentary on the scene; 
he leaves it to the reader to supply the outrage.
 22. Binjamin Wilkomirski, Bruchstücke: Aus einer Kindheit 19391948 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Erste Auflage, 1995), 8. Subsequent references are included, in square brackets, in the body of 
this text.
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frozen moat bend to form an enclosure that intensifies the aura of safety, 
as does the mention of the moat, a defense against incursion. Wilkomir-
ski’s sensation of floating affirms that he feels suspended yet secure in this 
enveloping atmosphere.
 The sustaining environment of the skating scene is echoed in a sec-
ond early scene in which Wilkomirski and his brothers have escaped 
from Riga and are staying in a farmhouse in the Polish forest: 
I can still see it exactly:
 We were all sitting around the table in the main room, and for some 
reason I was crying. Motti, my eldest brother, stood up and bent over me. 
His face was full of love and concern, his broad back curved down over 
me like a great safe shield, and I listened to his comforting voice. (389)
Even though Wilkomirski is in distress, here, as in the sledding scene, he 
is protected. Paralleling the position of the trees in the first scene, his 
brother bends over him; his voice envelops Wilkomirski, providing an 
experience of security. This landscape mirrors what Winnicott describes 
as the holding environment, by which he designates both the physical 
holding of the infant and also the complete and sustaining environment 
in which the infant exists before it achieves a sense of separateness and 
a relation to time and space.23 Wilkomirski writes of the latter scene of 
holding: “But this picture is quickly scared off by other ones, dark and 
suffocating, which push into my brain and won’t let go” (378). The pic-
tures that intervene are “like a wall of solid black between me and the 
sparkling and the sun” (378). The contents of the displacing images are 
terrifying, but given that they form a wall, they may also perform a sta-
bilizing function, by preventing something from entering Wilkomir-
ski’s consciousness. The very need to wall off the “pictures” of holding 
suggests that whatever associations accrue to them are more threaten-
ing than the “dark and suffocating” ones that intervene. He writes, “For 
the first time, the feeling of deathly terror in my chest and throat, the 
heavy tramp of boots, a fist that yanks me out of my hiding in a place 
under the covers at the bottom of the bed and drops me onto the floor-
boards in the middle of an otherwise unfurnished little room” (378). This 
scene is one of destroyed security that represents a reversal of the earlier 
holding environment: Wilkomirski is violently pulled from beneath the 
 23. D. W. Winnicott, “The Theory of the Parent–Infant Relationship,” in The Maturational 
Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development, 37–55.
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covers of the bed—another holding environment—and made to witness 
the murder of his father, whom soldiers force to march outside, where 
he is placed against a wall and then crushed by a truck. Having witnessed 
this scene, Wilkomirski writes,
I’m sad and very afraid because he turned away from me, but I feel that 
he didn’t do it because he doesn’t love me anymore [ich fühle, dass er es 
nicht tat, weil er mich nicht mehr liebt]. His own upset must have been too 
much for him, and he only turned away because something unknown 
was even stronger than he was.
 All at once I realize:
 From now on I have to manage without you, I’m alone [ich bin 
allein]. (379–80) [10]
This passage focuses less on the barely described event of the father’s 
murder, euphemistically presented as a turning away, than on its impact. 
The doubly negative form of the first sentence suggests the considerable 
psychic energy Wilkomirski must muster to defend against acknowledg-
ing his feelings of rejection: allowing himself to experience his father’s 
death in this way would subject him to “feelings of disharmony and 
discontinuity.”24 Read in this light, the recognition that he is alone can be 
understood as an assertion of his survival (captured in the “I am” of the 
statement) in the face of abandonment, as well as a broadcasting of a per-
sisting psychological condition: in the presence of others, Wilkomirski 
feels alone. The significance of this state cannot be overestimated; “alone” 
is the final word of his text:
I wrote these fragments of memory to explore both myself and my earli-
est childhood; it may also have been an attempt to set myself free. And I 
wrote them with the hope that perhaps other people in the same situa-
tion would find the necessary support and strength to cry out their own 
traumatic childhood memories, so that they too could learn that there 
really are people today who will take them seriously, and who want to 
listen and to understand.
 They should know that they are not alone. (496)
Intimacy, the alternative to solitude, might endanger Wilkomirski by 
making him susceptible to acting out the emotions he feels about his 
 24. Prager, “Healing from History,” 413.
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father’s death. Alone, he can externalize these emotions in narrative, that 
is, symbolize them, and, as we will see, in so doing, symbolically turn 
them against himself. The text captures this movement of displacement 
and reversal though a corresponding metaphorical turn: the literal child 
of the early scenes of holding metamorphoses into the figure of a bun-
dled child. The figure recurs in a number of scenes which, when read in 
relation to one another, represent the progressive obliteration from Wil-
komirski’s memory of the early holding experience and, more emphati-
cally, of the gratification associated with that security.
 The symbolic bundle first appears in an episode in a Polish train sta-
tion where, after the war, Wilkomirski waits to travel to a Swiss orphan-
age. He writes, “I sat in a corner on a bench, clutching my bundle, though 
I had no idea what was inside it” (386). An iteration of the bundled self 
of the sledding scene, the bundle Wilkomirski clings to, reflects his desire 
to retain something of that early connectedness; his ignorance of the con-
tents of the package, read as a figure of that experience, suggests Wilko-
mirski’s estrangement from the possibility of connection. By the time he 
has reached the orphanage, he has lost the bundle, which loss measures 
his increasing repression of the experience of holding.
 The next memory in which a bundle appears is of a concentration 
camp. Wilkomirski is trying to amuse a guard:
First he grabbed hold of my hand, we danced around in a circle, and 
he laughed. It sounded funny and rough, but that was just while he was 
laughing the angriness out of himself. Then he gave a great swing and 
lifted me onto his shoulders and I rode him like King David on his snow-
white horse. We galloped faster and faster in circles and I was so happy, 
I couldn’t even describe it: he’d been all angry, and now he was playing 
our games with us . . .
 But suddenly he began to run crazily straight ahead, and I got fright-
ened. He broke through the circle of amazed children, running for the 
wall that marked off our playground, took tighter hold of my feet, lifted 
me up over his head, and came to a stop for a moment at the wall. He 
was still holding on to my feet in the air and I flew forward like a loose 
bundle [wie ein haltloses Bündel], clean over his head, until my forehead hit 
the stone. That’s when he let go of me and went away. (387) [20]
As blood drips from his head, Wilkomirski thinks: “This is how it’s going 
to be, forever and ever, until everything’s dripped out of me, and then 
I’ll be dead” (388). The sledding scene’s aura of security, symbolized by 
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the bundling of the child, is transformed here into its life-threatening 
opposite: to be held like a bundle is now synonymous with becoming 
the object of murderous intent. The life-threatening “game” Wilkomirski 
plays with the guard recalls and negates his former feelings of security: 
the guard who tortures him is the ghostly embodiment of his brother, 
the guardian who once protected him. Reading the scene as an exten-
sion of the preceding one, we can understand the stone wall that Wil-
komirski hits his head against as a materialization of the “black wall” 
that had blocked his access to the earliest memories and as such, as an 
image of Wilkomirski’s solidifying self-estrangement. To summarize: this 
scene reverses the sledding scene, negating the early pleasures of security. 
It renders the symbolic mental wall as material barrier, thereby staging 
what is required for Wilkomirski to survive the loss of his father, or more 
precisely, to tolerate his reaction to that loss: the walling-off or repres-
sion of his feeling. It could be said that the description of his bleeding 
as a “dripping out” of “everything” attests to the force of his repression: 
Wilkomirski lives, but only to the extent that his affective life bleeds out 
of him.
 The next scene involving a bundle occurs on an evening when “two 
bundles [zwei schwere Bündel],” each containing a small child, are anony-
mously tossed into a camp barracks (428) [66]. Wilkomirski writes that 
he had never before seen such small children up close; he is shocked to 
notice their black, frostbitten fingers. The following morning the children 
are dead and their fingers white. With sadness and bitterness, an older boy 
explains to Wilkomirski that the infants had gnawed their fingers to the 
bone. The boy’s emotionality surprises Wilkomirski. He, by contrast, feels 
“a sense of superiority” because of the hardness of his bones in compari-
son to the babies’ fragility (429). These infants, as symbolic doubles of 
Wilkomirski’s vulnerable self, trigger a defensive indifference and nar-
cissistic self-satisfaction, necessary for Wilkomirski to remain intact and 
self-continuous.25
 The final scene involving a bundle reiterates Wilkomirski’s “flight” 
and near-death at the hands of the guard. This version takes trauma to 
the extreme of annihilation. In the scene, a female prisoner leads Wilko-
mirski into a warm room, presumably the camp laundry, and conceals 
 25. For a discussion of the image of the freezing bundles in terms of the “tenuous survival 
of affect” (156), see Mary Jacobus’s inspired reading of the text in relation to Ferenczian and 
Kleinian theories of trauma; Mary Jacobus, “Border Crossings: Traumatic Reading and Holocaust 
Memory,” in Psychoanalysis and the Scene of Reading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
124–62. 
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him beneath a pile of rags. SS men come to ferret out the other hidden 
children in the room, but they do not discover Wilkomirski. As Wilko-
mirski watches from his hiding place,
Two small, wriggling bundles [Zwei kleine, zappelnde Bündel] were pulled 
out by large hands; the noise got louder again, more yelling from the 
boots, then a big swing and the bundles flew clear across the room, all 
spread out in the strangest way as if they were trying to flap their wings, 
through the window, and out.
 Silence for a second—and in the silence, from outside, twice over the 
unmistakable sound of breaking skulls. (455) [95]
One of the prisoners orders Wilkomirski to run outside to a new hid-
ing place. As he does so, he sees the “two bundles [die beiden Bündel], still 
lying there, or rather, what was left of them” (456) [97]. Echoing the 
earlier passage in which his own head was bleeding, he writes that he 
is afraid of slipping in the “mass of yellow, sticky-shiny stuff [that] had 
flowed out and was splashed against the wall, on the ground, and right 
across the path” (457). Wilkomirski recalls his response to witnessing the 
murders: “I often reproach myself, I can’t understand how I could have 
felt nothing for the little ones back then. Although I was just a child 
myself, was I already so brutalized that there was nothing left in me, 
no sympathy, no pity, not even anger?” (458). In the face of paralyz-
ing resemblance—“I was just a child myself ”—Wilkomirski is indiffer-
ent to the children’s plight; this indifference can be read as an assertion 
or marking of his difference from them, a marking that is necessary to 
defend against the memory of his earlier bundled self. The phrase “not 
even anger” could be understood as a disavowal of the very emotion that 
abandonment elicits in Wilkomirski.
 The text contains a litany of such self-reproaches. To begin with, Wil-
komirski feels responsible for the murder of a child who was brought 
to the barracks and who didn’t understand the laws of daily life. When 
the boy began to cry loudly, because he needed to relieve himself, no 
one but Wilkomirski spoke up. Knowing that the guards would kill all 
of the children if even one were screaming, but also that they would kill 
whoever soiled his bed, Wilkomirski tells the child, “‘Just go in the straw, 
right where you are’” (423). The next day the boy was murdered for hav-
ing done so. Wilkomirski thinks afterward, “I’m guilty, I’m a murderer. If 
it hadn’t been for me, it wouldn’t have happened” (426). When, after the 
war, a woman asks Wilkomirski if he wants to go to Switzerland with 
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her, he hears himself answer that he does, even though a voice inside his 
head is telling him that he does not want to go. He thinks, “I felt as if I’d 
been defeated, disgraced. I was going to go away, all secretly, just go, leav-
ing the rest of them in this mess. I could feel the guilt like a lump in my 
throat” (384). Elsewhere he ponders,
Why had I, in particular, survived? I hadn’t earned that right. I had 
brought too much guilt on myself for that.
 I had handed over the new boy; I was inextricably caught up in the 
fact of his death. It was only because I was a coward that they killed the 
new boy. I might perhaps have been able to save him, and I didn’t do 
anything.
 I had betrayed my mother and now called a stranger [his foster 
mother] “mother.”
 I had given up the search for my brothers out of a fear of discovering 
the truth.
 I had deserted the colors, and abandoned my friends in the orphan-
age in Kraków to their fate. I was sitting here in safe, stuffed Switzerland. 
I had food, I had clothes, while they were under the stamp of Stalin in 
Poland, and still belonged among the unwanted. (490–91)
Killing, betrayal, desertion: crimes that bespeak the force of Wilkomirski’s 
inadmissible and displaced anger, now transformed into self-accusation. 
In a sense these self-accusations, especially that of desertion, are accurate; 
in point of fact the adult Wilkomirski is unresponsive to the vulnerability 
of those closest to him, whom psychologically he abandons when they 
are most vulnerable. For example, when his wife is giving birth to his 
son, even though he desires to “be there with her, to support her,” the 
actual delivery paralyzes him (444). Seeing his son’s crowning head, he 
writes, “I didn’t know how much dark hair a newborn baby can have. I 
wasn’t ready for this little half-head of hair. All I could do was stand still 
and stare at it, and once again, like an echo from before, I heard the ring-
ing and crackling noise in my chest” (444). The “echo from before” is a 
reference to an earlier scene in a concentration camp when, while sitting 
outside of a barracks, Wilkomirski had witnessed a rat emerge from the 
side of a female corpse. This sight confused and disoriented him, because 
he had been told that children come out of their mother’s belly. Wilko-
mirski recollects, “I open my mouth to scream, in shock and fear, but 
nothing comes out of my throat. It feels as if my gullet is being squashed 
into my chest, and I hear a noise deep inside me, a sort of ringing and 
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crackling, like something fragile being stepped on” (443). The “ringing 
and crackling, like something fragile being stepped on” can be read as 
symbolic of the traumatic rupture of Wilkomirski’s psychic borders, as 
can the following passage: “Everything inside me comes loose and seems 
to flow away; I flow away along with my blood and vomit in the bright, 
muddy runnels of water, down the street of the camp to wherever the 
runnels peter out” (444). The perceived distinction between Wilkomirski 
and the rats collapses when he sees one of those “deadly enemies of the 
little children in the camp” climb out of the female corpse (443). He 
thinks, “Mother, mama, my mama, what have you done?” (443). If moth-
ers give birth to “the enemy” rat, so Wilkomirski reasons, he must also 
be a rat; in other words, he must be his own enemy. Hence his answer 
to one question—“Am I a rat or a human?”—is to pose another: “I’m 
a child—but am I a human child or a rat child, or can you be both at 
once?” (444).
 Wilkomirski’s self-interrogation goes to the heart of his trauma: in 
the aftermath of abandonment, he is “both at once,” which is to say, both 
the human offspring of his father and mother and the raging enemy of 
his father. Remaining human requires that he destroy his raging rat self. 
This is precisely what the structural logic of Fragments’ rhetorical figures 
accomplishes: it performs a symbolic self-murder through the sequential 
transformations of the metaphorical figure of the bundle.
 As Wilkomirski’s perception of his wife and son as enemies suggests, 
there are limits to the power of symbolization to contain threatening 
emotion. This is also evident in Wilkomirski’s description of what hap-
pens after his son’s delivery:
I must have looked pretty bad as I left the birthing room. I walked down 
the long corridor, past the open dayroom where the nursing sisters were 
sitting having coffee and eyeing me curiously and giggling.
 As I went out into the open air, their mocking commentary still rang 
in my ears.
 They had been murmuring something about men—and weaklings 
who had no stomach for things. (444)
It is impossible to know whether the nuns’ scorn was real or imagi-
nary. What is evident, though, is that this scene derives its impact from 
its being yet another instance of a recurrent dynamic whereby Wilko-
mirski sees himself as a victim of assault. He falls into this very pattern 
on his book tour. Arthur H. Samuelson, Fragments’ American publisher, 
76  Chapter Four
reported that everywhere they went, Wilkomirski cried. Samuelson told 
Wilkomirski that if he didn’t stop the crying, he’d send him home.26 Wil-
komirski’s tears of grief elicit a punitive response—threatened abandon-
ment—thereby recreating the trauma of loss.
 It is tempting to see Wilkomirski as unconsciously soliciting the 
attacks upon him and to recognize the text as having been fabricated 
for this very reason. Consider the following: Wilkomirski’s critics were 
not the first to identify the fictional antecedents to Fragments; Wilko-
mirski was. He openly discussed the important influence of Kosinski’s 
The Painted Bird upon him.27 As is well known, critics accused Kosinski 
of conflating fact and fiction. In calling attention to Kosinski, Wilkomir-
ski thus opened the door for his critics to accuse him of the same thing. 
Moreover, in a university lecture titled “Childhood Memory as Histori-
cal Source,” Wilkomirski dropped an important textual hint about the 
psychological origins of his text (247): 
[O]ne should investigate every traumatic memory to whatever extent 
possible to see if it is about the original traumatization. It has been 
observed that an unbearably painful memory will later be covered over 
with a less onerous memory that apparently cannot be penetrated. This 
only happens when both memories are bound together in some the-
matic or emotional way. The hermetic layering of a traumatic memory 
by a second, less onerous memory is an especially common self-defense 
mechanism of children (screen memory). (250)
Wilkomirski invokes the concept of screen memory as an explanatory 
model for the emergence of his traumatic childhood Holocaust memo-
ries. He would have his listeners understand that these memories lay 
buried beneath less painful ones. But it is only a short step from his dis-
cussion of screen memories to Freud’s writing on the topic, with which 
Wilkomirski was probably familiar. Freud’s account of the origins of 
screen memories differs in significant ways from Wilkomirski’s. Freud’s 
therapeutic experience led him to conclude that some memories from 
childhood do not originate in a person’s early years but are representa-
tions of more mature impressions and thoughts that have been projected 
back in time and distorted. When this happens, later adult experiences 
 26. Gourevitch, “The Memory Thief,” 51.
 27. Maechler discussed Kosinski with Wilkomirski, as did Lappin. Maechler, The Wilkomirski 
Affair, 351n82. 
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appear to be memories of events from childhood, but in reality they are 
not. Freud writes,
It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all from 
our childhood; memories relating to our childhood may be all that we 
possess. Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they 
were but as they appeared at the later periods when the memories were 
aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as 
people are accustomed to say, emerge; they were formed at that time. And a 
number of motives, with no concern for historical accuracy, had a part in 
forming them, as well as in the selection of the memories themselves.28
Such memories represent mental experiences that the mind has placed 
in a childhood setting “[f]or the sake of its innocence.”29 This aura is 
necessary, according to Freud, because of the tendentious nature of the 
material hidden behind screen memories. The screen memories “serve 
the purposes of the repression and replacement of objectionable or dis-
agreeable impressions. It follows, therefore, that these falsified memories 
too, must have originated at a period of life when it has become pos-
sible for conflicts of this kind and impulsions towards repression to have 
made a place for themselves in mental life.”30 As “falsified memories,” 
screen memories are thus defensive constructions that arise in response 
to a struggle between unconscious desires and the ego’s resistance to 
their becoming conscious. Freud goes on to say that the very conflicts 
and desires of later life, which are projected back into childhood and 
expressed as screen memories, are phantasies.31 Commenting on a particu-
lar screen memory of one of his analysands, Freud writes that it emerged 
when the man “projected . . . two phantasies on to one another and made 
a childhood memory of them”; he continues, “people often construct 
such things unconsciously—almost like works of fiction.”32
 28. Sigmund Freud, “Screen Memories,” in vol. 3, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psy-
chological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1962), 
322 (italics in original). The temporal relation between the screen memory and the repressed 
material may vary; for the purpose of thinking about Fragments, the category of “retrospective 
or retrograde” displacement that Freud describes is especially relevant. In this mode of displace-
ment, the content of the explicit memory derives from early childhood, while the unconscious 
thought processes that comprise the essential subject matter of the memory derive from a later 
stage. Sigmund Freud, Psychopathology of Everyday Life, 44.
 29. Ibid., 317.
 30. Ibid., 322.
 31. Ibid., 315 (my italics).
 32. Ibid.
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 In giving a public lecture on the nature of childhood memory, Wil-
komirski was pointing to the very text—Freud’s essay—that could lead 
to the inference that his own memoir was one of those very unconscious 
constructions that are “almost like works of fiction.” Freud’s thinking 
enables us to appreciate Fragments as a screen memory, that is, a phantasy 
that serves to defend against Wilkomirski’s becoming conscious of con-
flicts emerging from a later period of his life.
 It seems that Wilkomirski all but invited his critics to attack him. 
The indefensibility of his position rendered him unable to do anything 
more than accuse his critics of creating a “‘poisonous’ atmosphere of 
‘totalitarian judgment and criticism,’” a comment that indicates how 
the controversy was a replaying of his imagined Holocaust victimization 
in which they (rather than he) were the aggressors.33 At the same time, 
his assumed attitude of self-defense may have afforded relief from the 
conflict between his feelings of aggression and the internal resistance it 
triggered.34
 The “memory of the offense” as defense against present internecine 
psychic warfare is what may well have resonated with the experiences 
of Holocaust survivors.35 To the extent that they, too, are vulnerable to 
self-division and internal attack, the performativity of Wilkomirski’s nar-
rative, enforced by Wilkomirski’s behavior, may have brought into relief, 
and brought relief from, the lengths to which the embattled survivor will 
go to sequester the emotions smoldering within.
 33. Carvajal, “A Holocaust Memoir in Doubt.”
 34. Without concluding that Wilkomirski unconsciously sought this result, Jay Geller notes 
that the primary source of Wilkomirski’s suffering is the “actual or anticipated refusal by others 
to hear and believe” his story (361). “The Wilkomirski Case: Fragments or Figments?” American 
Imago 59, no. 3 (2002): 343–65.
 35. For an exploration of this topic, see Primo Levi, “The Memory of the Offense,” in The 
Drowned and the Saved, 23–35.
Imre Kertész was born in Budapest on November 9, 1929. In 
1944 he was deported to Auschwitz and then sent to Buchen-
wald. He spent one year as a prisoner, returning after liberation to 
Hungary, where he worked as a journalist until he was dismissed 
by his newspaper in 1951 “after it aligned itself with the Com-
munist Party.”1 He served in the military for two years before he 
began to support himself through his writing and by translating 
German texts into Hungarian. Presently he lives in Budapest and 
Berlin.
 In 1975 Kertész published his first novel, Fateless, which in 
2004 was retranslated into English as Fatelessness. In the novel’s 
opening pages Gyorgy Koves, a fourteen-year-old Hungarian boy, 
spends a final day with his father, who has been called to labor 
service. Gyorgy’s parents are divorced, and, in obedience to his 
father’s wish, Gyorgy plans to remain with his stepmother rather 
than returning to live with his mother. But he never puts his plan 
into effect, because shortly after his father’s departure, Gyorgy 
is picked up on the streets of Budapest and sent to Auschwitz, 
where he is held for three days; he is then transported to Buch-
enwald and on to Zeitz. During his internment, Gyorgy’s physical 
 1. “Imre Kertész—Biography,” Nobelprize.org, June 18, 2010, http://nobelprize.
org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2002/kertesz.html.
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and mental condition deteriorates to the point that he becomes a Musel-
mann, but he survives nevertheless. After a year of camp imprisonment 
he is liberated. Before he returns home, he has a series of jarring, alienat-
ing conversations with strangers and former neighbors about his experi-
ences in the camps, and these reveal a fundamental tension between the 
way in which he views his persecution and the way in which his com-
munity resists his view. In speaking with his neighbors, he learns that his 
father has died in Mauthausen and that his stepmother has remarried. 
The novel concludes with Gyorgy’s anticipating that his mother is await-
ing his return with joy and with plans for his future.
 Kertész began writing Fatelessness in 1955; it was published nineteen 
years later.2 When it finally appeared in Hungary, it was greeted with 
“compact silence,”3 which one critic attributed to a perception of the 
novel as “a cynical provocation, a book about the Holocaust that refused 
to wear the accepted robe of victimhood; it declared everyone, perpetra-
tors and victims, had taken their own steps towards their future.”4
 Jeffrey Prager focuses on the negative social implications of the recep-
tion Gyorgy receives upon returning to Budapest, arguing that it attests 
to the community’s failure to participate in Gyorgy’s healing process:
George seems to know intuitively what is required to be mentally 
healthy: remembering, not forgetting; memories that do not return sub 
rosa to undermine one’s own sense of the continuity of life, of a sense 
of oneself moving forward into a creative and productive future, of an 
ability to experience, whatever his or her fate, happiness. Yet he is also 
prescient: recognizing the precariousness of his quest for mental health 
among those that cannot understand his experience as he lived it.5
According to Prager, it is the community’s responsibility to provide a 
“corrective emotional experience” in the present, analogous to the ana-
lyst’s relationship to the analysand.6 When it fails to do so, the survivor 
suffers further traumatization. That is why, according to Prager, trauma 
describes the failure of members of the community to contain against 
disappointment the memorial experience of the person. In this sense, 
 2. Julian Evans, “A Man Apart,” Books, Guardian.co.uk, April 22, 2006.
 3. “Imre Kertész—Biography.”
 4. Evans, “A Man Apart.”
 5. Prager, “Healing from History,” 414.
 6. Ibid., 413.
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psychological trauma is both a disease of the contemporary moment as 
well as a social one, when an individual’s capacity to engage the world 
presently and orient herself autonomously to the future is insufficiently 
enabled by the environment. When these conditions prevail, memory 
intrudes and a traumatic past dominates.7
Prager reads Gyorgy’s conversations directly after his liberation with the 
people of his community as forecasting a future bereft of the societal sup-
port necessary for the working-through of his traumatic memories. As 
a result, Gyorgy will be forced to forget his past; “[i]ntrusive memories 
or flashbacks may instead prevent his moving forward into a creative and 
productive future.”8
 Prager lays out the crucial social component of the survivor’s recov-
ery from trauma, and he emphasizes how the absence of a support-
ive community in itself constitutes a contemporary iteration of trauma. 
Departing from Prager’s analysis, my question concerns how the novel 
itself conceives of the community’s role in Gyorgy’s process of healing. 
Is Gyorgy’s relationship with the witnessing community comparable to 
the relation between analysand and analyst as Prager suggests? In view 
of the importance of dialogue in the healing process as Prager discusses 
it, what are we to make of the fact that most, if not all, of the novel 
consists of dialogue—not dialogue between Gyorgy and others, but dia-
logue occurring within Gyorgy’s mind? Even the direct quotations of 
his exchanges with others are embedded in larger narrative paragraphs 
that subordinate them to the cohesive framework of Gyorgy’s thought 
process. As such, the novel could be viewed as a continuous internal dia-
logue that incorporates the voices of others. I understand this structure 
as indicating Gyorgy’s attempt, through the creation of a dialogical tes-
timonial narrative, to reestablish both the intersubjective borders of his 
identity as well as the intrapsychic borders that Freud discusses in terms 
of primal repression.9 Perhaps only through such a marking of borders 
will Gyorgy will be able to regain the autonomy destroyed in the camps, 
where the voice of the other was indistinguishable from the threat of 
annihilation.
 7. Prager, “Jump-Starting Timeliness,” 233.
 8. Prager, “Healing from History,” 415.
 9. Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis write, “Anticathexis is the sole mechanism of primal 
repression”; and while the nature of this anticathexis is not identifiable, it probably derives from 
archaic experiences of rupture, “the breaking through of the protective shield against stimuli.” 
The Language of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1973), 334.
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 A scene in the novel that marks a turning point in Gyorgy’s survival 
in the camps exposes the mortal threat posed to the Holocaust victim 
by a relation that knows no borders. Forced to carry cement bags on 
his back, Gyorgy accidentally drops one of the bags. A camp supervi-
sor, “not . . . an SS serviceman . . . but . . . a yellow-overalled member 
of a more shadowy semimilitary ‘Todt’ organization,” witnesses this and 
proceeds to beat Gyorgy and to make him lick up the spilled powder.10 
Swearing at Gyorgy and then dragging him to his feet, he is determined 
to “teach” Gyorgy a lesson (169):
 
From then on, he personally loaded a new bag onto my shoulders each 
time it was my turn, bothering himself with me alone; I was his sole 
concern, it was me exclusively whom he kept his eye on, following me 
all the way to the truck and back, and whom he picked to go first even 
if, by rights, there were others still ahead of me in the queue. In the end, 
there was almost an understanding between us, we had got the measure 
of one another, and I noticed his face bore what was almost a smile of 
satisfaction, encouragement, even, dare I say, a pride of sorts, and from a 
certain perspective, I had to acknowledge, with good reason, for indeed, 
tottering, stooping though I might have been, my eyes seeing black spots, 
I did manage to hold out, coming and going, fetching and carrying, all 
without dropping a single further bag, and that, when it comes down to 
it, I would have to admit, proved him right. On the other hand, by the 
end of the day I felt that something within me had broken down irrepa-
rably; from then on, every morning I believed that would be the last 
morning I would get up; with every step I took, that I could not possibly 
take another; with every movement I made, that I would be incapable of 
making another. (169–70)
The Todt supervisor’s lesson is that even after the torture ends, the tor-
turer’s life-negating power remains active inside Gyorgy. It assumes the 
form of the broken-down “something within” that makes Gyorgy think 
each morning, step, and movement will be his last.
 In his Nobel Banquet speech, Kertész conceives of the survivor as a 
contributor to society who has his own lesson to teach:
The . . . survivor . . . asks the question: what is he bequeathing, what is 
his spiritual legacy? Has he enriched human knowledge with his tale of 
 10. Imre Kertész, Fatelessness, trans. Tim Wilkinson (New York: Vintage International, 2004), 
168. Subsequent references are included in the body of this text.
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suffering? Or has he only born witness to the unimaginable degradation 
of the human being, in which there is no lesson, and which ought to be 
forgotten as quickly as possible?
 . . . if you now ask me what still keeps me here on this earth, what 
keeps me alive, then, I would answer without any hesitation: love.11
Kertész’s comment suggests that we read his novel not as a gratuitous 
depiction of “unimaginable degradation” but as an enriching bequeathal 
of a “spiritual legacy.” How then can we understand Fatelessness as Ker-
tész’s legacy and as an indication of his enduring capacity for love? This 
is the question I will take up in what follows, arguing that the specifically 
dialogical structure of Kertész’s representation of his past transforms the 
degradations depicted on the level of plot into a narrative about a liv-
able future, and it does so by marking and crossing certain internal and 
external borders.
 Before he became a writer, Kertész was visited not by a literary but 
by an “existential” inspiration. In his Nobel Lecture he asks,
Why do we write? Here, too, I was lucky, for it never occurred to me that 
when it came to this question, one had a choice. I described a relevant 
incident in my novel Failure. I stood in the empty corridor of an office 
building, and all that happened was that from the direction of another, 
intersecting corridor I heard echoing footsteps. A strange excitement 
took hold of me. The sound grew louder and louder, and though they 
were clearly the steps of a single, unseen person, I suddenly had the 
feeling that I was hearing the footsteps of thousands. It was as if a huge 
procession was pounding its way down that corridor. And at that point I 
perceived the irresistible attraction of those footfalls, that marching mul-
titude. In a single moment I understood the ecstasy of self-abandonment, 
the intoxicating pleasure of melting into the crowd—what Nietzsche 
called, in a different context though relevantly for this moment too, a 
Dionysian experience. It was almost as though some physical force were 
pushing me, pulling me toward the unseen marching columns. I felt I had 
to stand back and press against the wall, to keep me from yielding to this 
magnetic, seductive force.
 I have related this intense moment as I (had) experienced it. The 
source from which it sprang, like a vision, seemed somewhere outside of 
me, not in me. Every artist is familiar with such moments. At one time 
 11. Imre Kertész, “Banquet Speech,” Nobelprize.org, June 18, 2010,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2002/kertesz-speech.html.
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they were called sudden inspirations. Still, I wouldn’t classify the experi-
ence as an artistic revelation, but rather as an existential self-discovery. 
What I gained from it was not my art—its tools would not be mine 
for some time—but my life, which I had almost lost. The experience 
was about solitude, a more difficult life, and . . . the need to step out of 
the mesmerizing crowd, out of History, which renders you faceless and  
fateless.12
In this visionary moment, Kertész gains an insight into himself that 
appears to originate in the outside world, a discovery via indirection, of 
his “faceless” self. Kertész links his facelessness to a loss of individuality 
and personal destiny resulting from the impersonal operations of “His-
tory” upon him. There is also a more intimate experience associated with 
being fateless and faceless: that of shame, which, as the following passage 
indicates, is closely related to the interruption of Kertész’s connection 
to his past. Kertész continues, “To my horror, I realized that ten years 
after I had returned from the Nazi concentration camps, and halfway still 
under the awful spell of Stalinist terror, all that remained of the whole 
experience were a few muddled impressions, a few anecdotes. Like it 
didn’t even happen to me, as people are wont to say.”13 A decade after 
liberation, Kertész’s past had become inaccessible to him: he had forgot-
ten most of it, and what he remembered he was dissociated from—his 
memories seemed not to belong to him: “[l]ike it didn’t even happen.” 
Kertész links his sense of loss to the forgotten traumatic events and to the 
feelings those events later give rise to.
 “[S]peaking of the twenty minutes spent on the arrival platform of 
the Birkenau extermination camp—the time it took people clambering 
down from the train to reach the officer doing the selecting,”14 Kertész 
writes,
I more or less remembered the twenty minutes, but the novel demanded 
that I distrust my memory. No matter how many survivors’ accounts, 
reminiscences and confessions I had read, they all agreed that everything 
proceeded all too quickly and unnoticably [sic]. The doors of the railroad 
cars were flung open, they heard shouts, the barking of dogs, men and 
women were abruptly separated, and in the midst of the hubbub, they 
 12. Imre Kertész, “Nobel Lecture—Literature 2002,” Nobelprize.org, June 18, 2010, http://
nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2002/kertesz-lecture-e.html.
 13. Ibid.
 14. Ibid.
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found themselves in front of an officer. He cast a fleeting glance at them, 
pointed to something with his outstretched arm, and before they knew it 
they were wearing prison clothes.
 . . . I came upon a series of photographs of human cargo arriving 
at the Birkenau railroad platform—photographs taken by an SS soldier 
and found by American soldiers in a former SS barracks in the already 
liberated camp at Dachau. I looked at these photographs in utter amaze-
ment. I saw lovely, smiling women and bright-eyed young men, all of 
them well-intentioned, eager to cooperate. Now I understood how and 
why those humiliating twenty minutes of idleness and helplessness faded 
from their memories. And when I thought how all this was repeated the 
same way for days, weeks, months and years on end, I gained an insight 
into the mechanism of horror; I learned how it became possible to turn 
human nature against one’s own life.15
The parallels between the past and his present situation enabled Ker-
tész to understand the disappearance of “their”—read: his—humiliating 
memories. Of living in socialist Hungary, he writes, “I saw how an entire 
nation could be made to deny its ideals, and watched the early, cautious 
moves toward accommodation. I understood that hope is an instrument 
of evil, and the Kantian categorical imperative—ethics in general—is but 
the pliable handmaiden of self-preservation.”16 The evocative present his-
torical moment set Kertész on the path of “discovering”—rather than 
remembering—his prior experience of accommodation. In an interview 
he stated,
I don’t see a difference between autobiography and fiction. When I begin 
to narrate what happened to me, it already becomes something different 
than what actually happened. It begins to develop a shape. My memories 
change and so do I. The writer is really a deceiver: He narrates what he 
experienced and changes in the process. Through this exchange of mat-
ter between himself and reality he frees himself from injuries that others 
carry around with themselves for life.
 To survive the concentration camp, I must follow its logic. This vol-
untary or involuntary collaboration is the biggest shame of the survi-
vor; he cannot admit it. The writer can. For literature possesses a special 
honesty. Those are simply good sentences, you know. Good sentences 
 15. Ibid.
 16. Ibid.
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are more important in this case than my own shame. Fatelessness is not a 
cheerful novel, but I experienced much joy while writing it.17
Kertész’s description of his shame as an “injury” recalls the breakdown 
Gyorgy suffers when the gaze of the SS’s man becomes installed within 
him. Insofar as shame is an internal iteration of this hostile external rela-
tion, it reveals the virulence of the hostile other, which produces new 
versions of itself long after the literal cessation of persecution. The 
exchange of matter between the writer and reality, which is a translation 
of “Stoffwechsel [metabolism],” indicates that Kertész’s well-constructed 
sentences do not heal his “wound” of shame so much as “free” him from 
it by changing its location through externalization, the very process that 
also characterized Kertész’s “existential self-discovery.”
 In what follows I will trace how Kertész’s narrative unfolds in three 
stages, each of which represents a distinct form and moment of exter-
nalization. Taken together, they chart the trajectory of Gyorgy’s progress 
toward successful metabolization of his shame. As we will see, when con-
sidered in relation to shame, the novel indicates the power of symbolic 
forms of expression to contain the survivor’s self-subverting emotions in 
ways that will enable Gyorgy to satisfy his preeminent need to regain his 
autonomy and to establish bonds of love.
 J. Hillis Miller points out the “disjunction [in the novel] between the 
language of the experiencing I and the language of the narrating I.”18 
 17. Jörg Plath, “Mein Leben ist eine Fiktion,” Der Tagesspiegel, October 10, 2006, http://
www.tagesspiegel.de/kultur/mein-leben-ist-eine-fiktion/761282.html, my translation.
  Ich sehe keinen Unterschied zwischen Autobiografie und Fiktion. Wenn ich 
anfange zu erzählen, was mir passiert ist, wird es schon etwas anderes als das, was 
wirklich passiert ist. Es beginnt, eine Form zu entwickeln. Meine Erinnerungen 
verändern sich und ich mich auch. Der Schriftsteller ist eigentlich ein Täuscher: 
Er erzählt das Erlebte und verändert sich dadurch. Durch diesen Stoffwechsel 
mit der Wirklichkeit befreit er sich von Verletzungen, die andere ein Leben lang 
mit sich herumtragen.
  Wenn ich im Konzentrationslager überleben will, muss ich seiner Logik fol-
gen. Diese willentliche oder nicht willentliche Kollaboration ist die größte 
Schande des Überlebenden, er kann sie nicht eingestehen. Der Schriftsteller 
kann es. Denn die Literatur besitzt eine besondere Aufrichtigkeit. Das sind 
einfach gute Sätze, wissen Sie. Gute Sätze sind in diesem Fall viel wichtiger 
als meine eigene Schande. Der „Roman eines Schicksallosen“ ist kein heiterer 
Roman. Aber er hat mir beim Schreiben sehr viel Freude gemacht.
 18. J. Hillis Miller, “Imre Kertész’s Fatelessness: Fiction as Testimony,” in After Testimony: The 
Ethics and Aesthetics of Holocaust Narrative for the Future, ed. Jakob Lothe, Susan Rubin Suleiman, 
and James Phelan (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2012). 
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This disjunction is temporal. It implies the existence of a gap or delay 
between Gyorgy’s experiencing of the events and the time of their nar-
ration. In what I designate as the first stage of Gyorgy’s metabolizing 
narrative, Gyorgy restricts the focus of his “narrating I” to the immedi-
ate present, that is, to the time of the events as they are occurring. In 
other words, the “narrating I” comes as close as possible to merging with 
the “experiencing I,” which enables it to avoid reflecting upon the later 
emotional impact of those experiences. This flight into the past aligns 
the narrative perspective with the temporality of the narrated events. As 
was also the case in Wilkomirski’s text, the focus on the past is a means 
of avoiding present emotional conflicts that are the by-products of past 
trauma. At the same time, the draining of affect from the scene brings 
into view what is not named: the cutting of ties to one’s fellow humans 
that in retrospect becomes a source of shame.
 This first stage of externalization is characterized by dissociation and 
spans the time before and during Gyorgy’s persecution. It exemplifies 
the defensive response to traumatic events that Judith Herman has ana-
lyzed in her study of survivors of trauma. Herman writes that through 
dissociation,
[e]vents continue to register in awareness, but it is as though these events 
have been disconnected from their ordinary meanings. Perceptions may 
be numbed or distorted, with partial anesthesia or the loss of particular 
sensations. . . . The person may feel as though the event is not happening 
to her, as though she is observing from outside her body, or as though 
the whole experience is a bad dream from which she will shortly awaken. 
These perceptual changes combine with a feeling of indifference, emo-
tional detachment, and profound passivity in which the person relin-
quishes all initiative and struggle.19
Gyorgy relates the events leading to and during his incarceration stripped 
of all affect but the feeling of wanting to avoid feeling. In this sense his 
narrative captures the dissociation by which Gyorgy survived the indi-
vidual moments that made up the continual trauma of his persecution. 
At the same time, the disassociation Herman identifies as a response to 
trauma as it occurs has implications for the trauma of the aftermath as Prager 
has analyzed it. Specifically, the absence of reflection by Gyorgy’s “narrat-
ing I” upon the “experiencing I” can be read as illustrating not only the 
 19. Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 42–43.
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defense mechanism that enabled Gyorgy to survive traumatization as it 
was occurring, but also the erasure of the affect of shame that develops 
when past situations are perceived through the lens of the present.20
 Consider, for example, Gyorgy’s account of the day and evening 
before his father’s departure for labor service, when neighbors and fam-
ily members, including Gyorgy’s paternal grandparents, come to say their 
good-byes to Gyorgy’s father. Gyorgy describes his stepmother’s expres-
sions of grief: “She even moved a hand in my direction, and I half feared 
that she might perhaps be wanting to hug me. She didn’t do so in the 
end, just let out a deep sigh, with a long, tremulous release of breath. I 
noticed her eyes moistening as well. It was awkward. After that, I was 
allowed to go” (4). Gyorgy confines his description to his stepmother’s 
physical actions and reactions, divorcing them from their emotional con-
tent, which he clearly does not want to register. He also does not indi-
cate what role he might have played in discouraging his stepmother from 
reaching out to him. He narrates the farewell scene between his father 
and himself with a similar detachment:
I found myself enfolded between his arms, his hug catching me off guard 
and somehow unprepared after all he had said. I don’t know if my tears 
stemmed from that or simply from exhaustion, or maybe even because, 
ever since the first exhortation that I had received that morning from 
my stepmother, I had somehow been preparing all along to shed them 
unfailingly; whatever the reason, it was nevertheless good that this was 
indeed what happened, and I sensed that it also gratified Father to see 
them. (26)
Gyorgy’s tears become a springboard for intellectualization. He specu-
lates on their occasioning circumstances, which could be his psychologi-
cal state of lowered defensiveness (“his hug catching me off guard”); his 
physiological condition (“exhaustion”); or his predilection for defensive 
anticipation (“I had somehow been preparing”). Judging his tears is also 
a mediating activity, because judgment itself is an intellectual act and 
because it enables him to assume what he imagines to be his father’s 
point of view. Each of these responses enables Gyorgy to divorce himself 
emotionally from his father’s departure as it is occurring. His need to do 
so is urgent; it trumps his desire for his father. Of the time when his father 
 20. This is the very experience of forgetting that Kertész described in relation to situations 
such as the photographed Selektion.
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strokes his head, he writes, “At that touch, for the first time today, some-
thing choked in my throat too, though it was not tears, more a kind of 
queasiness. I would have rather my father had no longer been here” (15).
 Commenting on his grandfather’s behavior, Gyorgy notes, “What 
stayed with me as maybe the strangest experience of that entire evening 
was Grandfather’s sole act to draw attention to himself when he pressed 
his tiny, sharply defined bird’s head for no more than an instant, but 
really fiercely, almost crazily, to the breast of my father’s jacket. His entire 
body was racked by a spasm” (24). Comparing his grandfather’s actions 
to those of a bird and restricting his focus to his grandfather’s physical 
movements creates a distancing effect. Nevertheless, that the scene stays 
with Gyorgy in spite of his attempt to emphasize its “strangeness” indi-
cates that there is something too familiar about it; it hits too close to 
home. Try as he may, Gyorgy fails to titrate all of his emotion from the 
scene: the diminutive, “tiny,” expresses Gyorgy’s perception of his grand-
father’s vulnerability, while the disparity between the grandfather’s physi-
cal size and the spasms that grip him intimate Gyorgy’s awareness of a 
depth of anguish that is reinforced through the verb “rack,” which indi-
cates that his grandfather’s reaction has both a physical and an emotional 
component. Although the grandfather’s emotions contrast with Gyorgy’s 
detachment, the repetitions within the two scenes of farewell invite a 
reading of the grandfather as Gyorgy’s symbolic other: both are small, 
and both are analogously positioned in relation to the father. Viewed in 
terms of Gyorgy’s efforts to dissociate from his potentially incapacitating 
emotions, the intensity of the grandfather’s reaction can be understood as 
a displacement of Gyorgy’s own unacknowledged despair over his father’s 
departure.
 To summarize, the dissociated narrative tone of the above passages 
registers both the emotional jockeying that Gyorgy performs at the time 
of his father’s departure so as to avoid overwhelming and destabilizing 
despair, and his avoidance of the shame that later arose in relation to the 
memory of his earlier detachment from his father and others.
 As Gyorgy’s survival becomes increasingly predicated upon the deaths 
of others, the potential for developing a belated sense of shame also 
increases. In the following scene, Gyorgy narrates his first exposure to 
death while on the train to Auschwitz. The opening sentence of the 
description literally names denial as Gyorgy’s method of surviving:
There is no denying that, from about the afternoon of the second day 
on, I . . . was constantly subjected to a particular voice coming from the 
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wagon behind us: not exactly pleasant. The old woman, so they said in 
our wagon, was ill and had presumably gone mad, undoubtedly from 
thirst. That explanation seemed credible. Only now did I realize how 
right were those who had declared at the very start of the journey how 
fortunate it was that neither small infants nor the extremely elderly had 
landed up in our wagon. The old woman finally fell silent on the morn-
ing of the third day. Among our lot, it was said at the time that she had 
died because she could get no water. But then, we were aware that she 
was also sick and old, which is how everyone, including me, found the 
case understandable, all things considered. (74–75)
Avoiding emotional response, Gyorgy describes the trauma of the wom-
an’s death in physical terms: he cannot shut it out; it invades him aurally. 
His use of understatement—it was “not exactly pleasant”—opens a mar-
gin of psychological distance between the woman and himself. As in the 
scene of his father’s departure, he intellectualizes his reaction, construing 
her death as “proof ” of the wisdom of his fellow passengers and from 
it extracting reassurance that his own powers of reason have remained 
intact. Representing the woman’s death as a logical outcome also shifts 
the focus away from Gyorgy himself; he can avoid thinking about the 
imminent threat he is under, for like the woman, he too is in danger of 
being driven mad from thirst. The anxiety that the woman’s death trig-
gers in Gyorgy nevertheless registers in his euphemistic description of it 
as a “falling silent,” words that also egocentrically construe the death in 
terms of the relief it affords him. He had reacted similarly to the woman’s 
vocalizing of anguish, thinking only of his own good fortune in there 
being no children or elderly people present in his wagon.
 Throughout his descriptions of his father’s departure and the fellow 
train passenger’s death, Gyorgy projects an image of himself as relatively 
invulnerable; others are more immediately imperiled than he. Later in the 
novel, when he has been taken to the camp infirmary, he must protect 
himself from the recognition that he directly profits from the death of 
another prisoner. Of the moment when Gyorgy was lying in the bunk 
beside a boy whose feverish body is warming him, he writes,
I was less enchanted with all his tossing and turning during the night, 
which, to be sure, did not always pay adequate consideration to my 
wounds. I told him as well: Hey! Cut it out, ease up there, and in the 
end he heeded the advice. I only saw why the next morning, when my 
repeated attempts to rouse him for coffee were futile. All the same, I  
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hastily passed his mess tin to the orderly along with my own . . . I later 
also accepted his bread ration on his behalf, and likewise his soup that 
evening, and so on for a while, until one day he began to go really 
strange, which was when I felt obliged finally to say something, as I could 
not carry on stowing him in my bed. (182)
Gyorgy never openly acknowledges that the boy’s death prolonged 
his own survival; instead he construes the death as having occurred in 
response to his own wishes: “I told him . . . [c]ut it out, ease up there, and 
in the end he heeded the advice.” Accepting the bread “on his behalf ” 
dissimulates the fact that Gyorgy profits from the death; indeed, the 
phrase connotes the contrary: that he is acting in the boy’s interest. Gyor-
gy’s representation of himself effectively as a nonwitness to the deaths of 
the old woman and the boy in the infirmary thus enables him to dissoci-
ate from a potentially self-consuming guilt about having survived instead 
of others.
 He has a more difficult time dissociating when his own body is 
invaded by agents of death. Of the time he was lying on a bunk with 
suppurating wounds on his hip and knee, he writes,
Still, the biggest surprise of all was the consternation, then horror, of feel-
ing a sudden tickling sensation on my hip and then, on lifting the paper 
bandage, seeing they [the lice] were now on my open flesh there, feed-
ing on the wound. I tried to snatch them away, get rid of them, at least 
root and winkle them out, compel them to wait and be patient at least 
a little bit longer, but I have to admit that never before had I sensed a 
more hopeless struggle or a more stubborn, even, so to say, more brazen 
resistance than this. After a while, indeed, I gave up and just watched the 
gluttony, the teeming, the voracity, the appetite, the unconcealed happi-
ness; in a manner of speaking, it was as though it were vaguely familiar 
to me from somewhere. Even so, I realized that, to some extent, and tak-
ing everything into account, I could see it their way. In the end, I almost 
felt relieved, even my sense of revulsion very nearly passed. I was still not 
pleased, still remained a little bit bitter about it, understandably enough 
I think, but now it was somehow more generalized, without acrimony, 
in acquiescing to a degree in nature’s larger scheme, if I may put it that 
way; in any event, I quickly covered the wound up and subsequently no 
longer engaged in combat with them, no longer disturbed them. (183)
The horror of this scene is not only that Gyorgy is being eaten alive, but 
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that he feels and sees that he is being eaten alive. The feel and sight of 
the infested wound is horrifying, because it reminds him of his helpless-
ness as a victim and also of the hopelessness of his situation. When he 
gives up struggling against the vermin and instead just watches them, the 
spectacle is “vaguely familiar,” which suggests that he sees an image of 
himself in the vermin. This may be because the spectacle mirrors his own 
dehumanizing struggle to survive, which, as has been discussed, requires 
that Gyorgy, like the vermin, feed off other prisoners’ lives. In this sense 
the spectacle reveals to Gyorgy a divided image of himself; he is both 
victim and victimizer, wound and vermin. I understand the “bitterness” 
that remains as a sign of the difficulty he has dissociating from feelings of 
anger and shame because of this division. In this regard Gyorgy’s cover-
ing of his wound is emblematic of the performative impact of Fatelessness, 
insofar as the text “covers” the injury of Kertész’s emotions by displacing 
them into a narrative about a fictional other.
 Also while in the infirmary where he discovers his vermin, Gyorgy 
finds himself in the position of owing the continuation of his life to the 
death of another boy. An orderly substitutes the other boy for Gyorgy 
when Gyorgy has been summoned, presumably to be murdered because 
his injury will make it impossible for him to participate in the evacua-
tion of the camp on foot. Gyorgy rationalizes the situation by invoking 
an abstract ideal: “it had all happened in due accord with justice (that 
was my opinion, at any rate), as I had been longer in the room, after all” 
(233).
 Toward the end of the novel, the concentration camp is liberated, and 
Gyorgy sets off for his home in Budapest. With liberation, “something 
loosened up inside,” as a result of which he becomes more reflective than 
he could be as a prisoner (236). Once he reaches the city, he begins to 
describe his camp experiences to the people who engage him in con-
versation. In the course of these conversations, it becomes evident that 
with this “loosening up,” the feelings that emerge in relation to his fresh 
memory of his persecution threaten to hamper his successful return to a 
place in the community.
 In his first exchange, Gyorgy is mostly reactive. He responds to a 
Holocaust denier’s queries about the gas chambers. The man dictates the 
terms in which Gyorgy speaks about his experience. Given that he holds 
his first conversation with a stranger, it is understandable that Gyorgy 
does not challenge the man’s point of view. As a result, the man easily 
extracts from Gyorgy the confirmation he seeks that the gas chambers 
didn’t exist.
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 In the next discussion, Gyorgy’s engagement deepens. The name of 
his first destination symbolically indicates that his coming home will 
necessarily involve memory and commemoration: he goes to Forget-me-
not Road, where the family of Bandi Citrom, his friend from the camps, 
lives. At the family’s apartment, Bandi’s mother and sister tell Gyorgy that 
Bandi has not returned from the camps. Only Bandi’s mother believes 
that Bandi has survived; his sister does not. Through the conversation 
it becomes clear that Gyorgy does not want to alienate or wound his 
interlocutors. Before speaking, Gyorgy first evaluates what he imagines 
Bandi’s family members to be feeling and what he imagines they want 
to hear from him. For example, when he notices the sister struggling to 
contain her fears about Bandi’s death, he is about to tell her that in his 
view her mother “had the clearer head, she knew Bandi Citrom better,” 
but he “h[olds his] tongue” (245).
 Riding a streetcar to his apartment building, Gyorgy next meets 
a journalist who engages him in extended conversation. The journal-
ist, “his face brightening,” tells Gyorgy, in reference to his persecution, 
“‘[T]he main thing is that it’s over, in the past’” (247). For Gyorgy it is 
not over. When asked what he feels about being back in his hometown, 
he responds, “‘Hatred [toward] . . . Everyone’” (247). Gyorgy’s willingness 
to converse and his mindfulness about the impact of his words on oth-
ers indicate his desire to return to his community. At the same time, on 
the threshold of his return, the hatred he feels marks a new iteration of 
his shame. Hatred signifies the self ’s connection to something outside of 
itself, and for this reason, it is more bearable than the destabilizing, intra-
subjective conflict that characterizes shame. According to Melvin Lansky, 
feelings of aggression such as hatred can be the outcome of a process of 
projective identification and can enable shame to be avoided:
Projective identification is instigated by the awareness, conscious or 
unconscious, of imminent or actual shame. An important function of 
projective identification, though by no means the only one, is that it is 
a mechanism that can in fantasy relocate one’s shame and pain to the 
other, in the conscious or unconscious conviction that this will rid one 
of the problem. This aspect of projective identification consists, then, of 
a reversal, a turning of the tables, a reversal instigated by an incipient or 
actual experience of shame. Putting shame into the shamer is a common 
defensive maneuver and a significant component of vengefulness.21
 21. Melvin Lansky, “The Impossibility of Forgiveness: Shame Fantasies as Instigators of 
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Lansky’s elaboration of the mechanism of projective identification as a 
response to shame is useful in understanding the surfacing of hatred in 
Gyorgy. Projective identification comprises the second of the three stages 
of the externalization of Gyorgy’s shame, and it informs his discussion 
with the journalist. In an effort to unburden himself of his shame, Gyorgy 
projects it outward, now displacing his inner conflict into the relation 
between the journalist and himself. Though the journalist tries to estab-
lish solidarity with Gyorgy by expressing his appreciation of the fact 
that Gyorgy had endured the “‘hell of the camps,’” Gyorgy rejects such 
a characterization of his experience (248). In his view what happened 
to him was “natural” (247), meaning a piece of experience he could not 
disclaim by describing it in heightened metaphors. The journalist persists 
in seeing the camps as an aberration: “‘a concentration camp in itself is 
unnatural,’” he maintains (247, italics in original). This prompts Gyorgy 
to recognize that “there are some things you just can’t argue about with 
strangers, the ignorant, with those who, in a certain sense, are mere chil-
dren so to say” (248). In spite of this observation, Gyorgy continues to 
“argue” with this stranger: 
I tried to explain how different it was, for example, to arrive in a not 
exactly opulent but still, on the whole, agreeable, neat, and clean station 
where everything becomes clear only gradually, sequentially over time, 
step-by-step. By the time one has passed a given step, put it behind one, 
the next one is already there. By the time one knows everything, one has 
already understood it all. And while one is coming to understand every-
thing, a person does not remain idle: he is already attending to his new 
business, living, acting, moving, carrying out each new demand at each 
new stage. Were it not for that sequencing in time, and were the entire 
knowledge to crash in upon a person on the spot, at one fell swoop, it 
might well be that neither one’s brain nor one’s heart would cope with 
it. (249)
While listening to Gyorgy, the journalist fishes in his pocket for his ciga-
rettes and offers one to Gyorgy, who refuses it; then, “having taken two 
deep drags, he set both elbows on his knees and leaned his upper body 
forward, not so much as looking at me, as he said in a somehow lackluster, 
flat tone, ‘I see’” (249). The journalist’s smoking, his physical doubling-
Vengefulness in Euripides’ Medea,” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 53, no. 2 
(2005): 457–58.
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over, and the draining of affect from his voice express the defensiveness 
that Gyorgy’s words have triggered. Gyorgy notices the journalist’s dis-
tress but still persists. He next describes what survival entailed for those 
prisoners who had been in the camps for many years:
I had seen prisoners who had already been—or to be more accurate 
were still—in concentration camps for four, six, even twelve years. Now, 
those people somehow had to fill each one of those four, six, or twelve 
years, which in the latter case means twelve times three hundred and 
sixty-five days, which is to say twelve times three hundred and sixty-five  
times twenty-four hours, and twelve times three hundred and sixty- 
five times twenty-four times . . . and so on back, every second, every 
minute, every hour, every day of it, in its entirety. From yet another 
angle, though, I added, this is exactly what can also help them, because if 
the whole twelve times three hundred and sixty-five times twenty-four 
times sixty times sixtyfold chunk of time had been dumped around their 
necks instantaneously, at a stroke, most likely they too would have been 
unable to stand it, either physically or mentally, in the way they actually 
did manage to stand it. (250)
The journalist remains stricken. “At this, still in the same position as ear-
lier, only now instead of holding the cigarette, which he had meanwhile 
discarded, with his head between his hands and in an even duller, even 
more choking voice, he said: ‘No, it’s impossible to imagine it’” (250). Of 
the time he spent observing the journalist’s reaction, Gyorgy writes, “For 
my part, I could see that [it was impossible to imagine the situation], and 
I even thought to myself: so, that must be why they prefer to talk about 
hell instead” (250). In an effort to compose himself reminiscent of Gyor-
gy’s own reliance on parsing time, the journalist “straightened up, looked 
at his watch, and his expression changed” (250). He also tells Gyorgy that 
that he works for a “‘democratic paper,’” as if to assert his absence of 
involvement in Gyorgy’s victimization (250).
 Although Gyorgy recognizes the journalist as one of the naïve and 
ignorant who are incapable of understanding the experiences of the vic-
tims, the fact that Gyorgy persists in arguing with him may signify that 
he is in the throes of projecting his “shame into the shamer.”22 Gyorgy 
does not intentionally set out to do this, but his overwhelming of the 
journalist’s imagination suggests that unconsciously this is what is occur-
 22. Ibid.
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ring. And while he does not derive perceptible gratification from the 
exchange, he also does not shy away from the opportunity it presents.
 An earlier scene in the novel anticipates this means of displacing 
shame onto the shamer. Of the moments spent passing through a 
bombed-out city along the Elbe River where the inhabitants are exist-
ing among the ruins, Gyorgy writes, “I tried to take pleasure at that sight, 
naturally, only I could not help being made to feel—by the selfsame 
people—somewhat uneasy at doing so” (240). Though he attributes the 
check on his gratification to the inhabitants themselves, given that they 
are passive objects of his gaze, his uneasiness must be an expression of 
an inner inhibition against acting on his vengeful impulse. As such, this 
scene reveals the internal conflict that now hampers Gyorgy’s return to 
his community: on the one hand, he seeks to unburden himself of his 
shame through projective identification; on the other hand, he is unable 
to sustain his objectifying displacement onto others, because it alienates 
him from the very community he needs.
 After leaving the journalist, Gyorgy returns to his former apartment 
building, where he meets two neighbors. The men tell him about his 
father’s death in Mauthausen and his stepmother’s recent marriage. In a 
manner reminiscent of the journalist’s, they urge him to “‘put the hor-
rors behind [him]’” so that he can move on with his life (256). As in his 
conversation with the journalist, Gyorgy does not accept their character-
ization of his experience or their advice to him. He remarks that in the 
camps he “didn’t notice any atrocities,” a comment that emphasizes the 
disparity between the immediacy of his lived reality and the abstractness 
of their characterization of that reality as filled with “atrocities” (256).
 When the neighbors express their incomprehension at Gyorgy’s 
reaction, Gyorgy responds by asking about what they did during those 
“‘hard times.’” They answer that they “‘tried to survive,’” which prompts 
Gyorgy to point out that “[t]hey too had taken one step at a time” (257). 
He illustrates his point about their survival by referring to the physical 
stepping of the prisoners during the selection process at Auschwitz:
For each train—and I am not saying it was always necessarily this num-
ber, since I have no way of knowing—but at any rate in our case you 
have to reckon on around three thousand people. Take the men among 
them—a thousand, let’s say. For the sake of the example, you can reckon 
on one or two seconds per case, more often one than two. Ignore the 
very first and very last, because they don’t count; but in the middle, 
where I too was standing, you would therefore have to allow ten to 
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twenty minutes before you reach the point where it is decided whether 
it will be gas immediately or a reprieve for the time being. Now, all this 
time the queue is constantly moving, progressing, and everyone is taking 
steps, bigger or smaller ones, depending on what the speed of the opera-
tion demands. (257)
As in his conversation with the journalist, Gyorgy narrates these events 
from a perspective that enables him to assert his agency: the past consists 
of a series of steps he had taken in a larger “operation” in which he par-
ticipated. But what distinguishes this dialogue from the first one is that 
Gyorgy converses with people who had been a part of his life before his 
deportation. Whereas in conversation with the journalist he acknowl-
edged his hatred in general terms, his accusations are now focused and 
personal. He tells his former neighbors,
[E]very one of those minutes might in fact have brought something new. 
In reality it didn’t, naturally, but still, one must acknowledge that it might 
have; when it comes down to it, each and every minute something else 
might have happened other than what actually did happen, at Auschwitz 
just as much as, let’s suppose, here at home, when we took leave of my 
father. (258)
Gyorgy first introduces the question of blame in a hypothetical formula-
tion—“let’s suppose”—and also includes himself among those who had 
facilitated his father’s capture. As he continues, his conclusions become at 
once more universal and more targeted:
I could no longer be satisfied with the notion that it had all been a 
mistake, blind fortune, some kind of blunder, let alone that it had not 
even happened . . . I made it clear to them that we can never start a new 
life, only ever carry on the old one. I took the steps, no one else, and 
I declared that I had been true to my given fate throughout. The sole 
blot, or one might say fly in the ointment, the sole accident with which 
they might reproach me was the fact that we should be sitting there 
talking now—but then I couldn’t help that. Did they want this whole 
honesty and all the previous steps I had taken to lose all meaning? Why 
this sudden about-face, this refusal to accept? Why did they not wish 
to acknowledge that if there is such a thing as fate, then freedom is not 
possible? If, on the other hand . . . there is such a thing as freedom, then 
there is no fate . . . that is to say, then we ourselves are fate. . . . It was 
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impossible, they must try and understand, impossible to take everything 
away from me, impossible for me to be neither winner nor loser, for me 
not to be right and for me not to be mistaken that I was neither the 
cause nor the effect of anything; they should try to see, I almost pleaded, 
that I could not swallow that idiotic bitterness, that I should merely be 
innocent. (259–61)
Gyorgy’s hatred has given way to “bitterness” that he now wants to 
avoid, indicating a shift in his attitude.23 Regarding himself as having 
been “innocent” in the past would mean holding his mother, his neigh-
bors, and his entire community responsible for not having protected him 
from victimization, a view Gyorgy does not want to entertain. Hence the 
modulation of hatred into “bitterness,” an indication of Gyorgy’s refusal 
to engage in a dynamics of blame and of his desire to achieve a stance 
of openness toward the very social body he needs to rejoin. Given this 
emotional shift, we can understand Gyorgy’s comment about his one 
reproachable act—having had this conversation in the first place—as a 
reflection of his desire to move into a position of even greater open-
ness so as to shield others from accusation and himself from isolating 
bitterness.
 Initially one of the men understands that Gyorgy’s accusations origi-
nate out of his need to unburden himself. He restrains the other neigh-
bor (called Uncle Steiner as a term of familiarity though he is not 
Gyorgy’s blood relation) from taking Gyorgy’s words as an affront. Of this 
moment, Gyorgy writes: “I saw that every now and then Uncle Steiner 
was about to interrupt or elsewhere about to jump to his feet, but I 
saw the other old man restraining him, heard him saying, ‘Leave him 
be! Can’t you see he only wants to talk? Let him talk! Just leave him 
be!’” (259). Notwithstanding his desire to control his vengeful feelings, 
the ensuing conversation demonstrates how they still dominate him: the 
inclusive and equivocal “we” of the passage above gives way to an overtly 
accusatory “they” in the passage below. Once Gyorgy intimates that the 
neighbors were accessories to his and his father’s deportation, their for-
bearance ends. He tells them:
They too had taken their own steps. They too had known, foreseen, 
everything beforehand, they too had said farewell to my father as if 
 23. The bitterness also echoes the feeling that remains when his wound was infested with 
vermin. In that scene he was also struggling to dissociate his shame and anger.
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we had already buried him, and even later on all they [the neighbors] 
had squabbled about was whether I should take the suburban train or 
the bus to Auschwitz. . . . At this point not only Uncle Steiner but old 
Fleischmann as well jumped to his feet. Even now he was still striving 
to restrain himself, but was no longer capable of doing so: “What!” he 
bawled, his face was red as a beetroot and beating his chest with his fist: 
“So it’s us who’re the guilty ones, is it? Us, the victims!” (260)
Fleishmann, initially the most understanding of the two neighbors, now 
also loses control; his face reddens and he begins pounding his chest, 
an equivocal gesture that could signify a self-flagellation or a displaced 
impulse to accost Gyorgy. Seeing that “they did not wish to understand 
anything” Gyorgy leaves, “in the midst of a few disjointed words and 
motions, one more unfinished gesture and incomplete utterance from 
each,” all of which are signs of a traumatization reminiscent of the jour-
nalist’s reaction to Gyorgy’s description of survival (261).
 Recognizing the influence of shame on Gyorgy’s interactions adds 
an intrasubjective dimension to the “contemporary moment” of trauma 
that Prager identifies with the community’s failure to provide support. 
Shame attests to the presence of the other within Gyorgy, in the form of 
his conscience, which belatedly judges—and condemns—his past actions 
according to standards that derive from the present. This second stage 
of the metabolization of shame, characterized by its conversion through 
projective identification into hatred, thus pits Gyorgy against the very 
community he wants to rejoin, and therefore, against himself.
 If Fatelessness had concluded with Gyorgy’s conversations with the 
members of the community, the foregoing discussion of shame and its 
transformation into hatred would affirm the pessimism that critics iden-
tify with the authorial perspective as regards Gyorgy’s future. But the 
novel continues for a few paragraphs, and in so doing inaugurates a third 
stage in the metamorphosis of Gyorgy’s shame, one that intimates the 
possibility of a more hopeful future. Leaving his former apartment build-
ing, Gyorgy observes,
Down below I was greeted by the street. I needed to take a streetcar to 
my mother’s place, but now it dawned on me that I had no money of 
course, so I decided to walk. In order to gather my strength, I paused 
for a minute. . . . Over ahead, in the direction that I would need to take, 
where the street appeared to lengthen, expand, and fade away into infin-
ity, the fleecy clouds over the indigo hills were already turning purple 
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and the sky, a shade of claret. Around me it was as if something had 
changed: the traffic had dwindled, people’s steps had slowed, their voices 
become quieter, their features grown softer, and it was as if their faces 
were turning toward one another. (261)
As Gyorgy beholds the view, he endows it with extension and dynamism: 
the street appears to continue forever, the colors of the clouds and the 
sky are in transition, and there is a general appearance of change. The 
movement in this spectacle reflects Gyorgy’s dawning sense of time as 
slowing and of the future as opening. The thinning of the traffic and the 
slowing pace of the pedestrians could also be seen as figuring a psycho-
logical expansion.
 D. W. Winnicott characterizes such visions as instances of “creative 
apperception” which “more than anything else . . . makes the individual 
feel that life is worth living.”24 According to Winnicott, this approach 
to external reality is not confined to the aesthetic realm; it is a universal 
practice of relating to the external world. It “is present when anyone—
baby, child, adolescent, adult, old man or woman—looks in a healthy way 
at anything or does anything deliberately.”25 Projecting himself into the 
spectacle before him enables Gyorgy to “gather [his] strength”; it also cre-
ates the impression that the world is receptive to him: the street “greet[s]” 
him. Most crucially, Gyorgy’s vision of people who look “as if their faces 
were turning toward one another” can be understood as a projection 
onto the people he observes of his own desire for recognition. Appearing 
as Gyorgy is about to find his mother, the turning of faces toward one 
another brings to mind Winnicott’s exploration of the significance of 
the mother’s face as the first thing the baby sees when it begins to look. 
According to Winnicott, in looking at her face, the baby sees not her 
face, per se, but itself. Functioning as a mirror for the baby, the face of the 
mother who has adapted well enough to her infant’s needs “reflects what 
is there to be seen” because, when “the mother is looking at the baby 
what she looks like is related to what she sees there.”26 This means that for 
the infants, who, in this early period of life, do not differentiate between 
themselves and their mother, the experience of looking is a means of 
“getting back what they are giving.”27 Though Gyorgy’s conversations 
with the journalist and the neighbor reveal how the community cannot 
 24. D. W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality (New York: Routledge Classics, 2005), 87.
 25. Ibid., 92.
 26. Ibid., 151–58 (italics in original).
 27. Ibid., 151. 
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function as his mirror, his capacity to become enlivened by viewing the 
street may be what saves him from himself, insofar as viewing reflects 
back to him, in a containing form, what he is giving. The scene suggests 
how, through creative apperception, Gyorgy externalizes potentially desta-
bilizing emotions in a nonthreatening perceptual exchange; it is Gyorgy’s 
(as yet) unmet desire for recognition that colors his perception of the 
faces turning toward one another. Given this, we could say that creative 
apperception affords psychic relief by expressing, at a distance, Gyorgy’s 
unfulfilled desire. Before setting out to find his mother, he makes one 
final observation:
Yes, as I looked around this placid, twilit square, this street, weather-
beaten yet full of a thousand promises, I was already feeling a grow-
ing and accumulating readiness to continue my uncontinuable life. My 
mother was waiting, and would no doubt greatly rejoice over me. I rec-
ollect that she had once conceived a plan that I should be an engineer, a 
doctor, or something like that. No doubt that is how it will be, just as she 
wished; there is nothing impossible that we do not live through naturally, 
and keeping a watch on me on my on my journey, like some inescapable 
trap, I already know there will be happiness. For even there, next to the 
chimneys, in the intervals between the torments, there was something 
that resembled happiness. Everyone asks only about the hardships and 
the “atrocities,” whereas for me perhaps it is that experience which will 
remain the most memorable. Yes, the next time I am asked, I ought to 
speak about that, the happiness of the concentration camps.
 If indeed I am asked. And provided I myself don’t forget. (262)
This concluding paragraph of the novel indicates that the future may 
well hold happiness. Gyorgy’s “growing readiness” to move forward 
results from his ability to apperceive creatively. In the pause before he 
takes his next step, he sees a square “full of a thousand promises.” Con-
sidered together, the above two reflective interludes of looking, which 
themselves are like the pauses between Gyorgy’s steps of accommoda-
tion, raise the possibility that in the aftermath of survival, Gyorgy may be 
able to “[retain] something personal, perhaps secret, that is unmistakably” 
himself, while complying with the demands of external reality.28 That 
Gyorgy recognizes the compatibility of accommodating to his mother’s 
 28. D. W. Winnicott, Home Is Where We Start From: Essays by a Psychoanalyst (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1986), 43.
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wishes and to “that inescapable trap” of happiness lends support to the 
notion that creative apperception can create a secret, containing space for 
dissociated emotions.
 The following passage reveals how the creation of this space of dif-
ference within Gyorgy now enables him to play host to nonthreatening 
others. Gyorgy muses,
It was that peculiar hour, I recognized even now, even here—my favorite 
hour in the camp, and I was seized by a sharp, painful, futile longing for 
it: nostalgia, homesickness. Suddenly, it sprang to life, it was all here and 
bubbling inside me, all its strange moods surprised me, its fragmentary 
memories set me trembling. Yes, in a certain sense, life there had been 
clearer and simpler. Everything came back to mind, and I considered 
everyone in turn, both those who were of no interest as well as those 
whose only recognition would come in this reckoning, the fact that I 
was here. (261)
Gyorgy’s very existence—“the fact that I was here”—comprises the 
“only recognition” of the dead: the woman on the train, the two boys in 
the infirmary, and even, perhaps, his father. In this regard it could be said 
that creative apperception makes it possible for Gyorgy to preserve the 
memory of others’ deaths within himself. By the same token, his recogni-
tion of the dead is a “reckoning” that is not synonymous with mourning. 
Because Gyorgy’s very survival was an untenable reckoning—the loss of 
another’s life was his gain—mourning is foreclosed, insofar as it would 
require that Gyorgy retrospectively confront his shame about his collu-
sion, under duress, in those deaths. The alternative to mourning is thus to 
keep the dead alive inside of himself: “Suddenly, it sprang to life, it was all 
here and bubbling inside me.” This makes Gyorgy a living site of death 
with an internal custodial bond to the dead.
 The opening of a memorial site of death within Gyorgy, enabled 
through creative apperception, reveals something about the relationship 
between Kertész’s shame and his writing. An elaborated form of creative 
apperception, writing is not an antidote, but a strengthening supplement, 
to shame. The creation of a fictional other in Gyorgy enables Kertész to 
distance himself from his shame so that he can recognize the deceased, 
who would otherwise vanish.
 In his Nobel Banquet speech Kertész draws upon a figure from Greek 
mythology to characterize his relation to his past in terms that indicate 
an image of himself as a living site of death. He states, “I have seen the 
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true visage of this dreadful century, I have gazed into the eye of the Gor-
gon, and have been able to keep on living. Yet, I knew I would never be 
able to free myself from the sight; I knew this visage would always hold 
me captive.” It can be no accident that Kertész invokes, to characterize 
his condition, the very image that Primo Levi uses to describe the pris-
oners who died in spirit before their bodies died. Levi writes that the 
Muselmänner “saw the Gorgon.”29 But whereas Levi insists that either they 
“have not returned to tell about it or have returned mute,”30 Kertész’s 
self-portrait indicates that, even after gazing into the eye of the Gorgon, 
he was “able to keep on living.” His words suggest not that he avoids the 
metamorphosis into stone, but rather that his awareness of the deadly 
transformation he undergoes paradoxically enables him to outlive it. His 
survival is thus a question of knowledge: “Yet, I knew I would never be 
able to free myself from the sight; I knew this visage would always hold 
me captive” (my italics).
 Whereas Levi invokes the myth of the Gorgon to signify the fur-
thest reaches of the victim’s desubjectification, emphasizing the gap that 
separates him as a survivor from the “true witnesses”—the Muselmänner—
Kertész’s reappropriation of the Gorgon myth simultaneously inflects it 
with an alternate self–other relation. Levi bears witness “in their stead,” 
that is, instead of the Muselmänner; Kertész, by contrast, conceives of him-
self as a living Muselmann. Kertész relates an occurrence that affirms the 
aptness of the image of himself as a living Muselmann. While Kertész 
was preparing his Nobel Prize Lecture, the director of the Buchenwald 
Memorial center sent him a copy of a daily report mistakenly listing 
“the death of Prisoner #64,921,” which was the number Kertész was 
assigned in the camps; about this erroneous announcement of his own 
death Kertész comments, “I died once, so I could live. Perhaps that is my 
real story. If it is, I dedicate this work, born of a child’s death, to the mil-
lions who died and to those who still remember them.”31 In the scene in 
which Gyorgy conceals the corpse in his bed, he executes to the letter 
what Levi describes in Survival in Auschwitz as the emblematic state of the 
Muselmann. Levi writes:
It is man who kills, man who creates or suffers injustice; it is no longer 
man who, having lost all restraint, shares his bed with a corpse. Whoever 
waits for his neighbour to die in order to take his piece of bread is, albeit 
 29. Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 83.
 30. Ibid., 83–84.
 31. Kertész, “Nobel Lecture—Literature 2002.”
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guiltless, further from the model of thinking man than the most primi-
tive pigmy or the most vicious sadist.
 Part of our existence lies in the feelings of those near to us. That is 
why the experience of someone who has lived for days during which 
man was merely a thing in the eyes of man is non-human.32
Levi’s “non-human” is Gyorgy, Kertész’s fictional other, whose very dis-
sociation from feelings of shame reflects his most human need to reas-
sume the place he lost in his community and to do so by becoming a 
living site of the dead.
 As a survivor of his encounter with the Gorgon, Kertész is a modern 
Perseus. Whereas Perseus could avoid the gaze of the Gorgon, Kertész 
could not, but he outlived his transformation nevertheless, existing as a 
man of stone. It could be said that the elegiac capacity of Kertész’s text, 
dedicated as it is to those who died, including Kertész himself, makes 
such an existence possible. In this regard, Italo Calvino’s commentary on 
Perseus is apt:
The relationship between Perseus and the Gorgon is a complex one and 
does not end with the beheading of the monster. Medusa’s blood gives 
birth to a winged horse, Pegasus—the heaviness of stone is transformed 
into its opposite. With one blow of his hoof on Mount Helicon, Pegasus 
makes a spring gush forth, where the Muses drink. In certain versions of 
the myth, it is Perseus who rides the miraculous Pegasus, so dear to the 
Muses, born from the accursed blood of Medusa. (Even the winged san-
dals, incidentally, come from the world of monsters, for Perseus obtained 
them from Medusa’s sisters, the Graiae, who had one tooth and one eye 
among them.) As for the severed head, Perseus does not abandon it but 
carries it concealed in a bag. . . . Here, certainly, the myth is telling us 
something, something implicit in the images that can’t be explained in 
any other way. Perseus succeeds in mastering that horrendous face by 
keeping it hidden, just as in the first place he vanquished it by viewing it 
in a mirror. Perseus’s strength always lies in a refusal to look directly, but 
not in a refusal of the reality in which he is fated to live; he carries the 
reality with him and accepts it as his particular burden.33
Like the concealing bag that Perseus keeps with him, Fatelessness per-
 32. Levi, Survival in Auschwitz, 171–72.
 33. Italo Calvino, Six Memos for the Next Millennium, trans. Esther Calvino (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 5.
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forms a holding function, containing within its pages a story steeped in 
the Medusan blood of dissociated shame. Calvino calls attention to the 
power that comes to Perseus precisely because he keeps the Medusa head 
with him: “When his enemies are about to overcome him, he has only 
to display it, holding it by its snaky locks, and this bloodstained booty 
becomes an invincible weapon in the hero’s hand.”34 A passage in Fateless-
ness, about Gyorgy’s detention before his deportation, reads as an allegory 
of the novel’s analogous apotropaic power. In the customs post where he 
is being held shortly after his arrest on the streets of Budapest, Gyorgy 
notices a few interesting faces. “One of them . . . did not join in the con-
versation, for instance, but instead merely read a book that, it seems, he 
just happened to have with him. He was a very tall, gaunt guy in a yellow 
windbreaker, with a sharp slit of a mouth stretching between two deep, 
ill-tempered-looking furrows in his bristly face” (47). The perpendicular 
lines of the man’s face in relation to the straight line of his mouth form 
the letter “U,” the signifier that Hungarian concentration camp prisoners 
wore on their chests. The symbolic letter, along with the man’s gauntness 
and his yellow jacket, reminiscent of the yellow badge Jews were made to 
wear, makes it likely that he is a figure or double of Kertész.35 When the 
prisoners are eventually marched out of the building, the man makes “a 
single long leap . . . he was off to the side, lost somewhere in the seething 
eddy of machines and humanity” (55). The allegorical author escapes to 
freedom, thanks to the Medusan book he possesses, which endows him 
with the ability to fend off his enemies. Read as a self-reflexive commen-
tary on Kertész’s relation to his writing, the scene represents the expres-
sive possibilities of fiction as enabling Kertész to carry the reality of his 
shame with him, to accept it as his particular burden. This, in turn, makes 
the future—and future love—possible, “somewhere in the seething eddy 
of machines and humanity.”
 34. Ibid. 
 35. This signifier later becomes an explicit topic of conversation, when an adult prisoner 
asks Gyorgy, “‘Do you know what this here,’ pointing to his chest, ‘this letter, [U] signifies?’ Sure 
I did, I told him: ‘Ungar, Hungarian.’ ‘No,’ he answered, ‘Unschuldig’ meaning ‘innocent,’ then gave 
a snort of laughter followed by prolonged nodding of the head with a brooding expression, as 
if the notion were somehow highly gratifying, though I have no idea why” (142–43).
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